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Abstract 
 
 
Research on the use of information technology (IT) in production in the developed 
world demonstrates that its impact on both economic growth and productivity has 
been substantial. Despite this, literature on the potential for India’s IT industry to 
bring about similar outcomes by selling IT within the country is resoundingly 
pessimistic. 
 
The most important finding of the research described here is that this outlook is far 
too gloomy. A newly assembled time series of the IT sector’s sales to Indian 
companies, or in other words the sector’s forward linkages, shows that these have 
been substantial for some time. Since 2005-06 they have also been growing 
significantly faster. An original econometric investigation into the impact of this 
ongoing investment finds significant increases in both total factor productivity and 
output in the firms and sectors that make up the sector’s domestic clients. 
 
These findings beg a question: If published analyses imply a dismal future for the IT 
sector’s forward linkages, why have domestic purchases from the sector, in fact, been 
growing so quickly? The research project included a programme of in-depth 
interviews undertaken in the field. This contributed another major finding. That is that 
IT has become appropriate for production in India as a result of a match between 
attributes of the technology and attributes of the country’s society and markets. 
 
The research described here was not limited to an investigation of the sector’s forward 
linkages. It also included an extensive survey of backwards and other linkages from 
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the sector to the rest of the Indian economy. The thesis concludes that these too are 
now substantial and that the IT industry can therefore be described as a leading sector.  
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Using this document 
 
Indian Financial Years 
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Indian Numbering System 
 
1 lakh = 100,000 = 100 thousand 
1 crore = 10,000,000 = 10 million  
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Data Tables 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Prologue: A parable about elves and shoes 
“As soon as it was midnight, there came in two little naked dwarfs; and they 
sat themselves upon the shoemaker’s bench, took up all the work that was cut 
out, and began to ply with their little fingers, stitching and rapping and tapping 
away at such a rate, that the shoemaker was all wonder, and could not take his 
eyes off them. And on they went, till the job was quite done, and the shoes 
stood ready for use upon the table. This was long before daybreak; and then 
they bustled away as quick as lightning.”  
Brothers Grimm, The Elves and the Shoemaker, (1912) 
 
Within the last three decades India has become a major exporter of information 
technology (IT) and associated services to the United States and other developed 
countries. Producing these IT exports involves creating and maintaining programs 
which have been specifically tailored for particular overseas client companies. The 
work is labour intensive and complex and, because of the time difference, is often 
done during the developed countries’ evening and midnight hours. Just like the elves 
in the story then, Indian software engineers use their specialised skills to produce 
bespoke products while their customers sleep. And just like the shoemaker’s new and 
wonderfully made shoes, Indian-produced IT is used in lands far, far away from the 
home of its producers. 
 
Until the end of the fairytale, when the shoemaker’s wife makes clothes for them, the 
elves remain both naked and shoeless. Their exquisite production makes the 
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shoemaker and his wife rich and puts beautifully finished shoes on the feet of many 
humans, but the elves and their kin receive no such boon. According to the accepted 
literature on the IT industry, this is also how it is in India. Throughout the already-
published chapters of the industry’s story, the finding is that India’s wider economy 
has not benefited from the sector’s existence. Indian IT firms have been equipping 
foreign firms with state-of-the-art technology while the majority of Indian firms have 
languished technologically. Some have attempted to arm themselves with IT, though 
without up-to-date technical advice or skilled personnel available in the IT industry, 
while others simply have not invested in IT at all. Apart from a relatively small group 
of IT workers and the companies that employ them, no one in India has become rich.  
 
In the end, fairytales always have a ‘happy ever after’. The research project described 
here finds that the same may be true in India. Indian firms are beginning to purchase 
IT from the country’s own IT industry and this is enhancing both their productivity 
and output. On top of that, production of the industry’s inputs is creating jobs and 
improving opportunities amongst low-skilled and disadvantaged workers. Together, 
these effects are having a noticeable impact on national-level output. In other words, 
IT in India no longer benefits only far-away firms in distant lands. It also now benefits 
the Indian economy and Indian people. 
 
The next section is a brief outline of the theoretical concepts used to tell this emerging 
story.  
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1.2 The theory: Linkages, leading sectors, and development 
The idea that expansion in a particular sector could play a key role in a developing 
country’s wider economic growth was first put forward in Albert Hirschman’s (1958) 
The Strategy of Economic Development. He begins with a section entitled “The search 
for a Primum Mobile” (p. 1) which lays out the theory’s foundations by arguing that, 
in a developing country, the most important step in creating or recreating a period of 
growth is to find “something” to start or restart it. Hirschman makes this case with a 
simple observation: As more and more empirical work and theorising is undertaken, 
the list of factors, conditions, obstacles, and prerequisites for growth gets longer (p. 
1). It is an observation of his day that remains true today. In 1992, Levine and Renelt 
assembled and tested a dataset of variables found in the literature to have a significant 
effect on economic growth. Their dataset included more than 50 possible factors, 
though even this list was not complete, as they excluded variables identified in the 
literature that were not readily amenable to the methodology they used (Levine and 
Renelt, 1992: 945).  
 
It is as fortunate now as it was in 1958 then, that the existence of this long list does 
not mean that every factor has to be available and in place before any output 
expansion can occur. Hirschman argues, ‘the resources and circumstances whose 
presence has been shown to be needed for economic development… are not so scarce 
or so difficult to realise, provided, however that economic development itself first 
raises its head’ (Hirschman, 1958: 5; italics in the original).  Logically, there can be 
no demonstration of profits in any specific business or technology prior to its 
inception. This means it is difficult, if not impossible, for entrepreneurs to envision 
the profitable outcomes of investments in new ventures, so risky decisions involved in 
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development are not undertaken (p. 10-14). Once a clear opportunity for profit can be 
demonstrated, though, entrepreneurs emerge and invest (p. 27). They then find that 
labour, capital, savings and all the other relevant items from the list are available in a 
latent form (p. 2–5).  
 
The existence of all these potential resources presents opportunities. A new phase of 
development can be created by finding and using an ‘inducement mechanism’ that 
demonstrates profitable economic expansion is possible and brings specific and 
unambiguous opportunities for entrepreneurs (Hirschman, 1958: 6). ‘The search for a 
primum mobile’ is the search for such an inducement mechanism. It is the search for a 
sector of the economy where the beginning of output expansion creates clear opportunities 
for investment into other parts of the economy and, so, more growth. It is here that an 
important role for a particular ‘leading’ sector becomes clear. The ideal ‘primum mobile’, 
according to Hirschman’s strategy for development, is a sector whose own growth induces 
growth in other sectors of the economy (p. 114–115, 202).  
 
The transmission of growth is achieved through “linkages” which can be any mechanism 
which achieves the transmission of growth from one sector to another. Hirschman suggests 
and explains three particular types (see Figure 1.1). These are backward linkages, where 
output growth is transmitted from sector A to sectors supplying A’s inputs; forward 
linkages where expansion is transmitted to other sectors which buy A’s outputs; and 
“entrained wants” arising from use of sector A’s products (p. 67, 100). Hirschman defines a 
“key sector” as one which has a “large” amount of backwards and forwards linkages, and 
which brings about entrained wants.  Expansion in such a sector invites or suggests 
investments in other sectors. If the sectors which are linked to the first themselves have 
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onward linkages to still more sectors, so much the better, because these indirect linkages 
can provide a further impetus for expansion and growth.   
Figure 1.1: Hirschman’s linkages 
Sector
A
Sector which 
supplies to A
Sector which 
buys from A
A’s backward 
linkages
A’s forward 
linkages
A’s sales to 
consumers
Consumers
A’s “entrained wants”
 
Source: Adapted from Hirschman (1958) 
 
Hirschman’s three linkages are not equally useful for bringing about economic 
growth. Backward linkages are the most reliable transmitters of growth because they 
occur in the context of shortage of a particular input to the ‘primum mobile’ sector. 
There are two different mechanisms by which expansion in the supplying sector can 
occur. The first is that the input becomes scarce, causing its price to increase and 
enticing entrepreneurs to invest in expanding its production. The second mechanism 
happens if this first mechanism fails. If entrepreneurs do not respond to increases in 
the input’s price, the first, expanding, sector will feel an urgent need for more of the 
specific input. In that case it will be compelled to provide investment into expanded 
production for itself (Hirschman, 1958: 93). For forward linkages the same urgency is 
less likely. Sector A’s firms may or may not feel the need to offer their product to a 
particular buying sector at a low price in order to continue to expand. Similarly, they 
may or may not invest into domestic sectors which could constitute new markets (p. 
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100). The crucial difference is that, for the ‘primum mobile’ sector, any sector which 
purchases its products, whether at home or abroad, is as good as any other, so there is 
no particular buying sector which is strictly necessary to A’s continued expansion. 
Entrained wants are perhaps even less reliable. They arise in two ways, both of which 
are dependent on the vagaries of consumer preferences. The first is when the 
increased use of sector A’s products leads to an increase in demand for products that 
are used in tandem with them, and the second is when the use of A’s products proves 
desirable, leading to an increase in demand for products which are similar (p. 68).  
 
Having laid out his definition of key sectors, Hirschman pauses to contrast them with an 
opposing type of sector which existed in many developing countries at his time of writing. 
These are the sectors which existed in the colonies solely to extract primary products and 
export them to the motherland. Hirschman argues that these were a source of hostility in 
developing countries because the extraction sectors had few, if any, linkages to the 
domestic economy, and so failed to improve outcomes for the colony (Hirschman, 1958: 
110). Singer (1950: 33) clearly demonstrates the empirical fact that production of tea in 
Ceylon1, oil in Iran, copper in Chile, and cocoa in Africa’s Gold Coast2 made very little, if 
any, contribution to the economic development of those countries. His explanation is that 
the extraction of primary products leads to expansion in other parts of the economy only if 
they are used as an input for manufacturing. Singer observes that in the examples he 
identified, processing and manufacturing were always done in Europe, after the raw 
materials had been imported. This meant that the original extraction industry prompted 
growth and investment in Europe, not in the colonies. Singer uses the word ‘enclave’ to 
describe colonial primary industries for export, because these sectors were incapable of 
                                                 
1
 Now Sri Lanka. 
2
 Now Ghana. 
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initiating any wider processes of domestic industrialisation. The investment made by the 
colonists was really only a contribution to growth at home, and the industry might just as 
well be considered a part of the colonial master’s home turf.  
 
The idea that linkages and highly linked sectors are important in determining the path 
and extent of economic growth has been verified by a recent body of work, associated 
most prominently with Ricardo Hausmann (Hausmann and Klinger, 2006, 2007, 
2007b, 2008; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2008; Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2006; 
Rodrik and Hausmann, 2006). Hausmann and Klinger, (2007: 11) analyse a mass of 
data on the products that different countries export, leading to the identification, for 
all pairs of products, of the probability that a country chosen at random will produce 
(and export) both3. This probability is a measure of the ‘relatedness’ of two products 
and can also be interpreted as a measure of the strength of linkages between sectors. 
Figure 1.2, which Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, (2006) have titled the ‘Product 
Space’, maps this measure for all possible pairs of 1,006 products included in the 
project (p. 13). Each node represents a product and is proportional to the size of its 
world market. The nodes are linked in pairwise fashion, and both the length of the 
link-lines and their colour indicates their relatedness. Longer links (in light blue) join 
products which are much less likely to be produced by the same country than pairs of 
products which are joined by shorter links (red lines) (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2008: 
4).  
 
                                                 
3
 Hausmann and Klinger (2007:11) use exports rather than production so as to focus on both available 
data and on products that a country produces well enough to succeed in world markets. 
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Figure 1.2: The ‘Product Space’ for 1998-2000 
Source: Hidalgo and Hausmann (2008:4) 
To ascertain that their “relatedness”, or linkages, measure is an important measure of 
how countries diversify from one product to another, Hausmann and Klinger (2007: 
21) undertake an econometric analysis of changes in countries’ production baskets. 
Their analysis shows that the “relatedness” of what a country already produces with a 
given new product has a strong and robust positive correlation with whether or not the 
new product will be produced in that country in the future (p. 22). Importantly, the 
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empirical analysis demonstrates that this result is driven by specific, product-to-
product linkages, and not by other theories which might produce similar 
diversification patterns (p. 22). 
 
This is a very highly regarded piece of research which has spawned many additional 
contributions, including several which recommend a strategy for development very 
similar to Hirschman’s. As of this writing, the first published paper on the subject, by 
Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2006), has been cited 500 times in only five years’4. 
Amongst these citations are two papers which use the product space to study anaemic 
economic growth in South Africa (Hausmann and Klinger 2006; Rodrik 2008). Both 
analyses note that South Africa’s existing production capabilities are in products 
which are not strongly linked to other sectors. This is given as the reason for a failure 
to diversify into new areas and so at least one of the reasons for slow growth. In a 
clear echo of Hirschman’s idea that bringing about expansion in a key sector with 
many linkages will promote growth, Hausmann and Klinger (2006) carry out an 
exercise to find one or more specific industries whose expansion might solve this 
problem. They look for sectors in dense parts of the “product space” or in other words 
sectors which have many linkages, and they conclude that the manufacture of 
machinery, equipment, and pharmaceuticals would be appropriate. Hausmann and 
Klinger then make a direct policy recommendation to the South African government 
that expansion in these industries would bring wider economic growth (Hausman and 
Klinger, 2006: 49). Hausmann and Klinger have performed similar analyses in Peru 
and Chile (Hausmann and Klinger ,2007b, 2008). Analysis again attributes periods of 
slow growth to the absence of strong and numerous linkages from existing production 
                                                 
4http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&q=hausmann+hwang+ rodrik+2006, accessed 
7 July 2011. 
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capabilities to new areas, and Hausmann and Klinger again advocate investment into 
particular highly linked sectors (Hausmann and Klinger, 2007b, 2008). Rodrik (2006), 
using Hausmann and colleagues work as a starting point, studies the evolution of 
China’s production capabilities. Here, in analysing a success story, Rodrik argues that 
it has occurred because of expansion in a particular, highly linked, sector. He finds 
that government policies which deliberately targeted expertise in electronics have 
been crucial to China’s wider success in production, exporting, and economic growth 
(Rodrik, 2006: 24).  
The data that forms the basis of Hausmann and colleagues’ and Rodrik’s conclusions 
does not include software or IT services, so their bodies of work cannot be used to 
evaluate the Indian IT industry5. On the one hand, this is unfortunate because it means 
it is not possible to place the current case study in a literature of comparable studies. It 
also means that this research project begins without an understanding of linkages from 
software and IT services production in the rest of the world. On the other hand, 
however, the absence of software and IT services in Hausmann and his colleague’s 
analysis presents an opportunity for a rich evaluation of the IT sector in India. 
Hausmann and Klinger’s (2007) ‘relatedness’ measure is agnostic on the causes and 
processes behind sector-to-sector linkages. In the following chapters, the analysis is 
much more definite. Each type of linkage process is identified and then its actions in 
India evaluated. In this respect the research project remains faithful to Hirschman’s 
original work. The concept of a “leading sector”, which is used as a yardstick for 
Indian IT in this project, is close to Hirschman’s original ‘key sector’. Its basis is the 
strength and number of specific, explained linkage processes. A leading sector in this 
                                                 
5
 The Indian IT sector is composed of mainly software development and IT services. Hardware 
manufacture (which is included in the product space) makes up only a small proportion of the sectors 
total revenues. (See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion.) 
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project must exhibit Hirschman’s three linkages or similar, explainable linkages 
which transmit growth from one sector to another.  
Another aspect of Hirschman’s ‘key sector’ concept which is retained for the 
definition of a “leading sector” in this project is the requirement for a leading sector’s 
linkages to be substantial relative to the size of its own output. Hirschman does not 
detail this condition directly, but he does advocate the use of a method for identifying 
key sectors (by Leontieff 1951) which is based on precisely that criterion (Hirschman, 
1958:108). To this requirement on the size of linkages, the definition of a leading 
sector used in this project adds a second which also must be fulfilled. That is, a 
leading sector’s impact on the economy through linkages must be substantial enough 
to impact macro-level output and growth. For the purposes of this project then, a 
leading sector is defined as ‘A sector which has a disproportionately large impact on 
macro-level economic growth because its expansion leads to growth of other sectors’ 
output through linkage effects’. 
It is a definition which, in common with Hirschman and Hausmann and colleagues’ work, 
recognises economic growth as an end in itself and pays no heed to qualitative aspects of 
that growth. This raises a concern because in developing countries not all processes of 
growth are of equal value. The ideal is for economic growth to benefit the poor, particularly 
those with many accumulated disadvantages. This ideal can be achieved in a leading sector 
strategy in two ways: through the type of sectors which expand because of linkages, and 
the types of sector-level growth process which linkages spark. In the best case scenario, the 
leading sector would be linked to secondary sectors which both offer employment to the 
poor and allow those workers a decent and continually improving quality of life. This latter 
criterion disqualifies the so-called ‘low road’ industries which achieve output gains by 
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competing on the basis of low wages, cheap inputs, and small margins (Guiliani, 
Pietrobelli, and Rabelotti,  2005: 550). Industries that follow this path offer workers a 
meagre living where previously there was no employment, but they do not usually lead to 
long-term development. Firms are not only vulnerable to the entrance of new and cheaper 
competitors but possibly to declining terms of trade. There is also little chance of 
accumulation of cash for either workers or firms, leaving the economy with very little in 
the way of investment for sustainable growth. ‘High road’ industries, on the other hand, 
achieve growth through upgrading, investment, and productivity improvements (Guiliani, 
Pietrobelli, and Rabelotti, 2005: 550; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000: 4). In these industries, 
an initial improvement of production techniques opens up the possibility of increased 
productivity and, hence, more profitable production. This can lead to firms possibly 
increasing workers wages and reinvesting profits for upgrading technology and equipment, 
meaning better outcomes for workers and a cycle of continuing upgrading, reinvesting, and 
profits for firms. These qualitative criteria for leading sectors are important in the following 
chapters because they are used as supplementary criteria for judging the Indian IT sector, 
along with the concepts of the leading sector, direct and indirect linkages, and the enclave.  
 
The following section provides a guide to the remainder of the thesis and what it 
contains.  
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1.3 What comes next: Three major original contributions 
The thesis makes three major original findings. Taken together, these demonstrate that 
the IT industry is a leading sector in India.  
 
The first of the three findings is that the body of existing literature which deals with 
forwards and backwards linkages from the IT industry into the Indian economy is out-
of-date and misleading. This literature is introduced and reviewed in Chapter 3, and is 
found to paint a dismal picture. Published works on India’s IT industry find that there 
are very few backwards and forwards linkages and that the limited, identified benefits 
are vastly outweighed by negative implications. The prognosis from this existing 
literature is dire. Optimism for the future of any linkages is rare, and, in the case of 
forward linkages, two influential contributions outline reasons why there is little or no 
hope (Dahlman and Utz, 2005; D’Costa 2003).  Balasubramanyam and 
Balasubramanyam, (1997), published in World Development, a highly ranked journal, 
even write that the IT industry in India behaves more like an enclave, not a leading 
sector. Chapter 5 provides empirical evidence that this view is far too gloom. It shows 
that 85% of the IT sector’s substantial input needs are now purchased from Indian 
supplying sectors and that these sectors hire low skilled and disadvantaged workers. 
Once these backwards linkages are added to those arising from the purchases of IT 
workers, the resulting output has been estimated to be between 2% and 3% of India’s 
GDP in 2005. Chapter 5 also demonstrates that forward linkages from the sector, 
measured by the value of software and IT services (SWIS) that the sector sold to 
Indian firms, began to grow significantly faster in the financial year 2005-066. As of 
                                                 
6
 2005-06 refers to the financial year from April 2005 to April 2006. This convention is adopted 
throughout the thesis. 
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2010-11, this trend has resulted in the SWIS domestic market amounting to nearly 
US$15bn. These forward linkages are to sectors which themselves sell in the domestic 
economy. An index of total forward linkages, benchmarking IT to other Indian 
industries, increased by 20% in only 3 years (2003–04 and 2006–07). 
 
The second major finding from this research project, explained in Chapter 6, answers 
an important question: If influential published analyses on IT in India imply a dismal 
future for forward linkages, why have domestic purchases from the sector, in fact, 
been growing so quickly? What becomes clear in the chapter is that the existing 
literature misses the possibility that IT could be an appropriate technology for firms in 
India, and it doesn’t foresee the possibility of there being significant demand in the 
domestic economy. In fact, IT is an appropriate technology for Indian firms because 
one characteristic of software, economies of scale, matches closely with Indian firms’ 
consumer markets, which are large and in need of IT, but price sensitive. The match 
brings a virtuous circle. If prices of IT products can be kept low, there will be a large 
market amongst India’s consumers for the final products that (potential) IT buyers 
make. These prices can remain low even after automation because whenever there is a 
large enough market, economies of scale built into software systems mean automation 
can be delivered for low per-unit costs. The IT sector has been instrumental in 
creating and activating this virtuous circle in several ways. The most important of 
these was an innovative deal between IT company IBM and mobile 
telecommunications provider, Bharti-Airtel in 2004. This introduced a new way of 
paying for SWIS outsourcing: the upfront costs of the IBM system were paid by IBM, 
and the customer, Bharti-Airtel, then only pays when they use it. It is a system that 
alleviates the need for firms to make the kind of risky investments that Hirschman 
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identified as difficult for entrepreneurs in developing countries. It is also a system that 
allows both seller and buyer to make money. The IBM–Bharti-Airtel deal provided 
the first of many demonstrations that the virtuous circle in action could be profitable 
for both sides. In short, it was a clear proximate cause of the acceleration in SWIS use 
in India from 2005-06 through to today. 
 
The third of the three major contributions is discussed in Chapter 7. The chapter 
describes an econometric model designed to establish the impact of forward linkages. 
Estimates arising from this work suggest that between 1.3 and 2.4 percentage points 
of India’s GDP growth between 2005 and 2008 can be attributed to output effects of 
investment into SWIS from the sector. This means that the acceleration in forward 
linkages from the IT sector is a major cause of acceleration at the macro level; Indian 
GDP growth accelerated from an average of 6% per annum in the 10 years before 
2004-05 to an average of 8.4% per annum in the seven years since then. But this is not 
the only important finding of Chapter 7. The econometric evidence also shows that 
output increases arising from forward linkages are not only the result of more inputs 
being fed into production, but that the introduction of outsourced SWIS from the IT 
sector increases total factor productivity in buying sectors. Buying sectors then have 
the opportunity to traverse the ‘high road’, rather than ‘low road’ to expansion, which 
in turn gives better opportunities to their workers. These findings on forward linkages 
are an important addition to the literature that details the impact of IT; this literature is 
reviewed in Chapter 2. For all the considerable effort expended in it, there has been 
no published empirical analysis of outsourced IT in any form. Even on related issues 
which have received a lot of attention, in particular the impact of non-IT outsourcing 
and in-house IT, there are few existing contributions which focus on developing 
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countries. Of these few have as rich a quantitative dataset as that used here, and none 
includes, as this thesis does, complementary qualitative research.  
 
In documenting these three major contributions, the remainder of the thesis follows 
the following layout. Chapter 2 provides the background to the research project, and 
is designed for the reader who is unfamiliar with the history and impact of IT 
adoption or with recent trends in the Indian economy. Chapter 3 reviews the current 
literature on the Indian IT sector. Chapter 4 describes the author’s research 
methodology; Chapters 5, 6, and 7 highlight the findings from the new research; and 
Chapter 8 brings the thesis to its conclusion.  
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2. Background: A new technology and a new Indian 
economy 
 
“The trouble with our times is that the future is not what it used to be.” 
 
Paul Valery (1977) 
 
 
The research described in the following chapters takes place at the confluence of two 
major trends—the beginning and spread of IT use and faster economic growth in 
India—which began to unfold in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Both of these 
radically altered what was possible, and both led to the expectation that the future 
would be different in known and unknown ways. The first trend and perhaps the most 
widely felt of the two, began with the invention of the computer, and continued with a 
raft of changes in technology use and associated ways of working across the globe. 
The second was equally disruptive in its effects, albeit over a smaller geography. It 
began with a significant acceleration in Indian economic growth in 1980 and 
continued with a previously inconceivable performance of consistently rapid 
expansion.  
 
Amongst a wide range of implications of these two game changing developments are 
several which are relevant to the research laid out in this thesis and these are the 
subject of this chapter. The intention here is neither to evaluate existing contributions 
on the issues surrounding the two trends, nor to come to any conclusions as to their 
causes, but merely to give an account of relevant background to the current work. 
Section 2.1 begins by covering the history and impact of IT adoption, focussing 
particularly on the type of IT produced in India—that which is sold to firms to be used 
in production. Section 2.2 outlines the recent history of India’s economy. Section 2.3 
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then wraps up this chapter and sets out how it fits in with what follows.
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2.1 IT in production: A revolution in developed country firms 
2.1.1 Rapid adoption of IT in the developed world  
 
Figure 2.1 shows investment in IT in the United States during the 1990s. It reveals not 
only rates of investment growth for computer hardware in excess of 30% for the 
majority of the decade, but also rates in excess of 25% for software and 
telecommunications equipment towards the end of the decade.  
Figure 2.1: Information Technology Investment in the United States, Annual Growth 1990–2001 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2001: 106).  
Note: in percentages 
 
This picture of rapid and prolonged investment into IT was reflected in both 
developed and newly industrialised economies during the 1990s. Figure 2.2 shows the 
per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) allocated to IT investment and production 
for 22 countries with developed economies and for 6 countries in emerging Asia. For 
the majority of these 28 countries, expenditure on IT was in the range 2.5% to 10% of 
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GDP in both 1992 and in 1999. The majority of countries’ investment was also 
significantly higher in 1999 than in 1992. 
Figure 2.2: Information Technology (IT) Expenditure and Production, % of GDP 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2001: 107). 
Note: in percentage of GDP 
 
The clearest proximate cause of these investment decisions is a combination of 
rapidly increasing quality, accompanied by rapidly declining prices for computers and 
other IT equipment. Production of these items is heavily dependent on the cost of 
producing semiconductor chips, a cost which has itself been falling rapidly because of 
technical progress (International Monetary Fund, 2001:105). Figure 2.3 shows price 
 33 
indexes for (1) microprocessors, computers, and peripherals; (2) software; and (3) 
communications equipment in the United States. In a trend that is consistent in other 
parts of the world (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002: 342), and earlier time 
periods7 (Triplett, 1999: 324), all three sets of prices declined from 1990 to 2001, with 
microprocessors falling fastest, followed by computers and peripherals. 
Figure 2.3: United States: Price Indices of Information Technology Goods  
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2001: 105). 
Note: 1999:Q1=100; log scale. 
 
This widespread experience of rapidly falling prices and, as a result, rapidly 
increasing investment into IT, has brought changes in both what firms produce and 
how they produce it. In fact, the changes have taken place in so many different 
sectors, and have transformed methods of production so dramatically, that authors 
have labelled them collectively as a “technological revolution” (e.g., Dasgupta and 
Singh, 2005: 3; David, 1990; International Monetary Fund, 2001; Nolan, 2001: 134; 
Perez, 1985), a distinct “stage of development” (Ozawa, 2005: 142), and even the 
                                                 
7
 Triplett describes the evolution of microprocessors since 1978, including both their consistently 
improving performance and their consistently falling price. 
 34 
harbinger of a “new economy” (Kay, 2001: 56–57). In many of these contributions, 
the introduction of IT is argued to be so important that it is compared to the 
introductions of steam power, electricity, and oil (David, 1990; International 
Monetary Fund, 2001; Nolan, 2001: 134; Perez, 1985).  
 
Those that are the most bullish on the socioeconomic importance of IT place it at the 
centre of a “long wave” of Schumpeterian creative destruction. They argue that a 
superior cluster of innovations around information, manipulated using IT, is replacing 
a previously dominant cluster of now-mature technologies that use inexpensive oil for 
mass production (David, 1990; Freeman, 1994; Perez 1985, 2001, 2005, 2008). This 
“techno-economic paradigm” shift is the cause of a worldwide move towards 
information and computer-intensive products and, in particular, services; it is also the 
reason why there is such huge demand for the technology (Perez, 1985: 9). The 
argument goes that as one pervasive cluster of innovations reaches maturity, the rate 
of innovation or improvement in technologies in the cluster slows down (Freeman, 
1994; Schumpeter, 1939). This diminishes the competitive advantage and, hence, 
Schumpeterian profits available to a firm working with technologies from the mature 
cluster and gives entrepreneurs a reason to experiment with new and radically 
different technologies. When this process of experimentation begins to settle on a 
new, technically superior cluster of pervasive innovations, entrepreneurs realise the 
benefits of their experimentation by producing and implementing the new technology. 
This takes place not only in those sectors previously using the old technology, but 
also in sectors not previously in existence. For a period the pioneering entrepreneurs 
are able to earn monopoly profits (Schumpeterian rents) as they are the only firms 
with the new technology. After that, other entrepreneurs follow their lead. As second-
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level entrepreneurs compete with each other and with first-level innovators, prices of 
the new technologies fall, making widespread and fast adoption throughout the 
economy possible.  
 
To support the importance of clusters of innovation, neo-Schunpeterians point to 
evidence such as that detailed in Figure 2.4. The figure illustrates a pattern which has 
been found in world GDP by many different authors in the years since it was first 
identified by Kondratiev in 1935. That is that GDP regularly switches between high 
and low growth in a wave pattern over 40 to 60 years (Hobsbawm, 1999: 87; 
Kondratiev, 1935; Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010). The neo-Schumpeterians argue that 
this occurs because of clusters of innovations. The high growth phase arises as a new 
cluster is adopted and its benefits realised, and the low growth phase takes over as the 
cluster reaches maturity. It is a claim which remains the subject of serious controversy 
(Freeman, 1994: 474; Kuznets, 1940: 267). However, if IT could indeed rightly be 
placed at the centre of a long wave of creative destruction, it would provide a clear 
explanation for the steep trajectory of investment into the technology in the developed 
and emerging countries8. It would also provide a dramatic context for the current case 
study. If the world economy is in the process of retooling in favour of information 
intensity and IT use, the industry which is the subject of the current case study 
produces a product which has strong prospects for sustained expansion over the 
coming decades (Perez, 1985: 15–16). 
                                                 
8
 Unfortunately verification of whether or not information and IT is at the centre of a neo-
Schumpeterian long wave is outside the scope of this thesis. There is unlikely to be a definitive answer 
to this question for many years to come.  
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Figure 2.4: Patterns in World GDP growth, 1870–2010  
 
Note: Curve 1 is Korotayev and Tsirel’s estimated long wave; Curve 2 is an 11 year moving average of 
World GDP Growth.  
Source: Korotayev and Tsirel (2010: 18)  
 
 
Even for sceptics though, one thing is clear. The rapid fall in IT prices and the 
consequent expansion of IT use led to an equally rapid expansion in the need for IT 
workers with the skills to implement the new technology (Athreye, 2005: 20; 
Chandrasekhar, 2001: 18-19; Desai, 2003: 9; Heeks, 1996: 115; Joseph, 2002: 13; 
NASSCOM, 2007b: 10). In particular, because software is an essential complement to 
computer hardware, the rapid growth of investment into hardware in developed 
economies (exemplified by Figure 2.1) was accompanied by a necessarily fast-
growing demand for software. Wherever a packaged software product was not already 
available, there was consequently a rapid increase in demand for technical personnel 
who could create new programs. During this period, the necessary experience was 
rare, so firms in developed countries were willing to accommodate learning on the 
job—albeit with a specialized workforce required to have advanced degrees in 
engineering, sciences, or maths (Perez, 1985: 29). With the years of advanced 
university education needed, the supply of these technical graduates in the United 
States and Europe could not expand quickly enough. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
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engineering, technology, the sciences and maths were not popular courses (Nolan, 
2001: 100). Even later, when it became clear that specialising in IT led to strong 
career options and high salaries, there was still a time lag involved in universities 
designing the necessary courses. In the intervening period, with demand outstripping 
supply and salaries ever-increasing, firms began to look abroad for the staff they 
needed (Heeks, 1996: 115).  
2.1.2 Strong evidence that IT improves productivity 
 
It was in this context of a shortage of qualified labour, learning on the job, and rapid 
technical progress that Western firms began to incorporate IT hardware and software 
into their working practices (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002: 344–345; 
Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1996: 18; Miller, 2001: 12; Nolan, 2001: 100). Over time and 
through much experimentation, it became clear that the ideal way to incorporate IT 
into a company was to gather information from all departments into a piece of 
software which is visible to and useable for all staff (Perez, 1985: 9). This increases 
both the amount and quality of information available to workers, enabling decisions to 
be made independently, without managerial assistance (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and 
Hitt, 2002: 342; Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1996: 11). If the system also stores 
information about such decisions, then workers can also be monitored using it, again 
with the need for fewer managers (Perez, 1985: 9) — yet saving employee and 
management time and cost is not the only benefit. Decentralised decision making also 
improves adaptability. The IT-enabled company is typically significantly more 
adaptable to changing circumstances both within and outside itself (Brynjolffson and 
Yang, 1996: 30). It uses fewer workers and managers (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and 
Hitt, 2002: 344), and it can easily adapt to offering alternative versions of a product 
(Brynjollfson and Yang, 1996: 30). Additionally, a firm with appropriate computer 
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systems can accumulate savings in “processing time”, “transaction costs”, “inventory 
costs”,  and “material wastage” (Mody and Dahlman, 1992: 1708). IT can even ensure 
that the firm makes efficient use of its assets through computerised inventory control 
and bookkeeping systems (Kraemer and Dedrick, 1994: 9). 
 
In hindsight, now knowing the uncertain nature of the early experiments using IT in 
the workplace, it is not surprising that the first attempts to quantify the impact on 
output and productivity yielded no measurable effects. At the time, however, these 
inconclusive findings were a massive shock to researchers. In reviewing literature 
which attempted to identify the impact of an expansion in IT capital (both hardware 
and software) in the United States, from a base of close to zero in 1975 to almost $80 
billion by the late 1980s9 to no avail, Robert Solow famously expressed the general 
frustration: “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity 
statistics” (1987:36). What followed was a huge amount of effort in questioning the 
data and methods used to identify the impact of IT, which was collectively referred to 
as the “Productivity Paradox” literature. This effort continued without reaching any 
convincing conclusions about the validity of the tools or the sign and magnitude of 
any bias10 until finally the “paradox” was resolved through publication of papers 
which found the expected effect — a positive impact of IT use on both productivity 
and output.  
 
The first of these successful papers used econometrics on large companies in the 
United States using data from the late 1980s and early 1990s (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 
                                                 
9
  Figures quoted in Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1999: 48.  
10
 Triplett (1999) identified a positive bias on the impact of IT (but no magnitude was identified); 
Bayoumi and Hacker (2002), Brynjolfsson and Yang (1999), and International Monetary Fund (2001) 
identified a negative bias on the impact of IT (no magnitude identified); Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003), 
Nordhaus (2002), and Stiroh (2001: 5) identified a bias of unknown sign on the impact of IT (no 
magnitude identified). 
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1993; Lichtenberg, 1993). These were followed by a long series of similar 
econometric analyses covering different geographies and timescales which have, in a 
majority of cases, also found a positive impact of IT. Figure 2.5 is taken from Stiroh 
(2002), and it provides a meta-analysis of these studies. Focussing on the output 
elasticity of IT capital (both hardware and software), it summarises the estimate from 
40 econometric models that were published in 20 different studies on firms or 
industries in developed countries. In Figure 2.5, the median estimate suggests that 
doubling the stock of IT capital leads to a 5% increase in output; however, there is 
considerable variation, with estimates ranging from –6% to +24% output change for a 
100% increase in IT capital.  
Figure 2.5: Histogram of Output Elasticities of IT from Firm or Industry-level Econometric 
Studies 
 
Source: Stiroh (2002: 30). 
 
As this literature using firm and industry-level data continued to build, a second set of 
analyses began to find evidence of output and productivity effects using macro-level 
national accounts data. This second literature examined the economy-wide impact of 
IT use on either economic growth or growth in aggregate labour productivity. Figure 
2.6 shows the results of analyses which report the impact on GDP growth in the 
United States. It summarises the results of eight separate analyses which all used the 
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same methodology but different time periods. The findings are arranged, from left to 
right, by the start date of the period under consideration, with each vertical bar 
showing the number of percentage points of GDP growth which are attributable to IT 
use. The chart shows that very little of US growth was attributable to IT in the 1970s 
and 1980s, with the three earliest studies finding that IT contributed less than 0.4 
percentage points (between 0% and 7%) of GDP growth during the period under 
review. From the early 1990s onwards, however, IT started to have a greater impact, 
and by the 1996–2000 period, its contribution had reached 1.36 percentage points per 
annum (32% of GDP growth in that period).  
Figure 2.6: GDP Growth Per Annum Attributed to IT in the United States  
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Oliner and Sichel (1994, 2000); Sichel (1997). 
 
 
This pattern of an emerging IT impact throughout the 1990s in the United States is 
also reflected in the findings of macro-level labour productivity analyses, which are 
illustrated in Figure 2.7. Actual labour productivity growth is plotted along the solid 
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line and the findings of studies in the literature which attempt to identify the impact of 
IT use in production are plotted on the other, horizontal, lines11. In the interests of 
clarity, only one of the many papers which found no impact in the early years is 
included, that of Oliner and Sichel (1994). To the right of this, the findings of six 
different studies which found that IT contributes between 0.6 and 1.1 percentage 
points of labour productivity growth in slightly different time periods in the mid- to 
late-1990s are also plotted.  
Figure 2.7: The Effect of IT on US Labour Productivity Growth, Percentage Points 
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Figure 2.8 compares the findings from the United States to the impact of IT found in 
other developed countries. It draws on the results of two studies published in 2001 
which identified percentage points of GDP growth attributable to IT use between 
                                                 
11
 These studies all used the same methodology but different data, so the comparison in Figure 2.7 is 
valid. 
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1995 and 1999 and between 1991 and 1999 respectively (Colecchia, 2001; Daveri, 
2001). To facilitate comparisons between the different countries, the impacts of IT 
identified by these authors have been expressed as a share of total GDP growth in 
each country.  
Figure 2.8: Share of Total GDP Growth Attributed to IT Use in Developed Countries 
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Taken together, these global findings show that as firms in developed countries 
experimented with the new technology and began to settle on appropriate ways of utilising 
it, IT did in fact begin to have significant returns. At the micro-level, estimates of the 
output effects of IT regularly put its marginal contribution to output as larger than its cost 
and, hence, its returns as super-normal (Sadun and Van Reenan, 2005: 4). At the macro-
level, use of IT has been accepted as the cause of acceleration in both economic growth and 
labour productivity in the United States. In other developed countries, between 10% and 
30% of economic growth in the 1990s has been attributed to the use of IT.  
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In developing countries there is so far very little evidence of a positive effect of IT, and as a 
result some authors remain unconvinced that the technology is or can be appropriate there 
(Miller, 2001; Mody and Dahlman, 1992). On evidence, use of national accounts or 
industry-level data is rare because it requires sophisticated data collection and handling 
which is often outside the capabilities or priorities for developing countries (International 
Money Fund, 2001: 109). On top of that, the majority of the existing econometric literature 
includes less wealthy countries only as part of an international sample with developed 
countries also included (Dewan and Kramer 2000; Kraemer and Dedrick 2002; Pohjola 
2002). In the main, these cross-country studies find an overall effect of IT, but it disappears 
if attention is restricted to developing countries only, leading to the conclusion that 
developed counties are driving the estimated relationship. Some authors argue that the lack 
of measured effect in developing countries is simply because IT is not appropriate for such 
countries. Mody and Dahlman (1992) offer perhaps the clearest example of this argument, 
stating that IT is only needed at the “emerging” stage of development, a period during 
which wage increases threaten the country’s comparative advantage in labour- intensive 
production. Miller (2001:12) also argues that because IT requires technically skilled 
workers, and that such workers are in short supply in developing countries, the technology 
will be much less useful there.  
 
This position is beginning to be challenged within a young literature which uses 
econometrics on firm-level data, often with data from several different countries included 
(Basant et al., 2006; Motohashi 2008; World Bank, 2006a). Basant et al. (2006: 13) are 
perhaps the most convincing in that group. They use firm-level data from Brazil and India 
to identify the effect of IT in manufacturing between 1998 and 2003. Even after controlling 
for firm-specific effects and a wide range of variables suggested by theory, they find a 
positive effect of IT on productivity that is more than double Stiroh’s (2002) median from 
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developed countries12.  Similar conclusions are made by World Bank (2006a) which used a 
much wider sample, including 20,000 firms from 26 different sectors in 56 developing 
countries, including India. That study shows that IT use, as measured by use of personal 
computers, email, and the Internet is positively correlated not only with labour and total 
factor productivity, but also with enterprise-level growth, profitability, and investment. 
Whilst these findings may be early indications of an emerging and strong impact of IT in 
some or all parts of the developing world, the weight of evidence remains light. So far there 
is no clear consensus as to whether less developed countries experience greater or lesser 
benefit from adopting IT than their counterparts in the West (Avgerou, 2003: 374; Miller, 
2001: 5; Patibandla, 2002: 102). 
 
2.1.3 New ways to organise production and new ways to compete 
 
Meanwhile, back in the developed countries, firms who had installed IT began to find 
new ways to use it to compete. They came to realise that the uses of their new systems 
were not limited to co-ordination, monitoring, or planning within an individual firm. 
The same systems that decentralise decision making among working groups in one 
firm are equally useful for decentralising decision making among different companies 
that work together; even if the companies are based in different countries (Olsen, 
2006: 5). It is a role for IT systems that has had far-reaching consequences since the 
1980s, because it has allowed companies to easily take advantage of policy changes 
which occurred around the same time as these technologies became available (Nolan, 
2001:101). Between the end of the 1970s and the late 1990s, trade and investment 
liberalisation in the form of reduced tariffs and free trade agreements (such as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and others signed by members of the World 
                                                 
12
 Stiroh (2002) found a median elasticity of 5% more output for doubling the IT stock, whereas Basant 
et al. (2006) found 15.7% for Brazil and 11.5% for India. 
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Trade Organization) flourished throughout the developed and developing world. This 
stimulated the growth of international trade which, in turn, offered companies in the 
developed world two options previously denied to them (Nolan, 2001: 97–98). First, 
they were able to purchase materials and intermediate goods from a much wider array 
of potential suppliers from around the world, and, second, they were able to compete 
for a share of a much larger global market. It is in how businesses reacted to these two 
new opportunities that the external co-ordination abilities of the new IT systems came 
to have such a far-reaching effect. With their IT systems in place or under 
development, Western firms devised the strategy of competing in the new global 
market by “selling off ‘non-core businesses’” and, instead, purchasing “non-core” 
intermediate inputs from the most cost- and quality- effective suppliers, wherever they 
happened to exist around the world (Nolan, 2001: 101; Olsen, 2006: 8). This practice 
is commonly referred to as outsourcing; if the supplier is in a different country, it is 
referred to as offshoring13.  
 
Outsourcing allows IT-enabled firms to develop their “core businesses” by focusing 
their research and development, mergers and acquisitions, and marketing strategies on 
achieving dominance in world markets for whichever parts of their business are the 
most profitable. This, in turn, allows firms to earn monopoly or oligopoly profits and 
so continue to invest in maintaining relative strength in their core activities. It is a 
strategy which has been ascendant, and successful, amongst large Western firms since 
liberalisation (Nolan, 2001: 101). However, outsourcing is not possible unless firms 
can rely completely on their supplying and buying partners. For this reason, the 
quality and extent of co-ordination between suppliers and buyers has become a much 
                                                 
13
 Offshoring can also refer to the practice of moving productive capacity to another country whilst 
keeping it within the same firm.  
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more important component of competitive advantage, and large Western firms have 
insisted that their suppliers both purchase IT systems and focus on core competencies 
themselves (Nolan, 2001: 103). In this new competitive regime then, both suppliers 
and buyers are finding new benefits from IT. The technology is not only delivering 
efficiencies internally, but also enabling new strategies for competition through 
facilitating outsourcing and offshoring of non-core businesses. Alongside the within-
firm cost and co-ordination savings discussed above, a new set of savings has been 
added to the competitive edge IT is expected to bring: between-firm savings, such as 
“deeper and more effective interactions with suppliers and consumers”, and 
“centralised global procurement” (Nolan, 2001: 102). 
 
Since 2000 an empirical literature has emerged which evaluates how outsourcing 
contributes to output and productivity in the firms and industries which use it. These 
contributions hypothesise that the impact of outsourcing should be visible through 
increases in either total factor productivity (TFP) or labour productivity, because 
outsourcing is expected to facilitate the relocation of the least productive parts of a 
company’s business, leaving better productivity in the core part of the business. This 
can occur simply because of the composition of tasks assigned to each company. 
However, it can also occur because the company concentrates its efforts on fewer 
remaining core tasks. Other routes by which outsourcing can impact on productivity 
come from accompanying organisational change which can trigger productivity-
enhancing restructuring of processes, or efficiency gains as firms learn from their 
partners (Amiti and Wei, 2006: 7).  
 
The literature predominantly uses studies of manufacturers who outsource either 
manufactured components or services. The latter group may include outsourcing of IT 
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services (e.g., Amiti and Wei, 2004), but the studies do not examine IT outsourcing 
separately. The literature covers the United States (Amiti and Wei, 2004, 2006) and 
the European Union (Egger and Egger, 2001), as well as single-country studies of the 
United Kingdom (Criscuolo and Leaver, 2005; Girma and Görg, 2004); Republic of 
Ireland (Görg and Hanley, 2003, 2005; Görg, Hanley, and Strobl, 2004); and Austria 
(Egger, 2001). The only authors who provide evidence on outsourcing for India are 
Banga and Goldar (2004). 
Figure 2.9: Empirical Evidence on Outsourcing and Productivity 
 
Source: Olsen (2006: 24). 
Notes: M = manufactures outsourcing, S = services outsourcing, MS = manufactures and services 
outsourcing, SC = services contracting, FO = foreign ownership. + indicates a positive significant 
effect. - indicates a negative significant effect. 0 indicates insignificant effects. Double signs indicate 
that effects are larger relative to single signs for the same study. Not all effects depicted here are 
necessarily robust over all model variations in the different studies. 
  
Figure 2.9 reproduces a summary table of the findings of this literature from Olsen 
(2006). Although it is so far a small literature, Olsen (2006: 28) does identify some 
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emerging generalisations. Under the column spanner titled “Productivity effects from 
outsourcing, the subcolumn labelled “M” (for manufactures outsourcing) is 
predominantly populated by small or insignificant effects. Olsen interprets this as 
evidence that there are diminishing returns to outsourcing of components 
manufacturing; as of the early 2000s, it was a much more established practice than 
services outsourcing. Olsen concludes that services outsourcing has a higher return, 
particularly if the outsourcing company is a services firm itself (Olsen 2006).  
 
What is not shown in the table is the size or magnitude of the productivity effects of 
outsourcing. Figure 2.10 shows estimated elasticities in the author’s preferred 
specification for 2 groups of studies whose estimates are based on the same method 
and so are comparable (Amiti and Wei 2004 (US); Banga and Goldar, 2004 (India); 
Criscuolo and Leaver, 2005 (UK): Girma and Gorg, 2003 (UK); Gorzig and Stephan, 
2002 (Germany); Egger and Egger, 2001 (EU). Banga and Goldar, Criscuolo and 
Leaver, and Gorzig and Stephan conducted firm-level studies where outsourcing is 
measured directly from firm-level data on expenditures, and Amiti and Wei, Girma 
and Gorg, and Egger and Egger conducted industry-level studies where outsourcing is 
measured by outsourcing intensity14. In the studies of developed countries, the 
elasticities are similar to one another, with two firm-level estimates (Gorzig and 
Stephan; Criscuolo and Leaver) arriving at the same exact elasticity figure; and the 
industry-level studies all estimating between 2% and 6% more productivity per 10% 
additional outsourcing intensity. The estimate for outsourcing in Indian manufacturing 
stands out for being somewhat larger than the developed-country estimates, at 13% 
more productivity for a doubling of outsourcing expenditure (Banga and Goldar).  
 
                                                 
14
 The proportion of total expenditure on inputs that is outsourced.  
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Figure 2.10: Estimates of the Elasticity of Productivity to Outsourcing 
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Note: M = materials/manufacturing, S = services. Adapted from sources cited in the table.  
 
 
This higher response in Banga and Goldar’s study is suggestive of a more important 
role for outsourcing in developing countries, but more research is needed. As with the 
literature on IT discussed above, there are few existing studies on developing country 
firms and industries which undertake to outsource. Unfortunately that means that, to 
date, the existing literature is inconclusive on whether developing countries can 
expect the same, more, or less in productivity gains when they outsource as their 
developed-country competitors achieve. 
 
The next section details the second area of background to the thesis: India’s pattern of 
growth since 1980. 
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2.2 Rapid growth in India’s economy via service sectors and the 
middle class 
 
Figure 2.11 plots India’s real GDP growth for the period from shortly after its 
independence15 to the present day. It illustrates clearly that economic growth in the 
country has accelerated since the late 1970s and early 1980s and is now proceeding at 
a rate far in excess of the norm in the period before that. Several rigorous statistical 
examinations have now converged on the conclusion that there was a statistically 
significant break point in the rate of economic growth between 1978 and 1980 
(Balakrishnan and Parameswaran, 2007: 2917; Virmani, 2004a: 8; Wallack, 2003: 
4312). Prior to 1980 (and after 1951-52) the average annual rate of growth was 3.6% 
whilst after it up to 2010–11(the coverage of this thesis), the same average was 6.2% 
(Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 2011). This section provides 
some explanations for the initial acceleration and identifies the character of growth in 
the later period, in particular it discusses the sectors of the economy which are driving 
the growth and the segments of society that are gaining the benefits from it. 
                                                 
15
 Independence was in 1947. This chart starts in 1951-52. 
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Figure 2.11: Real GDP Growth for India, 1951–52 to 2010–11 (in 1999–00 prices) 
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Source: Adapted from Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (2011; 2010-1011 figures 
estimated as of 31 May 2011). 
Notes: “10 per. Mov. Avg” shows a 10 year moving average of GDP growth 
 
Despite some controversy in the literature as to the economic theories that might 
explain acceleration and sustained improved performance after 1980, there is 
widespread agreement that a particular sequence of government policies and actions 
were important. The first of these to have an impact on economic growth was a deficit 
funded fiscal expansion which began at the end of the 1970s (McCartney 2010:51-
53). This large increase in public investment, from 5% of GDP in the 1970s to 9% in 
the 1980s, saw subsidisation of food grains in rural areas after the 1979 drought, as 
well as significant investment in agricultural infrastructure (Corbridge and Harris, 
2000: 148; McCartney, 2010: 51; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004: 8). These 
expansionary government expenditures are largely accepted to have been growth-
enhancing and some were also designed specifically to help the poor, in line with 
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then-prime minister Indira Ghandi’s historical socialist agenda. However, not all of 
the expenditures that comprised this surge in public investment were in line with a 
socialist ideology. Public infrastructure spending was also directed towards projects 
that aimed to support the corporate sector in urban areas (Corbridge and Harris, 2000: 
150).  
 
This aspect of the deficit spending of the 1980s fits in very clearly with the idea that 
there was a change in Mrs Ghandi’s agenda during the 1980s which left her 
government, and that of her successor and son Rajiv Ghandi, with a “pro-business 
orientation…aimed primarily at benefiting incumbents in the formal industrial and 
commercial sectors” (Kohli, 2006: 1253; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004: 2, 14). 
Perhaps the most important steps in this direction were the retraction of industrial 
controls, devaluation of the exchange rate, and the relaxation of restrictions on import 
of intermediate goods (Panagariya, 2004: 14-15; Virmani, 2006: 22). In 
manufacturing and in certain other industries, these reforms afforded entrepreneurs 
the opportunity to freely import state-of-the-art technology and, in many cases, to use 
it without having to apply for a license or permit from the government. In accordance 
with the interests of incumbent business, protection from foreign competition was 
maintained so that there was no sudden entry of foreign producers who could 
undercut Indian firms (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004: 2). However, during the 
1980s, the government changed the form of protection in many industries, switching 
from quantity restrictions to charging import tariffs. The tariffs were high enough to 
eliminate competition from abroad, but according to Virmani (2006:35) Indian firms 
understood that the tariffs could, and probably would, be reduced at some point in the 
future. This set of policy measures offered not only a genuine opportunity for 
manufacturers to upgrade their technologies, but also gave them an imperative to do 
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so because of the impending threat of competition from abroad. The evidence 
suggests that the private sector responded to this carrot-and-stick approach. Corporate 
investment increased from 1.1% of GDP in 1978–79 to 4.4% in 1982–83. There was 
also a rapid increase in the type of investment most strongly related to growth: Private 
investment in equipment grew from 4.5% of GDP between the 1950s and 1970s, to 
5.8% between 1980 and 1984, and 7.1% between 1985 and 1989 (McCartney, 2010: 
52).  
 
It was in 1991, more than a decade after economic growth started to accelerate, that 
“pro-business” policy making was conjoined with “pro-market” policy making 
(Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004: 3). India enacted a package of reforms which, 
although having no discernable impact on the rate of economic growth (Wallack, 
2003), have widely been credited with making the existing rate of growth sustainable 
(Acharya, 2002; Panagariya, 2004; Rodrik and Subramanain, 2004). In 1991 it 
became clear that the existing deficit-funded fiscal expansion was built on unstable 
short-term debts held abroad. When the Gulf War in 1990 raised the price of India’s 
oil imports, without any corresponding improvement in exports, creditors started to 
doubt that India would be able to meet its foreign exchange requirements. When the 
debt to service ratio reached 26.3% in 1989, and the ratio of short-term debt to foreign 
exchange reserves hit 382% in 1991, India faced a balance of payment crisis 
(McCartney, 2010: 54). It was under these circumstances that a wide-ranging set of 
neo-liberal reforms were enacted, including a restructuring exercise which shifted 
India’s debt towards more long-term agreements mediated by market exchange rates 
and remunerated at market interest rates. This offered a more readily tradable and so 
manageable set of borrowing for the government and opened the way for foreign 
investment into the country. Tariffs on Indian exports were removed, and the 
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exchange rate was first devalued and then allowed to float. These actions were largely 
successful, and eventually were responsible for placing the government’s finances on 
a more stable and, thus, sustainable footing16 (McCartney, 2010: 55).  
 
For the other partner in the government-business alliance during this period, corporate 
sector businesses, the outcome from the 1991 reforms was mixed. First, in a 
development that was mainly well-received by business owners, a great many of the 
remaining restrictions and regulations created during the earlier government-led 
planning were removed. The Statement of Industrial Policy of 1991 “did away with 
investment licensing” and removed “myriad entry restrictions” on firms (Panagariya, 
2004: 23). It also restricted the sectors reserved for public-sector monopolies to only 
eight (Panagariya, 2004: 23). For manufacturing firms, however, there was another 
important implication of the reform package; protection in the form of tariffs on 
imported products was dramatically reduced and competition from imports began to 
be felt in India (Panagariya, 2004: 24). Wherever these imported goods were superior 
or more competitively priced than India’s domestic manufactured items, Indian firms 
were presented with a decision: Either catch up quickly or lose part of their market 
share. It is a challenge that was spared many services firms in 1991 though. Not all 
services are tradable; it makes no sense to import a haircut. Of those services sectors 
that are tradable, many remained protected from foreign competition after 1991. 
Liberalisation was pursued gradually in the services sectors and the entry of foreign 
competition occurred much later. For example, in banking, controls and regulation on 
foreign involvement were maintained until only recently, with the state remaining the 
dominant player as late as 2004 (Panagariya, 2004: 24).  
                                                 
16
 Foreign exchange reserves and short-term debt returned to sustainable levels by the end of the 
twentieth century. 
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The differential treatment of services and manufacturing during the 1991 reforms, and 
the consequent impact of different levels of competition from imports, may well be 
contributory factors to the subsequent pattern of growth after that year17. Figure 2.12 
plots GDP growth rates by sector for the period between 1980 and 2008. It shows that 
prior to 1991, industries and services were growing at a similar rate, but thereafter 
services began to accelerate whilst industrial growth remained fairly constant. 
Between 1991 and 2000 the rate of growth of services was an average 1.4% higher 
than that of manufacturing industry. Between 2001 and 2008 the growth differential 
between the two had widened to 2.5%. 
                                                 
17
 See Gordon and Gupta (2004: 11–15) for a review of other possible explanations. 
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Figure 2.12: Indian GDP Growth Rates by Sector and Decade, 1981–2008 
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Source: Adapted from Reserve Bank of India (2009). 
 
This differential growth pattern since 1991 has led to a restructuring of the Indian 
economy, as shown in Figure 2.13. As with many developing countries experiencing 
structural change, the share of agriculture in GDP has been falling and now comprises 
a much smaller per cent of total Indian GDP. What is different about India, though, is 
that services, rather than manufacturing, have filled the gap, and as of 2008–2009, 
services’ share of GDP is approaching 60%.  
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Figure 2.13: Sector-wise Composition of Real GDP in India (1999–2000 prices)  
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Source: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (2011; 2010-11 figures estimated as at 
31 May 2011). 
Notes: Primary refers to the conversion of natural resources into primary products, for example 
agriculture or mining. Secondary refers to manufacturing. Tertiary is services. 
 
It is a development which stands out in stark contrast to both the economic history of 
the now-developed economies (Singh, 2006: 15) and to the theories of many of the 
most important thinkers in economics (as observed by McCartney, 2010: 107). 
Amongst these, analysis by three such scholars (Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Nicholas 
Kaldor) have the implication that the current structure of economic activity which 
India has developed will not be the best path for sustainable growth because 
productivity in the services sector is inherently low. Adam Smith (1776:127, 270) 
identified service sector workers as “unproductive labour” whilst Karl Marx treated 
services as a residual sector consisting of activities other than producing goods (Marx 
1887). Economic expansion for these two authors meant moving resources away from 
the services sector and towards urban manufacturers (Smith) or capitalist agriculture 
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or manufacturing (Marx). More recently, Kaldor’s work states that manufacturing and 
agriculture have inherently higher productivity and productivity growth than services 
because of static and dynamic externalities, including increasing returns to scale 
perhaps through learning by doing, and linkage effects to different sectors (Singh, 
2006: 25).  
   
Empirical evidence on productivity in Indian services reveals a very different story to 
that which Smith, Marx and Kaldor might have expected, and in doing so, it presents 
a mystery: Total factor productivity data reproduced in Figure 2.14, shows that 
productivity growth in services has exceeded that in manufacturing since 1981. Going 
further, Dasgupta and Singh’s (2005: 28) analysis of macro-level data concludes that 
there are indeed positive externalities of the kind envisaged by Kaldor from some 
service sectors in India to the rest of the economy. Hansda (2001) finds that at least 
some of these have arisen through linkages, just like those introduced in Chapter 1, 
between services and both agriculture and industry.  
Figure 2.14: Total Factor Productivity Growth by Sector, India, 1981–2001  
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For Dasgupta and Singh, this unusual productivity and growth-enhancing role of 
services is of central importance: 
“services in the future may replace industry as the engine of growth, even in 
developing countries. In that sense, India may be regarded as pioneering a new 
development path which gives primacy to services rather than to 
manufacturing as the leading sector.”  [Dasgupta and Singh, 2005: 3] 
 
The idea that services can play such a central role is also supported by evidence from 
outside India. Services has been the “largest and fastest-growing sector of the world 
economy over the past two decades” (McCartney, 2010: 108), and the service 
industries “now account for nearly three-quarters of total employment in some 
industrial countries” (Freeman, 1994: 489). However, for now, there is no consensus 
in the literature on whether a new development path that avoids manufacturing can 
really exist. 
For McCartney (2010: 114), productivity in services is just one criterion in a long list 
for sustainability of the current growth spurt, a list which he examines before 
concluding that India’s prospects are good. In particular, he gives significant space 
and attention to an account of the sustainability of demand in the Indian economy (p. 
84–85). This includes demand for savings and investment (p. 90) and demand for 
labour and consumption (p. 90–93). On the latter he notes that the period between 
1980 and 2000 was characterised by a phenomenon known as “jobless growth”, and 
many sectors of the Indian economy exhibited a declining trend in their growth–
employment elasticity. The employment elasticity of GDP growth declined from 
0.62% (between 1983 and 1994) to 0.16% (between 1994 and 2000) (Joshi, 2004).  
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It is a situation which could have been a major problem for consumption demand in 
India if two other circumstances had not occurred that improved the spending power 
of those with reliable work. The first of these is a corollary of the fast growth in 
productivity in services already noted in Figure 2.14. Gordon and Gupta (2004: 8) 
suggest this occurred because of improvements in output per worker, as service 
industries experienced rapid technological progress. These industries already hired 
skilled, educated, workers and paid them well. As their output per hour increased 
further, these high wages increased further.  The second reason is government efforts 
to redistribute incomes in favour of this already privileged group. According to 
Patnaik (1986) and Kurien (1989), government tax breaks have consistently favoured 
the middle class, and according to Sridharan (2004a), they have favoured employees 
in safe government jobs too. 
Figure 2.15: Increase in Real Daily Wages, by Wages Decile 1983 to 2000 
 
Source: World Bank (2006b: 30) 
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Figure 2.16: Increase in Real Daily Wages, by Wages Decile 1983 to 2000 
 
Source: World Bank (2006b: 30) 
 
 
Figures 2.15 and 2.16 illustrates how these two circumstances–output per worker and 
tax breaks for the middle classes–have impacted wage increases in certain segments 
of society since the early 1980s. Both figures relate increases in wages to existing 
wage deciles, with Figure 2.15 showing percentage wage increases and Figure 2.16 
the same data but in Rupees. Both figures show that wage increases have been 
concentrated in the higher wage deciles during the 1980s and 1990s.  
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Figure 2.17: Income distribution of Indian Households 1989–90 and 1998–99 
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Figure 2.18: Income Distribution of Indian Households 2002 and 2010 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2002 2010
Sh
a
re
 
o
f H
o
u
se
ho
ld
s 
by
 
In
co
m
e 
p.
a
.
< US$2,000 US$2,000 - US$4,200
US$4,200 - US$10,500 > US$10,500
 
Note: Nominal income given in current prices. Adapted from India Brand Equity Foundation (2011: 
36) 
  
Figure 2.17 and Figure 2.18 show how this pattern of wages growth has impacted 
India’s income distribution at four different points in time. The two figures come from 
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different surveys on incomes and use different income bands. Despite this, they 
clearly show that between the end of the 1980s and the present day a substantial 
stratum of Indian households has emerged whose income surpasses survival levels of 
consumption. Figure 2.17 illustrates this pattern for the nine-years between 1989–90 
and 1998–99. It is based on a survey of 100,000–250,000 households (depending on 
the year) where the head of household was asked to report the family’s annual 
income. During this period, 14% of the total number of households in 1998–99, 
arrived in the part of the income distribution that earned greater than US $1,700 per 
annum. The size of this group at the turn of the twenty-first century was nearly 25.8% 
of households (Sridharan, 2004a: 412). Figure 2.18 covers the period between 2002 
and 2010; in 2002, 28% of Indian households earned more than US $2,000 per 
annum, and in 2010, this group grew to 48%.  
 
Despite India’s middle classes often being pointed to as an important source of 
domestic demand for all kinds of output (Asian Development Bank, 2010; Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2008; Deutsche Bank, 2010; India Brand Equity Foundation, 2011; 
McKinsey, 2007) and as a political force capable of influencing policy (Fernandes 
and Heller, 2006; Singh, 2006), there remains some debate in the literature on how to 
translate data on incomes into evidence on the size of this important group. The 
difficulty arises because what makes a person middle class is based on two criteria: a 
set of attitudes, backgrounds, and political orientations, and a level of income 
determined to fall somewhere between being poor and being rich (Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2008). Researchers usually adopt a definition of what is survival-level income, 
and then define the middle classes as those who earn more than this amount but less 
than some upper-level income above which a person would be classified as rich 
(Asian Development Bank, 2010: 5). Even with this simplified and pragmatic route to 
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defining the middle class though, many choices need to be made, and income ranges 
that purport to define this class cover a wide range of values. Consequently, estimates 
of the size of the middle class cover a large range. In 2005, the lowest estimate of the 
middle class in India was 50 million people (McKinsey, 2007: 10) and the highest 
estimate was 274 million people (Asian Development Bank, 2010: 8). It is without 
doubt a wide range, but nevertheless a range that includes only very large numbers. 
Even at McKinsey’s more modest estimate, the Indian middle class still number the 
same as the total population of England in the 2001 census (Office for National 
Statistics, 2011). The more bullish end of the estimates puts India’s middle class as 
the second largest in the world, only after China (Asian Development Bank, 2010: 6). 
What is also true of India’s middle classes is that as long as their definition mostly 
contains groups similarly defined to those shaded in dark grey in Figures 2.17 and 
2.18, other researchers have come to the same conclusion as is so clear from the 
charts. India’s middle class has been expanding at an impressive rate since the 1980s 
(Asian Development Bank, 2010: 8; Deutsche Bank, 2010: 2; India Brand Equity 
Foundation, 2011: 37; McKinsey, 2007: 13). These middle-class consumers, in 
tandem with the services-led pattern of growth outlined above, play an important role 
in providing the demand for income-elastic services and manufactured goods which in 
turn have played a central role in India’s growth pattern (McCartney, 2010: 92). Not 
surprisingly, then, they have also played an important role in the part of India’s 
growth pattern which was researched in the project and is analysed in the rest of the 
thesis.  
 
The following section both provides a summary of this chapter and some comments 
on how its contents are relevant to the chapters which follow.  
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2.3 New research against the new backdrop: How this project fits in  
 
The discussion in this chapter offers a summary of two major trends which together 
created a favourable environment for the IT sector. Section 2.1 presented data that 
showed a rapid uptake for information technologies in the developed world and 
outlined how it affected both economic growth and the nature of competition in 
developed countries. The analysis remains agnostic on the possibility that IT is at the 
centre of a neo-Schumpeterian long wave of technical change, but demonstrates that it 
certainly has been adopted quickly in industries in developed countries, leading to two 
important changes for the emergence of the IT sector in India. First, the rate of IT 
adoption was too fast to be matched by output of suitably qualified staff in developed 
countries, thus creating a shortage of skilled IT workers. Second, the installation of IT 
systems brought about vastly improved co-ordination and communication both within 
and between firms. This latter improvement in capabilities, in tandem with 
international trade liberalisation treaties and policies, enabled Western firms to begin 
to compete through outsourcing non-core businesses to the most cost and/or quality 
effective locations around the world. As IT was vitally important to many industries’ 
growth, and because most firms had neither IT systems as their core competency nor 
the ability to easily and quickly recruit trained staff, many successful firms in 
developed countries turned to outsourcing to satisfy their IT needs. This sequence of 
events created a background of a demand for IT and an acceptance of offshoring as a 
means to deliver it, creating the circumstances for the Indian IT industry to grow, and 
for its study in the current project.  
 
Section 2.1.2 covered both the uses and impact of IT since the 1980s, including a 
summary of both experimental and ideal uses of IT systems and a review of the 
literature on the impact of these uses. The evidence shows that adoption of IT has 
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been an important driver of both GDP and productivity in developed countries since 
the late 1980s, and firm-level studies have recently begun to find IT also relevant for 
these outcomes in less-developed countries. It is a pattern of evidence on developing 
countries which is immediately reminiscent of that which appeared on developed 
countries just before the “productivity paradox” was resolved in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. At that time there was no evidence based on macro-level data for a 
positive impact of IT on growth and productivity in the Western world. The first 
positive impacts were noticed in firm-level data similar to that which has recently 
yielded positive impacts in developing countries. This suggests that these first studies 
in developing countries may be a leading indicator of a much wider role for IT in 
improving productivity and output in those countries. In turn, it is suggestive of the 
possibility that IT use in India, including uses arising from the IT sector’s forward 
linkages, might prove just as positive. The current state of the literature on the impact 
of IT highlights the need for more research in developing countries and, in particular, 
more of the kind of research that is included in the following chapters. 
 
A similar situation prevails in the current state of the literature on outsourcing. 
Section 2.1.3 finds that evidence from the developed world shows that outsourcing 
does indeed have a positive impact on productivity in the firms and industries which 
use it. However, the literature review finds only one study of outsourcing in 
developing countries. This study, which covers outsourcing of services from 
manufacturers in India, found a stronger effect on productivity than is the norm 
amongst studies in developed countries (Banga and Goldar, 2004). This is consistent 
with the possibility that firms in developing countries gain more in terms of learning 
from outsourcing relationships because of the advice available from experienced 
partners in the developed world. However, with such a small amount of evidence, it is 
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too early to conclude from the literature that this is indeed the case and, therefore, 
there is a need for more research. The literature review on the impact of outsourcing 
also reveals that there are no existing studies on the impact of IT outsourcing 
considered separately from other business services. This is an important omission if 
IT outsourcing does different and possibly more valuable jobs for the companies that 
buy it versus other types of outsourcing. In short, what the review of the literature on 
outsourcing finds is that there are now two important gaps: a need for more research 
on outsourcing from firms in developing countries, and a need for research on IT 
outsourcing considered separately from other services. The work in the following 
chapters occupies these gaps.  
 
Section 2.3 moves from the emergence and role of IT to outline the recent history of 
India’s economy. The section first outlines scholars’ debates on the causes of its 
significant acceleration starting in 1980 and then highlights some of the drivers of 
rapid economic growth thereafter. Along with a large fiscal expansion, another 
important contributor to growth was a particular style and sequence of reforms which 
was undertaken in Indian manufacturing during the 1980s and 1990s. According to 
Virmani (2006), one of India’s most senior government economists, first “pro-
business” reform and then “pro-market” reform were enacted and this combination 
led to increased corporate sector investment and, thus, growth. The reforms gave 
Indian manufacturers a window of opportunity in the pro-business period to prepare 
for the pro-market reform that introduced competition from foreign companies. That 
these policies successfully brought investment and acceleration around 1980 is 
important to this project. The research described in the chapters that follow suggests 
that one of the investment opportunities which were taken up during this period was 
the purchase of IT hardware and software. This happened not only in manufacturing 
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firms in the 1980s, but also later, when a similar scheme of reform was carried out in 
services. The importance of these later reforms is discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Section 2.3 covers which sectors of the Indian economy have grown the fastest in 
recent decades and which groups in society have most benefited from this growth. 
India’s experience runs contrary to received wisdom on development, which usually 
predicts that industrialisation and manufacturing lead growth. In India, it is services 
industries that have been replacing agriculture, as development leads to structural 
change. Partly as a consequence of this unusual sector-wise composition of growth, 
and partly for other reasons, the major beneficiaries of India’s economic growth in the 
past 30 years have been its middle class. Rather than lifting the most desperate out of 
poverty and into a sustainable level of consumption, India’s recent pattern of 
economic growth has concentrated on those who started with some advantages. This 
now-sizeable group has, as a result, been able to continue to consume non-essential 
products and services in ever increasing quantities. The discussion here stopped short 
of examining how and why these features of India’s economy are relevant for the 
current research. This omission is rectified in Chapter 6, where it is found that middle-
class demand for income elastic goods and services is important to the emergence of 
substantial domestic forward linkages from the IT sector. It also turns out in Chapters 
5 and 7 that in many cases it is the services sectors that both satisfy this middle class 
demand, and make up the domestic market for SWIS.  
 
The next chapter, Chapter 3, provides a review of the literature which considers the 
Indian IT sector specifically, and analyses its role in India’s economy.  
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3. The Literature: Incredulous about IT in India 
 
 
“And our nation, though it has no drinking water, electricity, sewage system, 
public transportation, sense of hygiene, discipline, courtesy, or punctuality, 
does have entrepreneurs. Thousands of them. Especially in the field of 
technology. And these entrepreneurs—we entrepreneurs—have set up all these 
outsourcing companies that virtually run America now.”  
 
Aravind Adiga, The White Tiger, (2008:4) 
 
 
The literature on the IT sector in India has two major strands. The first documents and 
explains the sector’s emergence and fast growth, and the second evaluates the role of 
the sector in the wider Indian economy. This chapter argues that both of these strands 
are permeated with a sense of surprise or disbelief similar to Aravind Adiga’s. 
Economists don’t make generalisations about India’s sense of courtesy, punctuality or 
hygiene, but they frequently express surprise that a substantial IT exporting sector has 
arisen in the country. They often follow that by contributing a new explanation for the 
sector’s unfathomable existence and success. It is on the hypothesis that the sector 
might play a wider role in the Indian economy that incredulity about IT in India really 
shows though. According to the literature, the IT sector has very few linkages of any 
kind in the domestic economy, and, forward linkages, in particular, have been 
woefully inadequate. Where it looks to the future, the literature is even less optimistic. 
It finds that, despite Indian firms having contributed to successful automation in 
America and Europe, it is unlikely in the short- to medium-term future that they will 
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do the same at home. On the question of IT being or becoming a leading sector then, 
the literature answers resoundingly in the negative. 
 
The remainder of this chapter reviews these two strands of literature. Section 3.1 
describes the sector, its markets, and its size with current facts and statistics. 
Explanations for the sector’s stellar growth trajectory are reviewed in Section 3.2, 
while Section 3.3 covers the literature written on the sector’s wider role in the Indian 
economy. Section 3.4 concludes by stating the reasons for questioning the pessimism 
in the latter set of literature, in turn justifying the current research described in the 
chapters that follow. 
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3.1 Stellar Growth in the IT Sector 
Figure 3.1 shows the size of the IT sector in India since 1985 in terms of its revenue 
earnings. Composed of Hardware (HW), Software & IT Services (SWIS) and IT 
Enabled Services/Business Process Outsourcing (ITES-BPO)18, the sector’s total 
revenues are now over 400 times higher than they were in 1985-86. This increase, 
from US$234m in the mid 1980s to over US$90bn in 2010-11, translates to a 
compound annual growth rate of around 26% per year over 25 years 
Figure 3.1: Revenue of Indian IT Sector (HW, SWIS, ITES-BPO) 
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(1999b:2); Kenney and Dossani (2002: 237); Kumar and Joseph (2005: 94); NASSCOM (2008a: 1); 
NASSCOM (2009a: 6, 203); NASSCOM (2011: 1); Sridharan (2004b: 34, 37). 
Note: (E) = estimate by NASSCOM (2011). 
This impressive and consistent growth performance has not surprisingly begun to 
contribute to India’s GDP. Figure 3.2 shows India’s total GDP and the total output of 
the IT sector in current $US dollars. The IT sector’s share of GDP has increased from 
                                                 
18
 These terms are defined in detail in Chapter 4.  
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0.1% in 1985 to 6.2% in 2010-11. This is still only a small share of the overall output 
of the economy, but it is a share that has been growing quickly. This is reflected in 
Figure 3.3 which shows the share of total GDP growth in each of the last 15 years that 
has come directly from the IT sector and demonstrates that growing IT revenues have 
been a significant contributor to economic growth. During the period, the sector has 
contributed an average of close to 10% of GDP growth per year. 
 
Figure 3.2: India’s GDP with IT Sector Output  
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Figure 3.3: IT Sector’s Contribution to GDP Growth 
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Notes: IT output as per Figure 3.1. 
 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the sector’s contribution to employment and export 
revenues, respectively. Employment in the sector has expanded rapidly, from 71,300 
IT professionals in 1992-93 (the earliest year available) to 2.5 million in 2010-11. The 
IT sector also contributes a substantial, and increasing, proportion of India’s exports. 
The IT sector’s share in total gross exports from India reached 24% in 2010-11, up 
from 0.6% in 1985-86.  
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Figure 3.4: Employment of IT Professionals in the Sector 
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Figure 3.5: India’s Exports with IT Sector Exports 
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Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, (2011)  
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These exports are not only significant within the Indian economy. Figure 3.6 places 
them in their international context by reporting exports of IT and ITES-BPO, 
excluding HW, in 2007 for the top 15 exporters worldwide. India comes fifth in this 
ranking, which is the highest position outside of Europe or the United States. Figure 
3.7 provides the same ranking, but for export growth between 2000 and 2007. It 
shows that India’s exports of IT are growing faster than any other country in the 
world. 
 
Figure 3.6: Exports of IT and ITES-BPO in 2007 for Top 15 Countries (US$ billion) 
 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2009: 77) 
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Figure 3.7: Growth in Exports of IT and ITES-BPO, 2000–2007 (%), for Top 15 Countries 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2009: 78) 
Figure 3.8 offers a breakdown of IT sector revenues by its component industries over 
the period from 1985-86 to the present. It shows that SWIS is not only by far the 
largest of the three industries in the sector, it was also the first to experience sustained 
and rapid growth (Kumar and Joseph, 2005: 94). Of the other two, HW makes up only 
a small proportion of the total revenues of the sector; although it predates SWIS, it 
never had the same success (Chandrasekhar, 2001: 16). ITES-BPO, on the other hand, 
has experienced fast growth since its arrival in India in the mid-late 1990s (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers 2005:15), and is an important part of the IT sector’s success 
story. The dramatic growth in ITES-BPO came after and, according to many authors, 
as a result of SWIS (Arora and Gambardella, 2005: 292).  
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Figure 3.8: The Indian IT Sector by Its Component Industries (SWIS, HW, ITES-BPO) 
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NASSCOM (2009a: 6, 203); NASSCOM (2011: 1); Sridharan (2004b: 34, 37). 
Notes: (E) = estimate by NASSCOM (2011). 
  
Figure 3.9 drills down further, to examine SWIS revenues by its destination market in 
the period between 1985-86 and 2003-0419. It reveals that although the domestic 
market has been growing, the increase in SWIS revenues in the 1990s was 
accompanied by a falling share of output being sold to the Indian domestic market. In 
short, it reveals that the impressive growth trajectory illustrated above has been built 
predominantly on success in SWIS exports. 
                                                 
19
 This data is updated to 2010-11 in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 3.9: Software and IT Services Revenue, Domestic vs. Exports, 1985-86 to 2003-04 
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It is perhaps not surprising given the picture revealed by Figures 3.8 and 3.9 that the 
majority of the large body of literature that explains the growth of the IT sector in 
India focuses on the success of Indian SWIS in export markets. Section 3.2 is a 
review of this literature. 
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3.2 A simple cause hidden amongst an abundance of explanations 
 
Surprise seems to be the most common initial reaction in the literature to the 
industry’s success in exporting SWIS. Opening sections of contributions on the 
sector’s early history have described it as “phenomenal” (Kumar, 2001: 4278), 
“striking” (Commander, 2005: 1), “unprecedented” (Joseph and Harilal, 2001: 3266), 
and both “extraordinary” and “remarkable” (Athreye, 2005: 7). Perhaps for this 
reason, there has been an inordinate amount of attention on the reasons for the 
sector’s accomplishments. Interest has in fact been so consistent, that 20 years after 
the first articles and books were published on the subject20, new explanations continue 
to emerge and literature continues to accumulate. This section reviews these 
contributions, and finds that, confusingly, both government intervention and, its 
opposite, free market-led development, are argued to be the most important. This 
review argues that the existence of this contradiction in the literature suggests that 
neither of these two opposing theories can, on its own, explain the sector’s success. 
Instead, the chain of events and consequences that brought about such impressive 
growth rests on a simple story: the sector’s early success was the result of the 
government and the private sector working, sometimes even intentionally, towards the 
same goal: to exploit a genuine opportunity for India which existed as a result of 
technological changes in the rest of the world. The remainder of this section teases 
this story out of the literature, beginning with a review of the debate on government 
intervention.  
 
                                                 
20
 Robert Schware published a paper on reasons for the IT sector’s growth in 1992, Jyoti Saraswati 
published on the same subject in 2009. These may not have been the first or most recent publications 
on the subject, but they do illustrate nearly 20 years of attention.  
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The pro-intervention faction argues, in line with a heritage of literature dating back to 
List (1856), that infant industry policy on IT was the crucial reason for the industry’s 
success. Saraswati (2008) is perhaps the clearest voice in this set of contributions21. 
According to Saraswati, the policy of providing protected domestic markets for HW 
in the 1970s was crucial. This policy led to IBM establishing a hardware 
manufacturing and maintenance operation in India rather than exporting there from a 
base abroad. Once the Indian government insisted that IBM either reduce its non-
Indian equity ownership to 26% or close its operations, the conditions for the 
emergence of the SWIS industry were in place (p. 1142). At the time, IBM was the 
only major supplier of IT hardware, so when it decided to leave India, a government 
enterprise, Computer Maintenance Corporation, was established for the sole purpose 
of overseeing its operations. This state-owned enterprise then became the major 
player in HW maintenance (p. 1140), which is why SWIS skills emerged for the first 
time in India outside of a multinational company. After the Minicomputer Policy of 
1971 was enacted and 40 HW import licences had been issued, a generation of SWIS 
firms was born and demand for skills in HW and SWIS grew (p. 1147). In Saraswati’s 
analysis, two subsequent policies unlocked the substantial export success that these 
firms achieved; the New Computer Policy of 1984 and, from 1991 onwards, the 
Software Technology Parks (STP) scheme. The New Computer Policy reduced the 
customs duty on HW from 135% to 60% (p. 1147), and the STP scheme allowed the 
government to set up business parks in various cities. It also provided each business 
that relocated to a business park with satellite communications that enabled them to 
export via email and telephone and incentivised export work by offering tax 
exemptions on export revenues (p. 1149–50). Overall, Saraswati describes 
                                                 
21
 Heeks (1996); Joseph (2002); Joseph and Harilal (2001); and Kumar and Joseph (2005) are others in 
the same vein. 
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government intervention as “integral in promoting” the SWIS industry (p. 1139), and 
he has elsewhere pointed to this set of policies as the most significant example of a 
“developmental state” (Saraswati, 2009: 1), since that phrase was popularised by 
Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) in their analyses of East Asian economies. 
 
Ironically, the same set of infant-industry policies analysed by Saraswati have been 
interpreted by the other faction writing on the sector as a case study on the benefits of 
governments not interfering in market-led processes. Perhaps the clearest of these 
critiques is the observation that the policies just analysed failed to achieve their 
intended purpose: to build a substantial HW manufacturing industry. While 
government intervened extensively into the HW industry, the early stages of the 
SWIS industry was accompanied by little government attention and virtually no 
interventions and controls. As Singh (2002: 25) puts it: “there are over 400 central 
government statutes governing manufacturing, as well as numerous state laws….  
[t]he software industry escaped these constraints partly by not being recognized by the 
government as an industry by itself.”22Another critique on government intervention in 
Indian IT comes from Evans’s (1992) look at policy in the 1980s, in which he argues 
that it benefited the SWIS sector by removing or relaxing previous government 
intervention. In particular, Evans argues that the policies which constrained the import 
of HW (so that Indian HW manufacturers could emerge in the presence of little 
competition) held the SWIS industry from growth. In his analysis, policy in the 1980s 
marked a clear change from these restrictive interventions and from state-owned 
production in the 1960s and 1970s (Evans, 1992: 1). It was this removal, he argues, 
that was responsible for the subsequent development in the SWIS sector. Ghemawat 
and Patibandla (1998: 1197) continue in the same vein by arguing that liberalising 
                                                 
22
 This point is also made by Kaushik and Singh (2004: 594) and Miller (2001: 31). 
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reforms in India in 1991, which removed various macroeconomic interventions23, 
were responsible for increased sales in export markets and even lead to improved 
technical capacity in some SWIS firms.  
 
The fact that contradictory conclusions can arise from analyses of the same set of 
policies reveals more about the analyses than about the policies themselves. In 
arguing that government policies at the beginning of the SWIS era were universally 
beneficial to the rise of SWIS exports, Saraswati (2008) twice misses that removal of 
restrictions on HW imports actually contributed to the emergence of SWIS firms; first 
in 1971, with the first issuance of HW import licences, and then in the mid-1980s 
when tariffs were reduced. However, Saraswati is not alone in being guilty of 
selective reportage of events. The authors seeking to argue that the removal of state-
led development in the IT sector was mostly beneficial skate over the importance of 
the STP scheme and its undoubted beneficial impact on SWIS exports (Evans 1992, 
Ghemawat and Patibandla, 1998). Rectifying these omissions, however, yields a fairly 
mottled picture; some government policies were beneficial for SWIS exports, whilst 
others clearly hampered its growth. This implies that, taken together, government 
policies were neither the main reasons for the sector’s success nor massive deterrents 
to it. Analysed in this light, the inconclusive evidence on government policy is 
suggestive of the need for an entirely different explanation of the sector’s success.  
 
                                                 
23
 See Chapter 2 for more detail on these reforms. 
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Literature in the pro-market category identifies comparative advantage24 as the key 
driver of a market-driven growth story for SWIS, providing one possible alternative 
narrative. These publications all point to data like that presented in Figure 3.10 which 
demonstrate that, as SWIS exports were becoming successful, India enjoyed an 
advantage in software arising from cheaper wages for IT staff (Athreye, 2005: 20; 
Chandrasekhar, 2001: 18–19; Desai, 2003: 9; Heeks, 1996: 115; Joesph 2002:13; 
NASSCOM, 2007b: 10). 
Figure 3.10: Cost of IT Labour in India, the US and the UK in 1995 
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Source: Athreye 2005:20 (Table 8) 
 
Whilst this absolute wage differential undoubtedly helped the SWIS industry export 
to developed country markets like the United States, it is not sufficient by itself to 
identify a comparative advantage as per Ricardo’s theory (1817: Ch. 7). Arora and 
Athreye (2001: 6) address this by carrying out an application of the theory to this case 
                                                 
24
 The theory of comparative advantage says that two countries can both gain from trade if they have 
different relative costs for producing the same set of goods. Even if one country is more efficient (low 
cost) in the production of all goods, under particular circumstances it can still gain by purchasing 
particular goods from a less-efficient country. Gains are available as long as the less efficient country 
produces the goods being traded more efficiently than the other products it makes, and as long as the 
efficiency difference between the products in the selling country is bigger than the efficiency difference 
in the buying country (Ricardo, 1817). 
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study. They examine the ratio of Indian labour productivity in the SWIS industry to 
that in manufacturing, and then compare this ratio to that of other countries25. Figure 
3.11 reproduces their analysis.  
Figure 3.11: 1995 Productivity in Manufacturing and Software across Countries 
($'000)
Manufacturing: 
Value Added per 
Employee (1)
Software: Revenue per 
Employee (2) Index (2/1)
Israel 38.3 100 2.61
India 4.1 8.93 2.18
France 77.143 161.32 2.09
USA 98.2 126.02 1.28
Ireland 117.1 142.24 1.22
Finland 76.16 83.46 1.1
Source: Arora and Athreye (2001: 29) 
 
Arora and Athreye (2001: 6) observe that India is more productive in software relative 
to manufacturing than all other countries, with the exception of Israel. In particular, 
India’s productivity in software is more than twice its productivity in manufacturing. 
In the United States, which was the destination for 65% of India’s software exports in 
1997 and 1998 (Heeks 1999b: 5), the same ratio is lower at 1.28. This demonstrates 
that India does indeed have a comparative advantage in software, so it is no surprise 
that India exports software to the United States. With productivity in the two sectors 
in the two countries as shown these are exactly the kinds of transactions that free-
market trade theory would predict. According to Ricardo’s theory, once trade is 
possible, both countries will benefit. 
 
Beneficial trade is of obvious relevance to the surge in India’s SWIS exports, but it is 
also a rather unsatisfying answer to the question this section addresses. Discovering 
                                                 
25
 Arora and Athreye (2001: 6) use value-added as the index of labour productivity in manufacturing 
and revenue per employee as the index of labour productivity in software. This is because 
manufacturing depends on raw materials inputs, whilst software requires fewer material inputs but is 
relatively more labour- and worker- intensive.  
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that trade in software occurred because there was a benefit to both sides is helpful, but 
it does not explain why such a benefit existed. In other words, it does nothing to 
explain why the productivity figures in Figure 3.11 are what they are. To understand, 
it is necessary to put Figure 3.11 in context and to understand qualitative aspects of 
the history of both manufacturing and SWIS in India. On this issue, Arora and 
Athreye (2001: 24) offer that: “This comparative advantage in turn hinges on the 
availability of a large workforce that is English speaking and technically trained, and 
in the relative disadvantage that the economy has in manufacturing due to poor 
infrastructure investments in the past”. It is a situation which does not exist in every 
developing country, and so may be a unique outcome of India’s particular history. For 
example, the prevalence of the English language in India is undoubtedly a result of 
being a British colony. What is perhaps more transferable as a lesson on development 
though, is the impact that India’s historical policy regime has had on its current 
productivity. Both India’s pool of technically trained labour and its poor productivity 
performance in manufacturing can be linked to decisions taken during its period of 
centrally planned, state-led development in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. In that 
period, policies aimed at developing self-sufficiency in heavy industry led both to 
higher-level technical engineering training being offered in public education and to 
the implementation of many controls and interventions on the private sector’s 
activities in manufacturing. These changes had direct effects on later productivity 
levels in software and manufacturing. The wide availability of technical education 
directly led to the existence of a trained workforce that was later required for high 
productivity in SWIS (Bhatnagar, 2006: 103; Kochar et al., 2006: 18),  and the 
existence of controls and interventions eventually proved detrimental to 
manufacturing productivity (Ahluwalia, 1985: ch.7). 
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To summarise this review of the literature then, historical government policy, from 
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, provided the first link in the chain of events which led to 
the IT sector’s success. This unintentionally created a comparative advantage for 
SWIS in India as a side effect of attempts to promote industrialisation. Then, from the 
1980s onward, the private sector exploited this comparative advantage to great effect. 
At first this process took place in spite of generally unhelpful or neutral policy (like 
restrictions on the import of hardware) from governments that were more interested in 
hardware manufacturing. Later on though, supportive policies like the STP scheme 
and tax breaks on exports were much more helpful.  
 
This narrative, however, cannot, by itself, explain the growth of SWIS exports. 
Having a supply of well-trained and relatively low-cost IT technicians would have 
been insufficient to cause the boom in Indian IT exports if there had not also been 
excess demand for these tasks to be completed in developed countries. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, this huge demand started the late 1980s and early 1990s, and despite 
scant attention on it in the literature on the Indian IT sector, its existence is really the 
most important cause of the sector’s strong performance. The simple story which 
explains the emergence and strong performance of the sector is that because of 
technical change in western countries there was a shortage of IT workers. India, for 
the reasons discussed in this section, was in a position to step in to offer the required 
manpower. It is this simple story which explains why the sector’s success is so 
surprising. In this case study, government and private sector activities intertwined to 
exploit an opportunity, and this was, with a few exceptions, successful. But without 
the inherent potential of the opportunity itself, even this joint effort would not have 
had “phenomenal” or “striking” results. It may well be rare to find both government 
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and the private sector combining to bring a high-tech industry to a developing 
country. It is rarer still to find such an industry, where demand is so large and fast-
growing that developed countries cannot meet their own needs for qualified workers. 
The reasons and circumstances which have been identified in this section combined to 
help India take advantage of such a rare and unique moment, and it was this which 
secured a “remarkable” event in India.  
 
The next section evaluates the literature that analyses IT’s wider impact on India’s 
development.  
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3.3 Abject pessimism on the IT sector’s wider impact 
There is no doubt from the evidence presented in Section 3.1 that the growth of SWIS 
exports has made a contribution to India’s economy through its impact on GDP 
growth, employment, and export revenues. However, the IT sector’s overall large and 
ever-increasing size means that it is utilising a similarly large and ever-increasing 
number of resources to produce that contribution. This section reviews the literature 
on the benefits and costs through linkages of using those resources to produce IT26. It 
is a literature which is remarkably pessimistic. There are several contributions which 
argue strongly that the sector’s activities are having negative implications for other 
Indian industries, and only a few contributions which identify positive linkage effects. 
On the other hand there are many accounts which lament a lack of these beneficial 
effects and argue that they are unlikely to arise in the future. In particular, many 
authors complain about a lack of forward linkages into India. They argue that the 
sector’s “super” export orientation27 means forward linkage benefits which should 
accrue to India are actually felt abroad. Taken together, these publications give the 
overwhelming impression that the IT sector is neither appropriate for India, nor can it 
help with its development needs. As in the epigraph that began this chapter, the 
picture painted is of an incongruous set of activities which exist within India’s 
borders, but do not belong there.   
                                                 
26
 There are many possible implications of the IT sector’s existence that fall outside the scope of the 
current work because they are effects that do not apply to other Indian industries. For example, social 
outcomes, such as quality of work (e.g., Ramesh, 2004: 492), workers’ identity (e.g., D’Mello and 
Sahay, 2007), and gender equality (e.g., Ghosh, 2002:47), though of obvious importance to workers in 
the sector, are excluded from consideration here. 
27
 Heeks 1996:18 
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The rest of this section reviews this pessimistic literature, and is laid out as follows: 
Section 3.3.1 discusses backwards linkages28, or the possibility that purchases by IT 
sector firms and workers provide a stimulus to other sectors in the Indian economy by 
providing demand for their products. It also includes more general linkages. Section 
3.3.2 discusses forward linkages, and Section 3.3.3 concludes with an overall 
summary of linkages in the literature and a discussion of whether or not these are 
extensive. 
3.3.1 A dearth of backwards and other more general linkages 
The literature identifies only one backwards linkage arising from India’s IT sector: the 
emergence of a venture capital industry in India, as highlighted by Kenney and 
Dossani (2002). In providing a detailed description of that industry’s arrival in India, 
the authors recognise the importance of government policies (p. 235), but they also 
argue that the IT industry’s existence was necessary for the venture capital industry to 
get a foothold in India. Because the IT sector uses venture capital as an input to 
production, the sector has provided “a continuing flow of investment opportunities 
capable of growing sufficiently rapidly to the point at which they can be sold yielding 
a significant annual return on investment.” (p. 236). Without these opportunities, they 
argue, venture capital would neither have emerged in India, nor had the success it has, 
in fact, experienced.  
It is one bright spot amongst a dearth of positive views. According to Heeks (1996: 
19), the IT sector has no other backwards linkages within the country. Apart from 
venture capital, all of the IT sector’s other inputs are purchased from firms abroad. 
This benefits other countries by providing demand for their products rather than 
                                                 
28
 Different types of linkages were introduced in Chapter 1. They are defined fully in Chapter 4. 
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benefiting India by providing demand for the produce of other Indian industries. IT 
hardware is generally imported, and because exports have been the major driver of 
growth in the sector, travel and other marketing expenses have predominantly been 
incurred in the US or Europe (p. 75–76). This means that the IT sector cannot provide 
an impetus to growth in industries that supply these products within India. It also 
undermines the impact of one of the direct benefits to the Indian economy laid out in 
Section 3.1: the contribution to the Indian economy made by foreign exchange 
earnings arising from the sector’s exports. Recall from Figure 3.5 that the IT sector’s 
contribution to India’s exports exceeded 10% in 1999-00, and has continued to grow, 
contributing approximately 24% of India’s total exports in 2010-11. Taking into 
account use of foreign exchange for purchases made by the SWIS sector’s backward 
linkages abroad, however, reveals that these figures are an overstatement of the net 
inflow of foreign currency29. Heeks (p. 75–76) redresses this omission by providing a 
careful consideration of the patchy macro-level data on imports by the sector. His 
estimates suggest that correcting for these expenses would have left net export 
earnings at approximately 55% of gross earnings in 1994-95. Joseph and Harilal 
(2001: 3267) conduct a similar analysis at the micro-level, using a sample of IT firms. 
Their findings verify Heeks’s estimates, finding an import intensity of exports 
between 50% and 60% in all years between 1993 and 1997. Heeks goes on to say that 
these estimates may still under-state the true net foreign exchange earnings for India 
from the sector. They do not take into account the extent to which multinational SWIS 
firms based in India repatriate their profits, a phenomenon which might, according to 
him, account for a further 20% of SWIS gross export income (p. 76).   
                                                 
29
 Inflow of foreign currency has a macro-stability benefit, particularly in the context of avoiding 
another balance of payments crisis like that experienced by India in 1991 (outlined in Chapter 2). 
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What then, about backwards linkages from purchases by the sector’s workers? Could 
these provide demand for the products of other Indian industries? Figure 3.4 noted 
that the IT sector employed 670,000 people in 2002-03. It is a figure which, according 
to D’Costa, writing in that year, is somewhat misleading. D’Costa (2003: 219) does 
not question the numbers, but he does point to the composition of the IT workforce, 
noting that employment has not spread beyond the most educated in India’s 
workforce, who also live in the wealthiest parts of the country. Joshi (2004: 4176) 
adds further weight to this claim with a survey of the labour market in India. Her 
work confirms that the English language and technical skill requirements of export 
workers in the IT sector means that only the most privileged of the country’s 
workforce are able to consider the sector as a relevant career option. As D’Costa 
(2003) points out, what this means for India’s ongoing economic and human 
development is that the urgent need for employment amongst the poorest and 
uneducated masses is unlikely to be met by continued expansion of exports of IT. 
What it may also mean is that the IT sector’s educated workers are those who would 
have had reasonable salaries, even if the IT industry did not exist. If this is the case, 
then the existence of the sector does not create an additional demand for non-IT 
products in any substantial way. Perhaps even more deleterious to the possibility of 
backward linkages is the so-called brain drain. Heeks (1996: 94-95) estimates that 
India loses around 10-15% of its SWIS export workers every year to developed 
countries. Living abroad, their consumption requirements are filled by their host 
country, removing their demand for products produced in other Indian sectors. 
 
According to the literature, a lack of backward linkages is the least of the adverse 
effects arising from IT sector employment on export projects. There are two possible 
negative linkages from the IT sector to other Indian sectors. The first is a kind of 
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“Dutch Disease”30 arising from the “windfall boom” of export income accruing to the 
IT sector (Joseph and Harilal, 2001: 3268): The windfall boom means that talented 
and well educated workers earn very good salaries in the IT sector. Other sectors 
which might otherwise have offered these workers employment must match this 
salary or manage without the skilled labour they would otherwise have had. 
According to Joseph and Harilal (2001: 3268), this has led to contractions in output in 
these other sectors. Perhaps even worse, though, is an outcome which has not yet been 
occurred, but which D’Costa (2003: 212) argues could well happen in the future. By 
paying higher salaries to those that are already privileged, the IT sector is breeding 
inequalities which may one day lead to social unrest or conflicts, particularly because 
the benefits of working in the sector are very visible to those without privilege or 
access to education.  
 
The same gloom is reflected with consideration of a much wider possible set of 
“other” linkages which could be relevant, but do not fall neatly into Hirschman’s 
schema31. The current literature identifies very few incidences of any of this wide 
range of possible positive effects arising from the IT sector. In particular, 
Balasubramanyam and Balasubramanyam (1998: 293) bemoan an almost complete 
lack of learning spillovers from the IT sector to other Indian industries, and a wide 
reading of the literature finds that other authors agree with this assessment. 
Throughout the publications reviewed for this research project, only one example of 
other industries learning from the IT sector is available to refute this claim. Arora and 
                                                 
30
 “Dutch Disease” is a phrase used to describe negative effects elsewhere in the economy arising from 
an export boom, usually based on natural resources reserves. It is named after the experience of the 
Netherlands in the 1960s, when it witnessed a boom in natural gas and, consequently, experienced 
weaknesses in its manufacturing sector. The phrase first appeared in The Economist. (‘Dutch Disease’, 
1977:82-83).  
31
 They are neither backward linkages (where the transmission of growth occurs through the IT sector’s 
purchases) nor forward linkages (where the transmission of growth occurs through the IT sector’s 
sales) nor entrained wants. 
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Athreye (2001) point to the role of IT firms in leading India’s wider industrial sector 
to adopt modern business practices. According to these authors, practices such as 
good corporate governance (as required by international financial markets) and 
equity-based reward systems for senior staff have been widely adopted in IT firms, 
and then copied by the rest of the old economy. Unfortunately, Arora and Athreye fail 
to present convincing evidence that these changes were, in fact, learnt from the SWIS 
sector and not from other industries’ own dealings with the Western world. They are 
similarly unable to identify any concrete positive impacts of these changes on 
productivity or output in the general Indian economy.  
 
In summary then, the literature on backwards and general linkages from the IT sector 
to other sectors in the Indian economy paints a rather bleak picture. One definite 
positive backward linkage into venture capital and two possible learning spillovers of 
corporate governance and equity-based reward schemes are the only favourable 
effects identified. Instead, the majority of backwards linkages are abroad, and a fair 
proportion of foreign exchange earnings go straight out of India to pay for expenses. 
On employment, the fact that a significant number of educated export workers take 
jobs abroad means that these workers also do not contribute to backwards linkages. 
What is perhaps worse is that, far from contributing to positive outcomes in other 
sectors by providing a demand for their products, IT is simply absorbing workers. In 
doing so, the IT sector is starving other domestic sectors of the skilled workforce they 
need, and in the process bidding up the salaries they must pay.  
 
3.3.2 No forward linkages, and no hope for them arising in the future 
This section covers the literature on the linkage that is most important for the research 
in the remainder of the thesis - that which is concerned with the extent and 
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consequences of the sector selling its output to Indian firms; in other words, forward 
linkages. In the main, contributions in the literature start by analysing or commenting 
on the relative size of domestic versus export revenues32 , or on the export versus 
domestic orientation of a sample of IT firms (see Figure 3.12). This data is almost 
universally interpreted as showing insufficient amounts of domestic sales. Authors 
argue that the sector pays “inadequate attention” to the domestic market (Kumar and 
Joseph, 2005: 99); that it is preoccupied with exports (Kohli, 1991); or even that the 
domestic market has been “neglected” (Heeks, 1996: 72) or “eclipsed” by exports 
(Schware, 1992: 150).  
Figure 3.12: Export Orientation by Share of Revenue for a Sample of IT Firms in 2002 
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Source: D’Costa 2006: 9  
Note: D’Costa’s statistics are from a survey of 102 NASSCOM members in Bangalore. 
Heeks (1999a) explains why a small domestic market is a problem for India’s wider 
development. He argues that: “Putting your brightest software stars to work on 
applications that boost the growth of foreign firms and foreign economies incurs a 
large opportunity cost when applications to meet the many pressing domestic needs 
are consequently sidelined” (p. 6). IT professionals engaged in export work make “no 
                                                 
32
 For SWIS, this is charted in Figure 3.9. 
 95 
skill input into the domestic market” (Heeks, 1996: 149), and because export work 
offers perks like travel abroad and exposure to Western technologies, talented workers 
involved in the domestic sector are often lured into export work (p. 131).  
It is a lamentable situation not only for Heeks, but also for a wide range of authors 
from across the ideological spectrum who argue that the rise of a domestic market for 
outsourced IT would be beneficial for India’s development. This position is so 
widespread, that amongst the many voices who argue for it (Chandrasekhar 2001: 1; 
Heeks,1999a: 9: Joseph, 2002: 2; Kumar and Joseph, 2005: 99; McCartney, 2006: 10 
Singh, 2002: 34), there is even a rare consensus between economists from the neo-
liberal orthodoxy (Dahlman and Utz 2005: xxix; International Monetary Fund 
2001:108) and Marxist-oriented heterodoxy (D’Costa, 2006: 25; Saraswati, 2009: 1). 
Agreement also comes from representatives of the directly affected parties. The trade 
body which represents the IT sector in India, the National Association of Software 
and Services Companies (NASSCOM), has a “domestic market initiative” which 
actively promotes members working with India’s non-IT sector (NASSCOM, 2008b: 
1). Representing the other directly affected party, non-IT firms in India, the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) goes even further, arguing in a joint paper with 
its hired consultants, that the IT sector’s involvement in private sector activity is not 
only desirable, but is “critical” for enabling economic growth (CII and Accenture, 
2007: 25). The discussion in Chapter 2, which analysed the literature on the impact of 
IT and of outsourcing elsewhere in the world, has already provided some justification 
for these calls. The results in Chapter 7 provide significantly more. For now though, 
the remainder of this section discusses the second set of findings in the literature on 
forward linkages—those that deal with the explanations of existing extent of forward 
linkages and their prognosis for the future.  
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On these issues, two well-known contributions offer in-depth analyses. Both start 
from the same position as the authors identified above, that the extent of forward 
linkages is small. Both also find, albeit for very different reasons, that the sector’s 
pattern of export-led growth may actually preclude the possibility of forward linkages 
emerging in the short- to medium-term. Perhaps the most popular of these two 
contributions is, according to Volynets (2007), the “bestselling” World Bank report 
penned by Dahlman and Utz in 2005. Theirs is an analysis that identifies market 
forces as the reason for export focus in the Indian IT industry. They argue that foreign 
firms can afford to pay more for Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICT), and so Indian IT firms cater to them first:  
On the one hand, India is reaping tremendous revenues from continuing to 
expand provision of distance services globally; on the other hand, the high 
fees garnered from providing foreign IT services pre-empt Indian companies 
from developing ICT applications to meet domestic needs. [Dahlman and Utz, 
2005: 114] 
 
Dahlman and Utz do not outline any specific solutions to this “major” (2005:114) 
issue, preferring to focus on the bigger picture: the transition to a “Knowledge 
Economy”. This broad concept is defined as encompassing “how any economy 
harnesses and uses new and existing knowledge to improve the productivity of 
agriculture, industry and services and increase overall welfare” (p. xvii). It clearly 
includes the types of activities that would occur if domestic firms used the IT industry 
to install new systems, but it also includes reams of other ways India’s firms and 
populace might utilise IT to improve productivity or welfare. The authors use macro-
level, cross-country score-cards, similar to those in Figure 3.13, as indicators of 
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whether this transition is likely and how long it might take. The diagrams show scores 
on knowledge-specific endowments and market-friendliness. The data is normalised 
so that for a country to perform better over time on a particular score, it must not only 
improve in absolute terms, but it also must improve faster than the rest of the 
comparator group of 140 countries.  
 
Figure 3.13: India KAM Basic Scorecard in 1995 and 2000, and Comparison with China in 2000 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2009). 
Whilst they do not explicitly say so, their choice of this methodology reveals a 
preoccupation with comparative advantage as the main determinant of where 
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knowledge-intensive industries locate. The theory predicts that in the absence of 
restrictions on trade, industries that use IT intensively will emerge wherever the 
endowments for this type of industry are relatively advantageous. It is only in these 
locations that they will be profitable enough to be able to pay the world price for IT, 
including for the types of outsourced IT sold by the Indian sector. According to this 
thinking, two things must happen before India’s firms will find it profitable to 
upgrade their information technology using the sector’s services. First, faster 
improvement in knowledge endowments, relative to endowments for other types of 
production and relative to other countries, must occur. India must overtake both 
developed countries and other developing countries in the ratio of knowledge 
endowments to endowments applicable for other types of production. Second, a 
policy and institutional environment that supports free trade must be in place so that 
India’s firms are able to participate and be competitive in global markets for 
knowledge-intensive products. Only then will India’s firms find it profitable to pay 
the high fees required by the Indian IT services sector. Dahlman and Utz do not 
acknowledge it, but their own data shows this eventuality may well be a long way off. 
The top pane of Figure 3.13 shows India’s position on knowledge endowments and 
free-trade friendliness relative to China. On all but one of the measures, China’s 
normalised score is significantly higher than India’s. The bottom pane shows India’s 
position in 1995 and in 2000; on some knowledge endowments, India has actually lost 
ground compared to other countries. On all the other measures, there has been very 
little change. 
 
In 2005, when Dahlman and Utz wrote their book, the comparative-advantage model 
for development was very much in the mainstream, so it is perhaps no surprise that 
this was the economic model underpinning the World Bank’s thinking on the place of 
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IT in the Indian economy. However, authors outside of the mainstream argue 
vigorously that it is not the most appropriate model. Heterodox authors concentrate on 
the circumstances under which developing countries can enter into new economic 
activities, not by changing what they have (their endowments) but by changing what 
they learn. Anthony D’Costa is one such author. Starting from the premise that most 
of the technology in the IT sector is tailored for developed countries, and therefore 
inappropriate for India, his influential 2003 publication uses Marxist analysis to see if 
social and productive relations in the sector are conducive to learning which might 
allow for the emergence of forward linkages. Finding the answer to this question to be 
no, he classifies the Indian IT sector as a exhibiting a negative version of “uneven and 
combined development”33.  
 
This pattern of development occurs when, in search of cheaper labour, a modern 
global industry establishes production within the borders of a less-developed country 
whose main economic activity is subsistence agriculture. The output of the new 
industry is too technologically advanced to be appropriate for the developing country 
to use, and its inputs are, apart from cheap labour, too advanced for the developing 
country to provide. This means that the presence of the industry does little for the 
development of the country; a proletariat emerges in the new industry, but traditional 
sectors do not respond and continue to develop slowly, without the newer technology. 
This unevenness is self-reinforcing. Locating in a less-developed country keeps global 
firms in a dominant position: they can produce using both the best technology and the 
cheapest labour. This offers them the ability to out-compete any new entrants and to 
invest in innovation which maintains their technological lead. In turn, this continued 
                                                 
33
 Trotsky’s original concept of uneven and combined development encompassed both positive and 
negative implications of developing countries existing alongside and trading with more developed 
countries (Trotsky, 1977: 23–27). D’Costa’s analysis of the IT industry in India diagnoses a negative 
version. 
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dominance raises barriers to entry for developing country firms in the modern sector, 
and thus raises the relative return for them to remain as subordinate suppliers of cheap 
labour for multinational companies. In the absence of independent industrialisation, 
the technology in the new sector never becomes appropriate for the general population 
of consumers and firms, and the unevenness of development continues unabated 
(Patnaik, 1997: 185).  
 
D’Costa argues that the particular version of uneven and combined development 
which applies to the Indian IT industry rests on two major issues. First, with so many 
people engaged in subsistence agriculture, the Indian economy is structurally unable 
to support wide-scale education to university level. Although there are large enough 
pockets of educated engineers sufficient to entice IT capitalism to India, the majority 
of the populace is, and will remain, insufficiently educated to participate (D’Costa, 
2003: 215). This has led to uneven development, with rapid growth of incomes 
amongst educated people working in the sector primarily in southern cities, and slow 
growth amongst the more numerous uneducated population, particularly in the west 
(p. 215–216). Second, global capitalists are so far ahead of Indian firms, that barriers 
to entrance in the industries that use IT are insurmountable. This means that the 
majority of Indian firms are not technically advanced enough to demand software or 
IT services (p. 222). The lack of domestic demand means that Indian IT firms can 
only fulfil the contracts offered by foreign companies, and these, in accordance with 
global firms’ interests in preventing catch-up in India, are low-value with very little 
learning. It is a self-reinforcing trap of underdevelopment. The dominance of global 
capital in IT sectors and in sectors using IT closes down any possibility of SWIS 
firms learning from non-IT firms in India, or vice versa, because neither is able to 
catch-up and learn for itself. In the end, according to D’Costa, a system is created in 
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which “fibre optic lines [are] running parallel with bullock carts” (cited in Reuters, 
2002: 1), and where, in the absence of “[p]olicies that deal explicitly with structural 
contradictions unleashed by uneven and combined development”, there is little to no 
hope for Indian firms to begin to utilise the industry’s services (D’Costa, 2003: 222). 
Figure 3.14: Bangalore: Uneven & Combined development? 
 
Source: Chen and Devnani (2006: 1). 
Of the two publications just reviewed— Dahlman and Utz (2005) and D’Costa 
(2003)—the prognosis for forward linkages from the IT sector is perhaps the most 
discouraging in D’Costa’s model. In his analysis, the focus on exports has trapped 
Indian SWIS firms into producing low-value, low-skilled services, directly preventing 
a domestic market for outsourcing from ever coming about. The situation is only 
marginally better in Dahlman and Utz because although they do at least offer some 
routes through which forward linkages might emerge in future, these are unlikely in 
the short term. In their analysis, there is potential for India to evolve its endowments 
to be better suited to IT-intensive production and this might lead to the emergence of 
forward linkages. However, for this to occur, endowments must accelerate past those 
of other countries; so that India becomes a relatively advantageous place to locate 
industries using IT, and this over-taking is exceedingly difficult to attain. In both 
cases, then, the prognosis for forward linkages into a domestic market is not 
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particularly positive. If either of these two analyses is correct, there is little chance of 
observing the growth of a significant domestic market in India in the early decades of 
the twenty-first century.  
3.3.3 Conclusion: IT is the opposite of a leading sector; it is an enclave 
 
The preceding sections reviewed the existing literature on the looming question that 
this thesis addresses. They analysed viewpoints on whether the IT sector has 
significant linkages, allowing it to be a leading sector in the Indian economy. Section 
3.3.1 argued that the literature on backwards and other linkages was very pessimistic, 
save for one backward linkage (venture capital) and two possible learning linkages 
(corporate governance and equity reward schemes). Authors found that the majority 
of backwards linkages led to foreign industries located abroad because many of the IT 
sector’s purchased inputs were not produced in India. On employment, a lack of 
favourable backwards linkages was joined by a negative effect arising from the 
windfall boom of export income. Skilled IT workers’ wages are high, which increases 
costs for other industries in India, who must compete with higher salaries to lure 
skilled workers. The discussion in Section 3.3.2 was perhaps even more negative. The 
literature review identified a large group of authors who found that forward linkages 
were woefully small. Despite their ideological differences, these authors were agreed 
that there could be substantial benefits to the Indian economy if this situation is 
rectified. Unfortunately two influential theoretical publications on this possibility 
were consistent in their implication: the prognosis is bleak. Neither predicted the 
emergence of substantial forward linkages in the short- to medium-term future.  
 
On the question of IT being a leading sector, or a sector with many linkages able to 
contribute to wider economic growth, the literature in these two sub-sections, taken 
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together, constitute a resounding no. In fact authors find the industry to be far more 
akin to the opposite of a leading sector identified in Chapter 1. Balasubramanyam and 
Balasubramanyam (1998) make this case very clearly. They draw a parallel between 
the modern IT industry in India and Singer’s colonial “enclaves” (1950). At first, it 
sounds like a far-fetched comparison. Singer’s enclaves produced basic primary 
commodities—a type of product far removed from software development or IT 
services. IT is neither basic, nor primary, nor a commodity. A deeper analysis, 
though, provides some parallels. Although software and IT services are not primary 
products, they, like Singer’s primary commodities, only become involved in other 
industries in the economy when used as intermediate goods to produce some final 
product. The Singer comparison is pertinent because, as with colonial enclaves, IT is 
exported and then used for the production of final goods in developed countries. This 
means that any output improvement or productivity gain brought about by use of 
Indian IT happens outside of India’s borders. More disappointing still is that these 
productivity gains may only be a first-round benefit for the destination countries. If 
use of IT leads to new or improved economic activity which embodies learning, it is 
the developed countries which import Indian IT that will enjoy these economic 
opportunities and not India. 
 
In Balasubramanyam and Balasubramanyam’s analysis, the IT industry in India 
behaves like the old extraction enclaves, offering no impetus for Indian firms to 
develop new capabilities. 
 
There are no obvious linkages between the sector and the rest of the economy, 
the engineers communicate with the clients or more specifically the computers 
in the clients’ firms abroad via the satellite link, flock together in the bars and 
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eating establishments in Bangalore during their leisure hours conversing in the 
lingua of bytes and ROMs of the trade. [Balasubramanyam and 
Balasubramanyam, 1998: 293] 
 
In short, according to the literature, because the sector has no significant domestic 
market, backwards linkages or other learning spillovers, it is a modern-day version of 
Singer’s enclaves. It is an industry in India which provides a highly lucrative 
investment for its owners, but whose benefits in terms of wider growth and 
development only occur abroad. 
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3.4 Tentative evidence that scepticism on linkages could be wrong. 
 
The three sections in this chapter reviewed the literature on the role of the IT sector in 
India’s economy. This analysis contributes two new arguments about the current 
literature’s pervading point of view. The first is that opinions on the sector are 
permeated with incredulity about the success so far and prospects for the future of IT 
in India. This manifests in the literature as a sense of surprise at India’s success in the 
IT industry. It is carried through into the literature on the sector’s impact on the wider 
economy where authors express both a lack of belief in existing linkages and a 
prediction that linkages will not occur in the future. Section 3.2 contributed the 
second new observation about the literature which is that there is, in fact, good reason 
to be surprised about the emergence and marked growth of the sector. Its success was 
the result of India being ready with the right kind of workforce and with 
entrepreneurial vigour during a unique moment in the history of IT as a budding 
technology. Opportunities when demand for a new technology is growing so quickly 
that the labour market in developed countries cannot keep up are rare. Times where 
government and private sectors have, intentionally or not, worked in the same 
direction to meet that need are rarer still.  
 
This final section makes a third new argument about the literature, one which is 
developed over the coming chapters: the incredulity in the literature on the sector’s 
wider role is misplaced. It is based on incorrect and out-of date-perceptions of what 
the sector does for India, and it is too pessimistic. Figure 3.15 shows the beginning 
evidence uncovered during the early stages of this research project, evidence that 
suggests this new argument is accurate. It illustrates four headlines which appeared in 
the news in India and abroad after 2005. Each of these headlines reads that the IT 
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sector is targeting or completing work in India. In other words, they all report the 
existence or emergence of forward linkages from the IT sector into India’s economy. 
Figure 3.15: Headlines from the Financial Newspapers in India and Abroad 
 
Source: The Economic Times (2008); Kurmanath (2008); Menon (2008); Merchant (2005). 
 
The journalists interviewed Indian IT industry executives, who expressed enthusiasm 
about the domestic market and a desire to complete projects there (Menon, 2008). The 
executives were optimistic about the size of the domestic market and its expected 
growth in coming years (Kurmanath, 2008); and they detailed particular strategies that 
their companies were planning to use to ensure that they are well-suited for 
completing domestic projects (Kurmanath, 2008; Merchant, 2005). 
 
These reports suggest an alternative hypothesis to the pessimism outlined in Section 
3.3, and indicate that, contrary to accounts in the reviewed literature, Indian firms are 
purchasing IT from the sector. When they do engage, Indian firms find IT companies 
that are interested in creating working relationships and have thought about their 
needs; in short, they find an IT partner that is willing and able to help. It is this 
alternative hypothesis that provides the impetus for the research laid out in the 
remainder of the thesis. Admittedly, the evidence found in newspapers is not rigorous, 
and it provides only snapshots of the IT sector’s situation in India. It does, however, 
suggest that the literature might be missing the true extent of forward linkages. If this 
is true, the literature might also be incorrect in its assessment of other linkages. To put 
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it bluntly, there is a need for new research which re-evaluates the findings on 
linkages.  
 
Chapter 4 translates this assessment into clear research questions and articulates a 
strategy to answer them. 
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4. The Research: Broad scope and extensive methods 
 
This chapter marks a dividing line. From here on, the thesis contains only original 
work initiated, researched, and analysed by this author on the Indian software and IT 
services (SWIS) sector. This new part of the thesis begins in this chapter with a 
discussion of the research and a description of the process. Section 4.1 is a review of 
the aims of the project and a discussion of the research questions. The goals are 
ambitious, leading to numerous and wide-ranging research questions and 
consequently to comprehensive research and findings. Section 4.2 sets out the 
systematic procedure that was followed to answer the research questions. The project 
involved a programme of qualitative research in the field; one substantial econometric 
model and one smaller one; an input–output analysis; and a tertiary study of existing 
private sector and government research. Each of these different methods was chosen 
to address a particular aspect of the research questions and great consideration was 
given to ensure that the methods were appropriate for the questions. Section 4.3 
concludes that the research project uses a vast array of data and techniques, and in 
doing so provides a strong demonstration of diverse and relevant research skills.  
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4.1 Ambitious aims and research questions 
 
The overarching aim of the new research is to validate or refute the hypothesis that 
the Indian software and IT Services (SWIS) sector is a leading sector as defined in 
Chapter 1. In other words, the aim of the project is to assess the current extent of all 
the SWIS sector’s direct and indirect linkages and to identify their impact on both 
linked sectors and macroeconomic outcomes. Forward linkages are of particular 
interest for two reasons. First, early evidence included at the end of Chapter 3 points 
to the existence of more forward linkages than were identified or predicted by the 
literature. This suggests that there are important questions to be addressed as to why 
the analyses in the literature appear incorrect. Second, there is the question regarding 
whether forward linkages have the potential to transform production processes. 
Chapter 2 found that in the developed world, use of IT in production has led to 
productivity gains large enough to impact GDP growth at the macro level. At its peak 
in the 1990s, this contributed 1.4 percentage points in the United States, and between 
10% and 30% of total GDP growth in other developed countries. If similar effects can 
be identified in India as a result of forward linkages from the sector, it would be a 
very important result. It was argued in Chapter 1 that productivity improvements not 
only lead to increases in output, but also to a desirable type of “high road” growth 
which has the potential to enable sustainable expansion based on reinvestments of 
profits, wages that guarantee a decent quality of life to workers, or both.  
 
Clearly, the need to assess all possible linkages with all possible industries in India 
that might be linked to SWIS necessitates a very wide empirical focus. This is 
compounded by the necessity of both identifying linkages and quantifying their size. 
For forward linkages two more areas to investigate are also included. That is to 
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identify what explains their current extent and growth and to quantify their impact on 
output and productivity. The remainder of this section explains how these wide-
ranging questions were approached. The first step was to convert them into several 
manageable and specific research questions; the second step made the research 
questions operational through clear definitions of words and phrases in them.  
Figure 4.1: Research Questions  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 diagrams the questions addressed in the research. It includes the 
overarching question which corresponds to the thesis’ overall conclusion and the three 
primary research questions (hereafter referred to as RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3). Each of the 
primary questions has several secondary research questions needed to clarify the 
Overarching Research Question: Is SWIS a leading sector in India? 
 
1. What is the current extent of direct and indirect linkages from SWIS 
and ITES-BPO? 
a. What is the current extent of direct backwards, forwards and 
other linkages?  
b. What is the current extent of indirect backwards and forwards 
linkages and how fast are they growing? 
 
2. What explains the size and growth trajectory of direct forward linkages 
from the SWIS sector? 
a. Are the arguments of D’Costa (2003) and/or Dahlman & Utz 
(2005) valid? 
b. Are there other explanations in the literature which have not yet 
been applied to this context but which are helpful? 
c. Is there another explanation not previously identified in any 
literature? 
 
3. What is the nature and size of the contribution that forward linkages 
from the SWIS sector make to outcomes in other parts of the Indian 
economy? 
a. What is the impact on firms that buy SWIS? 
b. What is the impact in different SWIS-buying industries? 
c. What is the impact on India’s economy overall? 
d. What is the process by which these contributions come about? 
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issues involved; for example, the secondary questions for RQ1 clarify the different 
types of linkages assessed to answer RQ1.  
 
The research questions rely on terms that were introduced in Chapter 1, such as 
leading sector and backward, forward, direct, and indirect linkages. Full definitions of 
these terms, alongside the definitions of the different IT-related sectors are given in 
Figure 4.2. The definitions of the IT sectors (HW, SWIS and ITES-BPO) are the same 
as consistently used by the Indian IT industry’s trade body, the National Association 
of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM). This is a pragmatic choice, as 
NASSCOM is the major source of available data on the size and activities of these 
sub-sectors (Desai, 2003: 2). In working with these definitions, the research is 
comparable with other work on the sector, including NASSCOM’s own research and 
that of government, private sector, and academic researchers.  
 112 
Figure 4.2: Definition of Terms in the Research Questions 
 
Source: NASSCOM (2009a: 251), Hirschman (1958) 
 
The research project focuses on the SWIS sector rather than the whole of the IT 
industry introduced and documented in Chapter 3. There are important reasons for 
this. The time and costs involved in assessing linkages from all parts of the IT sector 
were prohibitive in a project of the size envisaged. Additionally, the three IT-related 
sectors (HW, SWIS, and ITES-BPO) fall into different groups according to 
classifications which are important to the research. Perhaps the most important of 
these distinctions is that only two of the three sub-sectors actually produce IT. IT-
enabled services/Business process outsourcing (ITES-BPO), as its name suggests, 
SWIS Sector: The Software and IT Services sector is the industry in India which 
offers a full range of IT and software-related business-to-business services. These 
include custom application development, network consulting and integration, software 
testing, application management, IT outsourcing, software deployment and support, 
hardware deployment and support, IT training, IT consulting and systems integration, 
managed services, hosting services and support/maintenance, as well as sale and 
installation of packaged software in client businesses. 
 
ITES-BPO Sector: This is the industry in India that produces IT enabled 
service/Business Process Outsourcing, such as call centres, preparation of company 
accounts, and processing of bank account queries.  
  
SWIS–ITES-BPO: Together these two sectors make up the services part of the IT 
industry in India. Hardware, such as PCs, printers, and other peripherals, is excluded. 
 
Leading Sector: A sector which has a disproportionately large impact on macro-level 
economic growth because its expansion leads to growth of other sectors’ output 
through linkage effects 
 
Backward Linkage: Any process by which increased production in one sector 
prompts increased production in another sector which supplies inputs to the first. 
 
Forward Linkage: Any process by which increased production in one sector prompts 
increased production in another sector which buys inputs from the first. 
 
Other Linkages: Any other process by which increased production in one sector 
prompts increased production in another.  
 
Indirect Backward (or Forward) Linkages: In the presence of a backward or 
forward linkage, this is an increase in production arising from other backward or 
forward linkages from the second industry into all other sectors. 
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uses IT to produce business services such as back office operations or call centres; it 
does not, however, produce IT. Another relevant distinction between the different 
industries is that SWIS and ITES-BPO belong in the services or tertiary sector, whilst 
the HW industry is composed of manufacturing firms. The three sub-sectors also have 
very different policy histories, and have experienced very different patterns of growth 
(Chandrasekhar, 2001). For all these reasons, the research was necessarily restricted 
to one of the three sub-sectors of the IT sector. SWIS was chosen for several reasons. 
The most important of these is that the early evidence from newspapers, identified at 
the end of Chapter 3, indicates fast growth in domestic SWIS deals. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, SWIS is also the largest of the three sub-sectors and has had more success 
than HW, and a much longer history than ITES-BPO (Kumar and Joseph, 2005: 94).   
 
The only exception to the research questions’ focus on SWIS comes in RQ1 which 
looks at the total extent and growth rate of direct and indirect linkages. Here the scope 
of enquiry is widened to include ITES-BPO. This decision was made partially 
because the most useful data source available to address this question reports SWIS 
and ITES-BPO together. However, the decision was deemed fit because it is accepted 
in the literature that ITES-BPO has actually arisen because of the existence of SWIS 
in India. Expansion into ITES-BPO occurred because Indian firms were already 
acting as SWIS outsourcers (Arora and Gambardella, 2005: 292). These firms had 
access to IT and communication technologies that enabled ITES-BPO outsourcing, 
and they also had the capability and reputation of being able to successfully provide 
outsourced services. In other words, ITES-BPO came about because it was possible to 
purchase IT through forward linkages from SWIS and because other linkages from 
SWIS had led to learning that was relevant for ITES-BPO. What this means for RQ1 
is that direct linkage effects from ITES-BPO into other sectors in India can be 
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interpreted as indirect linkage effects from SWIS. For the purposes of an investigation 
into the extent of linkages, aggregating the two sub-sectors does not diminish the 
coherence of the findings.  
 
RQ2 addresses the reasons for changes in the size of the Indian domestic market for 
SWIS, or, in other words, the factors that determine the extent of direct forward 
linkages. The secondary research questions for RQ2 suggest an approach to the 
question which is rooted in the literature. RQ2a prompts a re-evaluation of the 
publications by Dahlman and Utz (2005) and D’Costa (2003) (covered in Section 
3.3.2) which implied that a significant domestic market was unlikely in the short- to 
medium-term. The other two secondary research questions look for alternative 
explanations, recognising that these may already exist in the more general literature 
on economics and development. RQ3 prompts an investigation of the contribution that 
the use of IT from the SWIS sector makes to other sectors in India, and into the 
overall economy. The secondary questions attached to RQ3 identify the levels of 
aggregation at which this contribution might be expected to be visible. They require a 
consideration of the impact of purchasing IT on output and/or productivity in the 
buying firm, the buying sector, and in India. RQ3d completes the set of research 
questions by asking a broader and more open question about the process by which 
domestic market deals contribute to improved productivity or output.  
 
RQ3 is the first of the research questions to introduce “SWIS-buying industries” as an 
object of investigation. This term refers to the industries that purchase SWIS from the 
IT sector. These industries were unknown at the beginning of the research project, and 
were later identified by reference to secondary data. This is detailed in chapter 5, 
where two different data-sources are used to identify SWIS-buying industries and is 
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verified in chapter 7, where a third data-source also quantifies expenditure on SWIS 
in a sample of Indian non-IT firms. It is worth noting here that there are some 
industries where production is inherently more amenable to the use of IT, including 
SWIS (Baily and Lawrence, 2001: 309; Mann, 2003: 4; Stiroh, 2001: 19; Triplett, 
1999: 318). This means that there are some industries which have a stronger potential 
to be purchasers of SWIS from the sector than others. In the chapters which follow the 
term “potential SWIS-buying industries” or “potential client industries” are used to 
indicate these relatively more likely sectors, although the inclusion of these terms is 
not intended to excuse the research project from identifying which sectors actually 
purchase outsourced SWIS in India.  
 
The research questions and definitions given in this section are intended to split the 
research goals into manageable and operational questions which can be addressed 
with particular research methods. Section 4.2 below describes which methods were 
used for each question. 
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4.2 A substantial programme of research  
 
This section covers the methods employed to arrive at answers to the research 
questions. They are many and varied. This author first undertook a programme of 
qualitative research in the field, and then collected and analysed several sources of 
secondary data. The analyses included one sizeable econometric model based on 
approximately 33,000 firm-level observations, one smaller econometric model, and an 
input-output analysis. A re-evaluation of existing private-sector and government 
research was also conducted. This number and mix of methods was necessary because 
the research questions have such a wide scope.  
Figure 4.3: Research Questions and Methods Employed to Answer Them 
1: Use of 
Tertiary  Data
2: In Depth 
Interviews
3: Analysis of 
Secondary Data
1. What is the current extent of direct and indirect linkages from SWIS and ITES-BPO?
a. What is the current extent of direct 
backwards, forwards and other linkages? x x
b. What is the current extent of indirect 
backwards and forwards linkages and how 
fast are they growing?
x
2. What explains the size and growth trajectory of direct forward linkages from the SWIS sector?
a. Are the arguments of D’Costa (2003) 
and/or Dahlman & Utz (2005) valid? x
b. Are there other explanations in the 
literature which have not yet been applied 
to this context but which are helpful?
x
c. Is there another explanation not 
previously identified in any literature? x
a. What is the impact on firms that buy 
SWIS? x
b. What is the impact in different SWIS-
buying industries? x
c. What is the impact on India’s economy 
overall? x
d. What is the process by which these 
contributions come about? x
3. What is the nature and size of the contribution that forward linkages from the SWIS sector make to outcomes in 
other parts of the Indian economy?
 
 
In assessing the extent of the different linkages, RQ1a requires a wide range of data 
on the IT sector, as well as on many other different sectors. It asks a measurable 
question about the size of specific quantities yet has a very wide scope of enquiry. 
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The method chosen for this question was use of tertiary data and analysis of certain 
secondary data. RQ3a–c on the impact of forward linkages and RQ1b on the extent of 
indirect forward and backward linkages similarly ask well-defined and quantifiable 
questions, but they each have a smaller scope. All these questions were addressed 
using analysis of secondary data. Finally, RQ2 and RQ3d require collection of 
explanations, or, rather, chains of causal events. RQ2, which asks to explain the size 
and growth of forward linkages from SWIS, and RQ3d, which asks how those 
forward linkages impact economic outcomes, require answers that may be different in 
different contexts and that are shaped by interactions between particular actors. For 
these reasons, the method used to understand their answers is in-depth interviewing. 
This mapping of chosen methods to questions is summarised in Figure 4.3. 
 
During the research, the different methods frequently provided additional information 
relevant to other questions, and so stepped outside the plan laid out in Figure 4.3. In 
other cases, the data collected for one question verified the data collected for another. 
However, the intention was to address each of the three groups of questions with a 
research method designed specifically for it. The remainder of this section lays out the 
different methods involved and the reasons why each method was chosen for the 
particular research question. The methods are discussed in the order they were 
undertaken during the research project. 
4.2.1 Use of tertiary data for an up to date assessment on linkages  
 
This section outlines the method used primarily to collect data on RQ1a; that is, it sets 
out how the current evidence on linkages from SWIS and ITES-BPO was collected. 
Answering RQ1a required the collection of data on a wide array of potential and 
actual linkage mechanisms between SWIS-ITES-BPO and all of the other sectors in 
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the Indian economy. For each of these potential linkage mechanisms, the question 
required an investigation of both what the linkage was and to what extent it was 
important. In short, RQ1a is an oversized question with a wide remit. Answering it by 
collecting primary data would require its own large research project. Similarly, 
amassing sufficient secondary data to provide a new analysis of all possible linkages 
could easily make it impossible to address any further research questions. It is for 
these practical reasons that the majority of the answers to RQ1a (presented in Chapter 
5) are established by reference to the analyses of other authors. While the work on 
RQ1a uses analyses of other authors, in many cases new explanations based on 
reinterpretations of their evidence, re-evaluations of their conclusions, or new 
applications of their empirical findings are put forward.  
 
This reanalysis for RQ1a shares many characteristics with the task of reviewing the 
literature on a subject. However, there is an important difference between a literature 
review and the majority of the work which follows in the discussion of RQ1a. Unlike 
the literature review in Chapter 3, a great deal of the evidence which is marshalled 
under the first method has not been published in peer reviewed academic journals. It 
includes summaries, categorisations, and other analyses of data which have been 
carried out by private researchers, government agencies, industry associations, and 
other interested parties. These “other” researchers undoubtedly did not have the same 
aims or research questions as those that are of interest here. Their findings may have 
been based on assumptions or prejudices which are not easy to identify from their 
publications and which could be inconsistent with the current work or simply 
incorrect. In short, control of the steps involved in moving from primary data to the 
results has remained in the hands of researchers whose work has not been reviewed by 
experts (Blaikie, 2000: 184). These concerns are particularly important in seeking to 
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provide the most current analysis possible on the SWIS sector’s linkages in India. The 
research on these issues is often published first by those actually involved in the 
activities concerned. Not surprisingly, these are exactly the groups and actors who 
have the most to gain or lose by publicising one thing and ignoring another.  
 
This is especially true for one source of tertiary data which was used very regularly 
the work under method 1, the IT industry’s trade body, NASSCOM. NASSCOM is by 
far the most comprehensive and widely accepted source for the Indian IT industry 
(Desai 2003:2). However, its primary function is not to provide researchers with an 
unbiased account of the IT industry’s activities. Instead, all of the eight objectives 
listed on NASSCOM’s website (http://www.nasscom.in), and reproduced in Figure 
4.4 below, are concerned with helping NASSCOM’s members to achieve various 
goals. These range from influencing policies at home and abroad to supporting 
success in export markets, co-operation within the industry, and upgrading of 
production to “world-class” level. Objective 2 specifically states that NASSCOM’s 
data collection and dissemination activities are designed for use by “software 
developers and interested companies overseas”. 
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Figure 4.4: NASSCOM’s Stated Objectives 
 
Source: http://www.nasscom.in/ (accessed 15 January 2011). 
 
 
Figure 4.5 reproduces NASSCOM’s membership criteria with a view to identifying 
the organisations that are intended to benefit from their activities. It is clear that 
NASSCOM’s membership is restricted to only those HW, ITES-BPO, and SWIS 
companies whose revenues have reached Rs 1 crore (US$221,900 in 2005) and which 
are formally registered to pay tax in India. Conversely, not all companies which 
Aims and Objectives: 
 
NASSCOM aims to drive the overall growth of the global offshoring market and 
maintain India’s leadership position, by taking up the role of a strategic advisor to the 
industry. NASSCOM’s varied strengths include advocacy on public policy, 
international trade development, research and market intelligence services, and access 
to an international network through linkages with 40 industry associations across the 
globe. This enables NASSCOM to advise members—both established and emerging 
companies to further their growth. 
 
Other goals include accelerating trade development efforts, improving talent supply, 
strengthening local infrastructure, building partnerships and driving operational 
excellence. It also boosts the process of Innovation; IT workforce development and 
enhanced cyber security. 
 
Objectives: 
1. Maintaining close interaction with the Government of India in formulating 
National IT policies with specific focus on IT software and services  
2. Maintaining a state of the art information database of IT software and services 
related activities for use of both the software developers as well as interested 
companies overseas.   
3. Encourage members to provide world-class quality products, services and 
solutions in India and overseas and help build brand equity for the Indian IT 
software and services industry.  
4. Taking effective steps to campaign against software piracy.  
5. Provide an ideal forum for overseas and domestic companies to explore the 
vast potential available for Joint Ventures, Strategic Alliances, Marketing 
Alliances, Joint Product Development, etc., by organising Business Meets with 
delegations of various countries.  
6. Work actively with Overseas Governments, Embassies to make the Visa and 
Work Permit Rules more "India Industry Friendly".  
7. Disseminate various policies, market information and other relevant statistics 
by sending more than 200 circulars (annually) to all members.  
8. Involve membership participation in various forums of NASSCOM on 
subjects such as HRD, Technology, Exports, Domestic Market, E-Governance, 
IT Enabled Services, IPR, Finance, Government Policies, Quality, etc.  
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satisfy these criteria are members. Joining NASSCOM is optional, and membership 
fees start at Rs22,000 (US$500 in 2005) per year. What this means is that 
NASSCOM’s objectives are to support and help a subset of the industry which not 
only meets its criteria for membership but which also envisages sufficient benefits 
from NASSCOM’s activities to justify paying the membership fees. 
Figure 4.5: NASSCOM’s Membership Criteria 
 
Source: http://www.nasscom.in/ (accessed 15 January 2011) 
 
These aims and membership criteria have important implications for the use of 
NASSCOM’s data and research for two different reasons. The first is that 
NASSCOM’s published data on the IT industry consists of data only on their own 
members34. This is important, because although NASSCOM reports that their 
membership includes 1,200 firms and 95% of the entire industry’s revenues35, these 
firms are not a random sample and NASSCOM do not verify the 95% statistic. Desai 
(2003: 2) attempts to rectify this by comparing the size of the NASSCOM 
membership in 2002 to an alternative listing of IT companies. He finds that at the end 
of fiscal year 2002, the alternate list included 4,000 IT firms, whilst NASSCOM, 
                                                 
34
 This is true of the data presented in Chapter 3, as well as NASSCOM data used in the rest of the 
thesis.  
35
 http://www.nasscom.in/ (accessed 15 January 2011) 
IT software and services organization registered in India with annual revenue from IT 
software and services exceeding Rs 1 crore 
 
These include: 
    * Software Development Companies 
    * IT Services Companies 
    * Software Product Companies 
    * Resellers of Branded Software Packages 
    * E-Commerce Companies 
    * IT Enabled Service Companies 
    * System Integrators 
 
Eligibility: Any firm, society, company or division thereof registered or incorporated 
in India and conducting business in IT software, IT services with annual revenue 
exceeding Rs 1 crore is eligible to apply for Regular membership.   
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which in that year also claimed to cover 95% of industry revenues, numbered only 
850 members. This is a large discrepancy, and one which casts doubt over 
NASSCOM’s statistic.  
 
Despite this, Desai eventually argues that NASSCOM’s figures are reliable. He 
conducts a comparison between NASSCOM’s IT export figures and those provided 
by the Reserve Bank of India (Desai, 2003:2) and finds that NASSCOM’s figures 
were within 10% of the bank’s figures. He concludes that the difference could be due 
to lags in reporting. Figure 4.6 provides another verification of NASSCOM figures, 
this time comparing NASSCOM’s figures to those from International Data 
Corporation (IDC), a well respected private sector research consultancy, on the size of 
the sector in 2006. The dark and light grey bars show NASSCOM data for 2005-06 
and 2006-07 and the black bar gives the IDC figure for the full calendar year 2006. It 
is clear that these two sources are comparable and that any discrepancy between them 
is small.  
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of NASSCOM and IDC Figures on the IT Sector for 2006 
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Source: NASSCOM (2009a);  
Note: IDC figures reported by Businesswire India (‘India IT Industry grows by 31% in 2006, say IDC’, 
2007).  
 
What is perhaps more reassuring than these two attempts to verify NASSCOM’s 
figures is that the potential sources of bias arising from concentrating on 
NASSCOM’s membership, rather than the whole industry, would tend, if anything, to 
underestimate many of the phenomena under investigation for RQ1a. This means that 
if there is evidence of NASSCOM’s members having linkages in India, the extent of 
this is likely to underestimate the full extent of linkages from the whole sector. This is 
particularly true for the aspect of RQ1a which forms the basis of the second two 
research questions: the extent of forward linkages, or in other words, the size of the 
domestic market for SWIS. The fact that NASSCOM treats ITES-BPO as part of the 
IT sector itself rather than as a potential SWIS-buying industry, means that they 
exclude forward linkages between SWIS and ITES-BPO. On top of that, 
NASSCOM’s objectives as stated in Figure 4.4 are about making it easier for Indian 
IT companies to succeed in export markets. This, in tandem with the nature of paid 
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membership, makes it likely that NASSCOM’s membership may well be skewed in 
favour of those firms that benefit most from those activities, exporters. There may 
well be many domestic-oriented IT companies that simply do not join NASSCOM, 
because the price of membership may not be worth it for companies that are not 
export producers. As there is a host of small IT companies and/or IT companies which 
do not make the membership criteria and, therefore, cannot  be included in 
NASSCOM’s figures, preliminary evidence was collected during this research 
project. This evidence suggests that these smaller and/or unregistered firms do, 
indeed, primarily produce for the domestic market36.    
 
The second reason for caution in using NASSCOM’s data, however, is less easily 
identified and potentially more problematic: the possibility of research being carried 
out in a way that ensures favourable findings. Published research by NASSCOM is 
often commissioned to produce specific outcomes and to influence specific actors in 
accordance with NASSCOM’s objectives. For example, the NASSCOM and Credit 
Rating and Information Services of India Ltd (CRISIL) (2007) study on linkages from 
the SWIS sector form an important part of the findings for RQ1a, and no doubt has 
been used in NASSCOM’s ongoing negotiations with the Indian government. The 
sector continues to receive tax exemptions and other benefits as a result of 
government policy, and NASSCOM actively seeks to justify the continuation of this 
largesse. Finding that backwards linkages to the rest of the Indian economy are 
substantial can only help with this cause. While the results of NASSCOM & 
CRISIL’s work are probably reliable, there is also no opportunity to examine every 
decision made during its study. For this reason, the discussion of its findings in 
Chapter 5 is contrasted with similar studies by different organisations and researchers. 
                                                 
36
 See Chapter 7 for more details. 
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These, in the main, verify its results and so alleviate some of the uncertainty around 
using these findings.  
 
This was the strategy employed to alleviate worries about possible biases in all 
tertiary data throughout the work on RQ1a. Wherever possible, many different 
sources were consulted on each issue, and, in particular, NASSCOM’s data was cross-
referenced against other researchers. Where possible, both quantitative and qualitative 
work is included, and quantitative work includes both hard (e.g., revenue) and soft 
(e.g., opinion) metrics. 
 
4.2.2 In depth interviewing to explain causes and processes 
 
The second method used in the research for the project was designed specifically to 
answer RQ2 and RQ3d, or, in other words, to find out what explains the size and 
growth trajectory of the domestic market for SWIS and how it contributes to 
improved output or productivity. These are very different questions than those 
investigated with the first method. RQ2 and RQ3d necessitate the explanation of 
causal processes rather than the description of the nature or size of particular things. 
This points to the need for qualitative data of the sort that comes from the answers to 
open-ended questions (Blaikie, 2005: 203). For RQ2, the secondary research 
questions identify several sources of hypotheses, in particular those mentioned in the 
literature as being relevant to the current case study. However, the possibility that 
none of these hypotheses is the true answer is acknowledged. For RQ3d, the research 
question offers even less guidance as to possible answers. For these reasons, the 
method chosen had to be able to elicit new hypotheses. Again, it is a consideration 
which suggests unstructured, qualitative research.  
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Questions RQ2 and RQ3d are concerned with a social episode that occurs when 
domestic firms purchase SWIS from the sector. This means that there is a need for 
relevant words and terms to be made operational by reference to the experiences of 
those involved (Blaikie, 2005: 196). For example, D’Costa (2003) uses terms such as 
“global markets”, “power” and “learning” to explain the size of the domestic market. 
Dahlman and Utz (2005) add “markets”, “prices” and “endowments”, amongst others. 
These, as well as many other concepts, only become relevant to IT firms or SWIS-
buying firms when they interact with one another or with other relevant actors. In 
short, these terms are socially constructed; their meanings have been shaped by 
people’s or firms’ actions according to their subjective understanding of their 
circumstances, surroundings, and business processes. Identifying social actors’ own 
understanding of their experiences and relationships was therefore a necessary step 
towards the objective of clarifying what the different terms meant, and determining 
whether they contributed to explanations that are important. Often this subjective 
understanding of words, terms, and explanations may not be conscious. The method 
chosen for these two questions, therefore, not only needed to seek new explanations 
and operationalise concepts in the literature, but also needed to uncover hidden 
mechanisms and meanings which define and describe the process of the domestic 
market emerging and the process by which it impacts on output and productivity. This 
is yet another reason for choosing qualitative research, and, in particular, it suggests 
the use of the method chosen: in-depth interviewing.  
 
In-depth interviews involve private interviews in which the interviewee is considered 
to be the expert and the researcher the student. To avoid biasing the interviewees’ 
responses, and consequently the data collected, the researcher must follow certain 
clear guidelines (Family Health International 2010). The first is that questions must be 
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neutral, with the researcher both listening carefully to the respondent’s answers and 
probing for clarification. Leading questions that test preconceived notions must be 
avoided, unless they are prompted by one of the respondent’s earlier answers. Finally, 
the researcher must not express approval or disapproval of the respondent’s answers. 
This method of in-depth interviewing has been identified as ideal for getting close to 
social actors’ own explanations, meanings, and interpretations, provided that these 
guidelines are followed carefully (Blaikie, 2005:234). Interviews uniquely offer a 
great deal of scope for clarification questioning, and nuances, and contradictions can 
be fully investigated (Family Health International, 2010:30), even without the 
researcher being involved in the social episode being investigated and so taking the 
risk of influencing the phenomenon under investigation (Blaikie, 2005: 234). A final 
benefit of in-depth interviewing is that it offers an opportunity to discuss sensitive 
issues which might not get aired in the context of a focus group (Family Health 
International, 2010: 30).  
 
The particular programme of interviewing for this project consisted of 30 interviews 
that took place between 19 January 2009 and 4 March 2009. Figure 4.7 shows the 
occupations of the people interviewed; the majority were directly involved in the 
domestic market either as IT professionals or as buyers of outsourced IT. However, 
various experts and commentators, including members of the Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII) and NASSCOM, market research professionals, and several academics 
with experience of researching the IT sector were also included. 
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Figure 4.7: Breakdown of interviewees according to occupation 
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Admittedly, the group of respondents described in Figure 4.7 is neither a large nor a 
random sample. This is partly a necessary consequence of the choice to embark on a 
programme of qualitative research, as samples are always smaller in such studies 
(Blaikie, 2005: 205). Judgment was used to identify respondents so that the sample 
would be made up of professionals who, by virtue of their experiences, can speak 
more generally about different aspects of the domestic market. In particular, the 
sample was chosen to include experts on many of the SWIS-buying sectors in India, 
as well as IT executives with project experience in many sectors. In accordance with 
the guidelines set above, there was no set questionnaire for the interviewing process. 
Each respondent was asked a few questions about their own experiences, but was 
encouraged to take the conversation in directions which seemed relevant to them. It 
was not the intention of the schedule of interviews to provide a representation of the 
whole set of actors involved in the market for SWIS in India. However, when there 
was significant agreement from many respondents on causal processes relevant to the 
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question, this was taken to be supportive of a more general relevance for those 
particular processes. 
 
The interviews were recorded, then written as field notes, and eventually coded into 
categories based on possible answers to the two research questions. These categories 
were kept large and open in the first instance, as it was not the intention to distil the 
qualitative data into quantitative “metrics”. A second round of re-categorisation was 
made of all of the respondent comments on eight causal mechanisms which might 
answer RQ2, and on seven processes which might answer RQ3d. For RQ2, some of 
these explanations/categories correspond to causal explanations given in the literature, 
whilst some arose from the answers given by the respondents themselves. For RQ3d, 
all of the categories came out of the interviews and consisted of processes suggested 
by the respondents themselves. In this way the explanations and processes which 
emerged from the analysis were grounded in the qualitative data collected.  
 
4.2.3 Quantifying the scale of effects using secondary data 
 
The third and final method is the analysis of secondary data using econometrics or 
other techniques. This was used in three ways to answer the research questions. The 
most important use was in a major econometric model which answers RQ3a-c on the 
impact of forward linkages from SWIS. Statistics on secondary data were also used to 
identify the extent of indirect linkages for RQ1b and to analyse the growth trajectory 
of direct forward linkages for RQ1a. These questions share some common 
characteristics. First, they are all concerned with providing descriptions rather than 
explanations, and they all require the quantification of specific metrics. Second, in 
identifying and measuring these quantities, answers must verify or falsify hypotheses 
that arose from the literature. For RQ3a-c, for example, the hypothesis which arose 
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from the literature is that sectors that purchase SWIS experience increases in either 
output or productivity as a result of their investment. If the hypothesis is true, the 
chosen method must be able to identify that contribution and measure its size. The 
third similarity between the three questions is a requirement written into them to reach 
general macro-level conclusions.   
 
These three considerations justify the choice of quantitative analysis of secondary 
data. The answer to RQ3a-c was investigated using firm-level econometric modelling 
in accordance with the literature on the impact of IT, as laid out in Chapter 2. The 
answer to RQ1b was addressed through analysis of input–output tables as suggested 
by Hirschman (1958), and the growth path of direct forward linkages was analysed 
using time series econometrics. These methods are designed specifically to quantify 
the size, extent, or rate of change of the metrics of interest, and they come with their 
own tools for assessing whether these can be classified as large or significant. 
Similarly, statistical tests exist for validating or rejecting hypotheses which must be 
verified or falsified in order to answer questions, and clear guidelines and rules exist 
for ensuring that these conclusions will be unbiased and robust. Quantitative work is 
more replicable than other methods, and this is important for understanding how 
quantities of interest change over time (Blaikie, 2005: 205), a consideration which is 
explicitly important for the answer to RQ1b. What is perhaps the most important 
advantage of quantitative work in this context, though, is its unmatched ability to 
support generalisations on the phenomenon under study at the macro level. 
Quantitative analyses like econometrics generally work with limited variables yet 
enough cases to inspire confidence that any findings are representative.  
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Of course, there is a trade-off with any choice of research method, and the quid pro-
quo for attaining greater generality through pursuit of quantitative analysis is the need 
to resort to preconceived ideas about the nature of the social world and why it is the 
way it is (Blaikie, 2005: 242). For the research which used method 3, assumptions 
were made about the nature of processes involved prior to the research being carried 
out. For example, using firm-level econometrics to investigate RQ3a-c pre-supposed a 
particular form for the production function of firms in the sample. Using input–output 
analysis involved a similar assumption that the proportions of various inputs used in 
production of a particular good remain constant over time. To a large extent, 
assumptions like these, which formed a part of the research under method 3, were 
suggested by the literature and informed by other similar investigations. However, the 
research project sought to mitigate any problems with specific assumptions causing an 
incorrect basis for quantitative analysis in several other ways. The first was that 
method 3 was not started until after research using method 2 was completed. 
Immersion in the specific context and the process of carrying out qualitative research 
entailed much learning which helped to identify incorrect assumptions. This was 
especially true for RQ3a-c which sought to quantify the effects of a process which had 
already been explained through the pursuit of method 2—that of SWIS-buying firms 
and industries benefiting in terms of output or productivity as a result of their IT 
purchases. 
 
As might be expected, the other strategies employed for mitigating possible issues 
with particular assumptions are very specific to the particular analyses undertaken 
using method 3. For that reason, the following chapters contain a more detailed 
explanation of assumptions, and a discussion of issues surrounding sampling, 
robustness and methodology alongside the results that arose from their pursuit. 
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4.3 Conclusion: A demonstration of diverse relevant research skills 
 
This chapter describes the strategy followed for the research undertaken for this 
thesis. Section 4.1 outlined the ambitious aims for this research and identified how 
they follow from the discussions in chapters 1 through 3.  Section 4.2 outlined the 
pros and cons and, ultimately, why and how the three methods to answer the research 
questions were selected. Section 4.2.1 examined the use of tertiary data to answer 
RQ1a, and Section 4.2.2 explained the use of in-depth interviewing to address the 
issues raised by RQ2 and RQ3d. Section 4.2.3 finished the discussion of methods by 
covering general issues surrounding the quantitative analyses needed to answer RQ3a-
c and parts of RQ1.  
 
The research undertaken to form the basis of this thesis was extensive and varied. It 
involved both collecting a wide range of data and the application of a diverse group of 
methods. The completion of this programme of research demonstrates a strong ability 
to carry out research on the part of this author, including the ability to select 
appropriate methods and data sources and the skills needed to carry out both 
qualitative research in the field and quantitative analysis. Within quantitative research, 
the project demonstrates a capability to carry out several different types of analysis, 
including a major econometric modelling exercise. Finally, the choice of tertiary 
analysis of existing research as one of the methods demonstrates an aptitude for 
evaluating and triangulating existing research to assess its value and strength.  
 
But this is not the only or even the most important benefit of analysing several sets of 
data using several different methods. More important are the implications that the 
strategy has for the project’s ability to uncover new facts about the subject, and to 
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understand the consequences of those new facts. In this respect, diversity is vital 
because it matches appropriate methods to questions and because it confers 
confidence in the findings. If many different analyses of many different sets of data 
all point towards SWIS being a leading sector in India, it is possible to conclude with 
confidence that this is, in fact, true.  
 
The remaining three chapters outline, in turn, the evidence that has been collected on 
the three research questions; in doing, so they provide original contributions to this 
subject. Chapter 5 describes the results on the first research question. It covers the 
current evidence on linkages from SWIS-ITES-BPO into the Indian economy.  
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5. Results: Evidence of extensive linkages  
 
“The domestic market is big now. Ten billion dollars per year in software and 
IT services is not to be sneezed at.” 
Rajdeep Sarawat (Interview with author, 22 January 2009, Delhi) 
 
 
This chapter describes the evidence that extensive forward linkages from the SWIS 
sector have emerged in India and continue to grow quickly. It is an exciting new 
finding because it means that there is a possibility that the gains in output and 
productivity which developed countries experienced when they began to use IT37 
might also be achievable in India. If this does occur, the fact that the amount spent in 
India on SWIS from the IT sector is now large (at around US$10bn in 2008-09 and 
US$14.6bn in 2010-11) means that these gains might be sufficient to impact outcomes 
at the macroeconomic level38. This chapter contains good news for other types of 
linkages, too. The extent and growth rate of other linkages is not as dramatic as that of 
forward linkages, but other linkages do exist and they have an impact on economic 
outcomes in India. The stimulus to the economy arising from SWIS sector purchases, 
combined with the domestic purchases of IT sector workers, was estimated between 
2% and 3% of India’s GDP in 2005. Importantly much of this impetus was felt 
amongst low-skilled workers, and partially felt amongst even the most disadvantaged.  
 
It is a set of results which has serious implications for the literature that was reviewed 
in Chapter 3. This current research reveals that, contrary to widely held views, the IT 
sector is neither disconnected from India’s economy nor can it be described as an 
enclave. Backwards and other linkages have begun to emerge showing that the 
                                                 
37
 As outlined in Chapter 2. 
38
 The impact of forward linkages on India’s firms, industries and macro economy are discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
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literature which described them as virtually non-existent is now out-of-date. With IT 
firms actively implementing SWIS solutions in Indian firms on a large and ever-
increasing scale, the literature which described the domestic market as “inadequate” 
(Kumar and Joseph, 2005: 99) or “neglected” (Heeks, 1996: 72) is misleading and far 
too pessimistic. If it was published after the late 1990s, this literature is also guilty of 
carelessness. Since the 2000s, the domestic market for IT has been substantial, and 
since 2005-06 it has been growing at a rate of over US$1bn per year.  
 
The rest of this chapter is divided into two main sections which present the new 
evidence collected on different types of linkages. Section 5.1 contains a synthesis of 
evidence on backwards and miscellaneous other linkages. Section 5.2 presents a wide 
variety of previously undetected or ignored data and two new secondary analyses on 
the extent of forward linkages. Section 5.3 concludes with a call for research on the 
causes of growth in forward linkages and their impact. 
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5.1 Backwards linkages are now visible and important 
 
On backwards linkages, Section 3.2.1 concluded that the only unambiguous positive 
linkage was to the emergence of the venture capital industry (Kenney and Dossani, 
2005). NASSCOM and Delloite (2008: 19) updated the data on the size of this 
industry. They found that investment into Indian companies by either venture 
capitalists or other forms of private equity has grown from 5 deals worth US$20m in 
1996 to 280 deals worth US$1.2bn in 2000 (see Figure 5.1). It is a significant 
expansion, and one that has been led by deals in the IT sector with 66% of deals in 
2000 focussed on IT.  
 
Figure 5.1: Private Equity and Venture Capital Funding in India  
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Source: NASSCOM and Delloite (2008: 19). 
 
The continued expansion of venture capital in India has begun to provide investment 
into other sectors (see Figure 5.2). Between 2000 and 2006, private equity and venture 
funding has provided investment funding for manufacturing, engineering and 
 137 
construction, medical and healthcare, and food and beverage ventures, amongst 
others. This investment has undoubtedly helped to fund expansion in these other 
sectors.  
 
Figure 5.2: Venture Capital and Private Equity Investment by Sector in 2000 and 2006 
 
Source: NASSCOM and Delloite (2008: 19) 
 
On the question of other backwards linkages from the IT sector, the traditional 
literature was particularly pessimistic. Far from providing the opportunities for 
domestic entrepreneurship envisaged by Hirschman (1958), Heeks (1996: 19) 
identified the sector as one whose backwards linkages were predominantly to firms 
and entrepreneurs abroad. According to Heeks, the problem was not only that the 
hardware used in the sector was generally imported, but also that the sector’s other 
expenditures were predominantly sourced abroad. Heeks argued the most obvious 
reason for this pattern was the practice of delivering IT work onsite through 
“bodyshopping”. With this mode of SWIS delivery Indian engineers travelled to 
Europe or the United States to work for foreign firms alongside the firms’ existing 
employees. This meant that the sector’s purchases on items related to travel, 
marketing, and living expenses took place in the host country rather than in India (p. 
75-76). Updating Heeks’s analysis reveals a change in the mode of delivery of SWIS. 
Between 1996 and the present, bodyshopping, or onsite service provision, has largely 
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been replaced by the offshore model (Athreye, 2005: 7; Desai, 2003: 10, 13). Now, 
the majority of Indian IT firms provide their IT services from within India, and SWIS, 
in particular, is delivered remotely via the Internet and email, and supported by 
telephone. This new pattern has created a demand for local supplies of all kinds of 
products and services, thereby diminishing the extent of the IT sector’s foreign 
exchange expenditures. Of these expenditures, Kumar (2005: 107) confirms that net 
foreign exchange earnings by the sector have been increasing as a result of a 
downward trend in imports. He found that between 1996 and 1999, around the same 
time that bodyshopping began to be replaced by offshoring, the share of export 
revenues being spent on imports fell from 55% in 1996 to 48% in 199939. 
 
A recent study conducted by NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007) provides details on the 
extent of the IT sector’s spending in India. The study begins with a survey on a 
random sample of SWIS and ITES-BPO firms to ascertain their operating 
expenditures on different inputs in India and abroad. The results of this survey is 
verified and validated against known industry-level facts and costs, and found to be 
within acceptable margins of comparability (p. 21). The study also includes an 
analysis of a sample of IT companies’ balance sheets to understand the extent of 
domestic capital expenditures. These expenditures are then apportioned into different 
categories and verified against well-known costs of buildings, furniture, hardware, 
and so forth. The two sets of findings, one on operating expenditures and one on 
capital expenditures, are then scaled up from the sample estimates in a bid to reflect 
the expenditures of the whole sector. Figure 5.3 illustrates the results of this exercise; 
and it shows that, according to NASSCOM and CRISIL’s estimates, in 2005-06 only 
16% of items purchased by the IT sector were imported, with the remainder split 
                                                 
39
 Clearly there is a need for further research on this issue to update these figures. 
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amongst a wide variety of domestic industries, including construction, 
communications, travel, and transport.  
 
Figure 5.3: Domestic and Foreign Expenditures by SWIS and ITES-BPO Sectors in 2005-06 
SWIS & ITES-BPO 
Expenditures (Rs Bn) % 
Transport 15.3 3.4%
Equipment Maintenance 9.5 2.1%
Buildings Maintenance 11.5 2.6%
Security 2.4 0.5%
Catering 6.6 1.5%
Legal and Accounts 8.3 1.9%
Recruitment 10 2.2%
Training 12.8 2.9%
Travel 21.5 4.8%
Communication 28.1 6.3%
Insurance 4.2 0.9%
Printing & Stationery 3.5 0.8%
Power and Fuel 8.2 1.8%
Other OPEX 168.1 37.8%
CAPEX on Construction 41.2 9.3%
CAPEX on IT infrastructure 9.1 2.0%
CAPEX on Furnishing 13.7 3.1%
Total Domestic 374 84.0%
OPEX and CAPEX Spent abroad 71 16.0%
Grand Total 445 100%
 
Notes: Adapted from NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007: 9, 10, 20, 21, 24). 
 
The NASSCOM and CRISIL study goes on to estimate the impact of the expenditures 
in Figure 5.3 on total output in India. The expenditure figures are fed into the input–
output equations published in tables for 1998-99 (which was the latest available at 
their time of writing)40. The total output impact of the IT sector’s expenditures are 
then simulated by identifying the expansion of output required in the sectors in Figure 
5.3 (direct linkages) and the expansion required to provide inputs for those sectors 
                                                 
40
 One methodology for using input–output tables to assess the extent of direct and indirect forward 
linkages in discussed in Section 5.2. It is likely that NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007) used a similar 
approach to assess the extent of backward linkages. 
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(indirect linkages). The results of this simulation on total output are presented in 
Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4: Output Impact of Backwards Linkages from SWIS and ITES-BPO Sector in 2005-06 
SWIS & ITES-BPO 
Expenditures (Rs Bn) 
Output Multiplier 
from I-O System
Total Output Effect 
including Direct and 
Indirect (Rs Bn)
Transport 15.3 2.17 40.9
Equipment Maintenance 9.5 1.98* 17.7
Buildings Maintenance 11.5 1.98* 21.5
Security 2.4 1.98* 4.5
Catering 6.6 2.13 14.0
Legal and Accounts 8.3 1.98* 15.5
Recruitment 10 1.98* 18.7
Training 12.8 1.23 15.8
Travel 21.5 2.17 46.7
Communication 28.1 1.27 35.9
Insurance 4.2 1.53 6.4
Printing & Stationery 3.5 2.20 7.7
Power and Fuel 8.2 2.29 18.6
Other OPEX 168.1 1.98* 313.93
CAPEX on Construction 41.2 1.96 80.8
CAPEX on IT infrastructure 9.1 2.12 19.3
CAPEX on Furnishing 13.7 1.91 26.2
Total Domestic 374 1.88 704.0
 
Source: NASSCOM & CRISIL 2007:25 
Notes: OPEX refers to operating expenditures, CAPEX to capital expenditures. * This output multiplier 
is from the “All other services” category in the input–output tables; I–O = input-output. 
 
The study discovered that several of the domestic industries that the IT sector 
purchases from are themselves fairly high spenders in the domestic economy. Overall, 
for every 1 rupee spent by the SWIS-ITES-BPO industry, another 0.6 rupees accrues 
somewhere in the Indian economic system. To put these figures into context, this 
author has calculated that the total output effect from backwards linkages from the 
SWIS-ITES-BPO industry of Rs. 704bn is equivalent to roughly 2% of GDP in 
200541. 
 
There is one other backwards linkage which is not included in the above analysis by 
NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007), despite that study’s thorough consideration of 
expenditures by IT firms. This is the education industry which has matured as a result 
                                                 
41
 Calculation uses NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007: 25) and World Development Indicators (2010). 
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of the industry’s ongoing demand for qualified staff and the consequent need for 
potential IT workers to be trained. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the type of training 
which is most useful for a career in IT is an advanced education in engineering, or 
specific courses on information technology itself. Since the IT sector’s inception in 
the country, India’s output of these graduates has increased rapidly. Both public and 
private education establishments have expanded, with the private sector providing 
paid training for IT sector jobs, and the government filling in the gaps with 
affirmative action for disadvantaged castes (Carnoy, Dossani, and Tilak1, 2010: 2). 
As a result, Indian colleges and universities now produce 300,000 technical graduates 
every year (p. 2), a figure which outstrips the output of every other country in the 
world except China. Enrolment on these courses in India is continuing to rise. Figure 
5.5 illustrates a growth rate in engineering education higher than that of any other 
country (p. 1). Not surprisingly, this growth is then reflected in the country’s stock of 
technical graduates. In the 15 years between 1990 and 2005, the number of graduates 
with engineering training in India more than doubled, from 500,000 to 1.2million (p. 
55).  
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Figure 5.5: Enrolments in Higher Education in Engineering 
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Source: Carnoy, Dossani, and Tilak1, (2010: 68). 
 
In 2006-07, there were a total of 2,264 public and private institutions providing 
degree or other advanced technical qualifications in India. Between them they 
educated approximately 833,000 students for annual fees of between Rs 23,000 and 
Rs 72,000 (or between US$500 and US$1,750), depending on the school and its 
location (Carnoy, Dossani, and Tilak1, 2010: 44, 45). It is a large industry, and in 
engineering, where 85% of the students attend private colleges, it is one which is 
using only a small proportion of government funding (p. 16). 
 
The news on backwards linkages from IT workers’ purchases is also hopeful, 
according to NASSCOM and CRISIL’s study. They estimate the impact of spending 
by SWIS-ITES-BPO sector employees in a separate analysis whose results are 
reported in Figure 5.6. NASSCOM and CRISIL used a similar methodology to the 
one just described. First, they conducted a survey amongst SWIS-ITES-BPO workers 
to understand their consumption amongst various categories of consumption goods, 
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durable goods and services. Then they used these expenditures and the input–output 
equations to simulate total output arising as a result of these purchases. The survey 
found that SWIS-ITES-BPO workers have a younger demographic profile and earn a 
higher wage than the average worker in India, with the majority being 22–30 years 
old and 83% being single (p. 6, 23). Perhaps because of this demographic profile, a 
large proportion of their expenditure was on items that could be considered luxuries. 
Entertainment, holidays, and eating out used over 10% of all expenditures by 
respondents in the survey. Consumer durables also accounted for 5.5% of 
expenditures by this group, and vehicles 2.7%. 
 
Figure 5.6: Consumption Expenditure by SWIS and ITES-BPO workers by Category of 
Purchase 
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Source: NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007: 28). 
Note: Spending is shown as a percentage of total income, not disposable income. The percentage for 
taxation and other deductions are not shown.  
 
Figure 5.7 covers the analysis on how these expenditures impact output in the Indian 
economy. NASSCOM and CRISIL calculated total domestic expenditures, reported in 
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the third column of the table, by applying the above expenditure shares to the SWIS 
and ITES industries’ total wage bill (net of taxes) for workers living in India. They 
then calculated output multipliers using the input–output tables, and multiplied the 
output multipliers by total domestic expenditures to establish the total output impact 
in the economy as a whole from IT workers’ spending.  
 
Figure 5.7: Output Effect of Consumption Spending by SWIS-ITES-BPO Sector Workers 
Output 
Multiplier
Domestic Spending by SWIS-
ITES-BPO Sector Workers 
(Rs. bn)
Total Output 
Impact (Rs. bn)
Housing 1.96 84.20 165.1
Cars and Vans 2.48 7.80 19.4
Motorcycles and Scooters 2.43 2.80 6.9
Consumer Durables 2.61 17.20 44.9
Food Items 2.48 22.30 55.3
Clothing 2.44 15.10 36.9
Fuel and Power 2.29 8.50 19.5
Telephone 2.3 11.90 27.5
Transport 2.17 10.60 23
Education 1.23 11.90 14.6
Health 2.37 5.70 13.4
Insurance 1.53 13.40 20.4
Eating Out 2.13 11.20 23.9
Entertainment 1.98 9.70 19.1
Holidays 2.09 15.60 32.7
Other 2.32 11.70 27.2
Total 259.80 550
 
Source: NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007: 26). 
 
In Figure 5.8, NASSCOM and CRISIL complete their analysis of backwards linkages 
arising from IT workers’ consumption by mediating the figures in Figure 5.7 to reflect 
that these workers would most likely have been employed elsewhere had the SWIS-
ITES-BPO sector not existed. They offer three scenarios for the extent of incremental 
consumption based on three assumptions, detailed in the table, about SWIS-ITES-
BPO workers’ next-best job if the sector did not exist. For the middle assumption that 
SWIS-ITES-BPO pays Rs. 200,000 (US$4,540) above the workers’ next-best option, 
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this author has calculated that the consumption spending of SWIS-ITES-BPO workers 
contributes a total of Rs. 204bn (US$4.62bn), or a further 0.6% of 2005 GDP.  
 
Figure 5.8: Output Effect of Consumption Spending by SWIS-ITES-BPO Sector Workers in 
2005-06, for Different Second-Best Job Scenarios 
Incremental Consumption 
Spending from SWIS-ITES-
BPO  (Rs Bn)
Total Output Impact 
(Direct and Indirect) 
(Rs Bn)
IT/ITES workers have 
no second-best job 260 550
IT/ITES workers' 
second-best job pays Rs 
200,000 less than 
current job 96 204
IT/ITES workers' 
second-best job pays Rs 
100,000 less than 
current job 48 102
 
Source: NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007: 29). 
 
Joshi (2009) provides some verification for these findings. She conducted a survey 
amongst 100 households and 20 SWIS-ITES-BPO firms in Gurgaon, Haryana. It is a 
study which specifically set out to identify the impact of spending by SWIS and 
ITES-BPO workers on production demand in other sectors and, consequently, on 
GDP growth (p. 23–24). While Joshi’s sample is fairly small and geographically 
concentrated, her method does allow for a more in-depth understanding of how 
consumption changes when a worker goes from a non-IT job to an IT job. Her survey 
of SWIS-ITES-BPO workers recorded changes in household expenditures between 
the respondent’s current IT sector job and their previous job. Figure 5.9 details these 
results, and it shows that the largest increments in expenditure after getting a new job 
in the SWIS-ITES-BPO sector are in the services industries, whilst the smallest 
increments are in expenditures on food.  
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Figure 5.9: Average Monthly Food, Non-food, and Services Expenditure in SWIS-ITES-BPO job 
versus Previous Work 
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Source: Joshi (2009: 39). 
 
In Joshi’s sample, these additional expenditures amount to roughly Rs 8,000 
(US$185) per month, or Rs 106,000 (US$2,450) per year. In 2008-09, there were 
1.6m SWIS and ITES-BPO workers in India (p. 39). If each of these were represented 
by the figures arising from the sample42, this would constitute Rs 170 Bn (US$3.9bn) 
of direct expenditures arising from IT workers’ consumption patterns. This figure is 
not directly comparable to those in the first column of Figure 5.7 because it is based 
on a later year than NASSCOM and CRISIL’s study, but it is quite close to their 
estimates of SWIS–ITES-BPO workers’ expenditures. This author applied 
NASSCOM and CRISIL’s total output multiplier to Joshi’s figure of Rs 170 Bn. This 
gives a total output effect of IT workers’ consumption expenditures, once indirect 
linkages have been taken into account, of approximately Rs 360 Bn (US$8.3bn), or 
                                                 
42
 This is an heroic assumption, but one which is maintained in Joshi’s macroeconomic estimates (Joshi 
2009: 39). 
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0.75% of 2008 GDP43, a figure which is broadly comparable to the 0.6% found for 
2005 based on NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007). 
 
Having provided verification of their figures, this author carried through NASSCOM 
and CRISIL’s estimates to a total output effect (see Figure 5.10). It is based on the 
middle assumption for consumption expenditure that SWIS-ITES-BPO pays Rs 
200,000 (US$4,540) more than workers’ next-best option. The total output impact of 
linkages is Rs 908 Bn (US$20.6bn in 2005), or a total of 2.6% of India’s GDP.  
Figure 5.10: Domestic Output from IT Firms’ and Workers’ expenditures in 2005-06 (Rs. Bn) 
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Notes: Adapted from NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007: 9, 10, 29). 
 
The NASSCOM and CRISIL study is not the only piece of recent evidence that makes 
use of India’s input–output tables to identify the impact of the IT sector on the wider 
economy. The Department for Information Technology’s e-Readiness Assessment 
Report for 2006 (2006: 19–22) follows a similar methodology to identify the impact 
of the IT sector on social outcomes. The report does not outline the results of 
                                                 
43
 Authors calculations based on Joshi (2009: 39).  
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intermediate steps in the process, such as the ones of interest around linkages between 
sectors, and it is not entirely clear from the discussion on the analysis whether the 
linkages included are exactly those in the NASSCOM and CRISIL study. Despite this 
lack of comparability, the Department of Information Technology’s research does 
offer some validation for the finding that the total impact on output from the sector is 
substantial. Using data from 1999, they find that the total output effect of the sector is 
Rs 1066 Bn., or 5.4% of 1999 GDP. To triangulate this figure with that arising from 
the NASSCOM and CRISIL study, this author netted out the direct effect of IT output 
on GDP in that year44 from this figure. This revealed a total contribution to GDP from 
linkages of 3.7% of GDP. If anything, this suggests that the estimate based on 2005 
data in NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007), of 2.6%, is an underestimate of the extent of 
linkages.  
 
It is an encouraging picture, and one that seems to be reflected not only in quantitative 
effects of employment in the sector, but also in qualitative aspects. Contrary to 
D’Costa’s (2003: 215–216) gloomy conclusion that only the middle and upper classes 
can expect improved livelihoods as a result of the sector’s existence, current research 
shows that IT firms’ and workers’ demand for goods produced in India also leads to 
employment for low-skilled and poor workers. Perhaps the most extreme example of 
this comes from Olsen et al (2010), whose research on livelihoods in the slums in 
Chennai focuses on a group of people with significant “accumulated disadvantages” 
(p. 3–4). They find that as a result of the 2009 worldwide credit defaults and a 
consequent decline in IT exports, demand for goods and services produced in the slum 
communities declined considerably. In particular, construction, automobile 
                                                 
44
 Revenues to the IT sector amounted to 1.7% of GDP in 1999 (see Figure 3.3 in Section 3.2). 
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manufacturing, transport, and domestic services, as well as street vending, and 
laundry by workers in the slum were impacted (p. 7). This demonstrates that, before 
the decline in the world economy set in, linkages from IT firms and workers were 
providing jobs for poor and uneducated workers in the slum communities that Olsen 
and colleagues visited. It is a finding that is verified in two of the analyses of linkages 
already covered in this section. Joshi’s (2009: 39) survey of SWIS-ITES-BPO 
workers in Gurgaon included a question about hiring lower-skilled workers within 
their households. She found that, on average, for every one SWIS or ITES-BPO 
worker, 0.5 domestic low-skilled workers were employed. NASSCOM and CRISIL’s 
study included an assessment of employment arising from linkages outside of IT 
employees’ households. They repeated the entire methodology detailed above, but 
used employment rather than output multipliers from the 1998-99 input–output table. 
They found that following the same assumptions as those which led to the numbers in 
Figure 5.4, the SWIS-ITES-BPO sector was responsible for a total of 3.64 million 
workers outside the IT sector in 2005-06. This translates to a 2:1 ratio: overall; there 
are 2 additional workers in the economy for every one worker directly employed by 
the IT sector45. NASSCOM and CRISIL’s methodology identifies which sectors these 
workers were employed in. These are predominantly catering, housekeeping, 
construction, security, technology, and transport. Figure 5.11 details the skill profile 
and the level of education of the employees in these sectors. It shows that the majority 
are educated only to high school level or below. 
 
                                                 
45
 Authors calculations based on NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007: 9, 10, 29) and NASSCOM (2009b). 
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Figure 5.11: Education Profile in Sectors that are Backwards Linked to IT in 2005-06 
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As the IT sector has continued to expand in revenue terms, it has also expanded its 
presence outside of the relatively wealthy areas in the south of India, which was its 
original geographical base. This is an important development because it means that 
the geographical inequality associated with the industry, lamented in the literature 
(D’Costa, 2003: 215), is beginning to abate. The impetus for geographical expansion 
has occurred because of tight labour markets in the first cities which provided a base 
for the IT sector, Bangalore and Mumbai. It has also been enabled by the fact that 
SWIS is “weightless” and costs little, if anything, to transport to its final customer 
(Quah, 2001). According to NASSCOM and Delloite (2008: 1), there are now 28 
cities which host an IT industry as a result of this process. Figure 5.12 maps these 
secondary cities. 
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Figure 5.12: Secondary cities which host an IT industry in 2008 
 
Source: NASSCOM and Delloite (2008). 
 
NASSCOM and Delloite offer a case study of one of these cities, located in one of 
India’s poorest states in the north-west of the country. Bhubaneswar is situated in 
Orissa, which according to World Bank (2006b) is the second poorest state in India 
(p. 43) and has a proportion of the population below the poverty line similar to that of 
many sub-Saharan African countries (p. 45). Despite this, the top four largest IT 
companies (Infosys, TCS, Wipro, and Satyam) have offices in Bhubaneswar and, as 
Figure 5.13 illustrates, the region has grown into a substantial exporter of SWIS. 
Exports from Orissa have grown at a compound annual rate of 176% between 1997–
98 and 2006–07, and growth in the most recent year in the study was more than 
double the national average rate (NASSCOM and Delloite, 2008: 1). By 2006–07 
exports from Orissa had reached Rs 800 Crore, or nearly US$200m. 
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Figure 5.13: Software Exports from Orissa  
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Source: NASSCOM and Delloite (2008). 
 
Given this exponential growth in export revenues, the sector in Orissa has 
experienced similar growth in employment. Direct employment of SWIS-ITES-BPO 
professionals has grown at a compound annual growth rate of 206% between 2001 
and 2007; and NASSCOM and Deloitte forecast that the sector will employ 430,000 
people by 2011–12 (2008: 1). Added to this substantial difference in job opportunities 
is the further stimulus arising from the sector’s demand for ancillary services. Using 
methods similar to those of NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007), NASSCOM and Deloitte 
(2008:1) estimate that these backwards linkages will provide another 1.7 million jobs 
by 2011–12, primarily in sectors like security, transport, housekeeping, and catering.   
 
There are two more linkages from the IT sector which are likely to have a general 
beneficial effect on other sectors in India. The first of these is that the “brain drain” 
bemoaned by Heeks in 1996, discussed in Section 3.4.1, has begun to slow down and 
even, in places, begun to reverse into “brain gain” (Chacko, 2007) or “brain 
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circulation” (Commander, 2008; Saxenian, 2005). For example, a survey by 
Vonderheid of Indian-born IT professionals in Silicon Valley in the United States 
finds that more than 50% of these professionals would consider returning to India, and 
45% “probably would return home” (2002: 1). Authorities in developed countries 
changed their visa-issuing strategies during the 1990s, from offering permanent visas 
to offering temporary stays. This tactical change applied to the H1-B skilled worker 
visa which is frequently used for IT workers emigrating from India (Sasikumar and 
Hussain, 2008: 5), so it is likely to be an important determinant of return migration. It 
is also true that Indian-born IT workers in the United States and other developed 
countries now see India as a more desirable place to live and work than they once did. 
They return because of improving opportunities within the IT sector in India and 
because there are now jobs for them within other public and private sector 
organisations which are increasingly using IT technology (p. 1). A senior recruitment 
professional who participated in an in-depth interview as part of this current project 
said that, for many senior positions, salaries in India are now comparable to those that 
can be earned in the United States. This enables return migrants to experience the 
personal life benefits of being based in India without experiencing a loss of earning 
power. For many older professionals who have been in the industry for 10–15 years, 
and now wish to raise children in India, return migration is often sought to be close to 
family (Kris Lakshmi, 23 February 2009, Bangalore).  
 
Backwards linkages arising from the expenditures of return migrants is one obvious 
route through which this “brain gain” phenomenon could have a beneficial impact on 
other sectors in India. However, there are also several other possibilities. Return 
migrants often bring new skills and new knowledge home. This is particularly 
 154 
important because in many cases knowledge on technologies like IT is tacit and 
complex and so difficult to diffuse. This means that returning migrants that embody 
the tacit knowledge required can play an instrumental role in assisting firms to expand 
their services in new areas (Song, Almeida and Wu, 2003). On top of this human 
capital contribution to their home economy, returning migrants often bring social 
capital in the form of contacts with developed country firms, organisations or 
residents and financial capital in the form of saved earnings from their years abroad. 
This offers returning migrants the opportunity to become entrepreneurs and many run 
successful businesses in IT and other industries (Saxenian 2005).   
 
The other, more general linkage from the IT sector’s activities comes from the solid 
reputation that India’s IT industry has built for itself in export markets. By 2008, 
nearly 75% of the Fortune 500 and 50% of Global 2000 corporations source their 
technology-related services from India. Indian IT firms have also been listed on 
global stock markets and have even purchased successful companies in developed 
countries (NASSCOM and Delloite 2008: 21, 24). This has led many commentators to 
point to the IT sector as an exemplar of what India can achieve. For example, the 
India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), whose mission is to “to promote and create 
international awareness of the Made in India label in markets overseas”46 cites the IT 
industry has having “played a key role in putting India on the global map”47. It is a 
trend which has filtered through to attitudes in developed countries. For example, 
Kamp reports the comments of a London-based executive at a French bank: “In 
Britain, non resident Indians can hardly believe what is happening. ‘Made in India’ is 
not just respectable but before anyone knew it, sought after. What has made a 
                                                 
46
 http://www.ibef.org/aboutus.aspx (Accessed 16th January 2011) 
47
 http://www.ibef.org/industry/informationtechnology.aspx (Accessed 16th January 2011). 
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difference is that people know now what we are capable of. Earlier they thought India 
is the land where their curry came from” (2003: 1). All of this good news on India has 
been highlighted as an important contributory factor in the vigorous increases in the 
flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to India (Kumar 2005: 114; Miller 2001: 21). 
Whilst it is outside the scope of the current work to identify the numerous benefits 
that these investments into India may have on other sectors, Figure 5.14 reveals the 
investments have indeed been substantial.  
Figure 5.14: FDI into India 
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Source: World Development Indicators (2010). 
 
Overall, the synthesis provided in this section of the new evidence on backwards and 
miscellaneous other linkages reveals a far more positive picture than that painted by 
the literature discussed in Chapter 3. Despite the pessimistic outlook given there, the 
IT sector’s recent history has revealed many beneficial and wide-ranging impacts 
arising from its continued growth. This section has demonstrated that backwards 
linkages from SWIS–ITES-BPO have become important in the Indian economy. Not 
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only have IT firms begun to purchase a large proportion of their inputs within the 
Indian economy, but the sheer size of their workforce has swelled sufficiently to 
become a significant force in terms of consumption demand. Together, these two 
effects have contributed a macro-level output effect between 2% and 3% of GDP, 
which is on top of the direct earnings of the sector (6.2% of GDP in 2010-11). 
Perhaps even more encouraging, the distribution of benefits from the IT sector’s 
growth has begun to have a more-inclusive nature. This section has demonstrated that 
two ancillary jobs have been created for every one IT worker as a result of the IT 
sector’s expenditures and the demands of its workers. In the areas visited by Olsen et 
al (2010), these ancillary jobs are being filled by those with the heaviest accumulated 
disadvantages, including little if any education and limited skills. On top of that, the 
IT sector has spread geographically throughout the country, and now even exists in 
some of the poorest and most disadvantaged areas of India.  
 
The next section evaluates the extent of forward linkages. In presenting newly found 
and assembled data, as well as two original analyses, the research shows that these 
linkages are now undeniably both sizeable and fast-growing.
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5.2 Forward Linkages are Large and Growing Fast  
 
Figure 5.15 shows revenues for the Indian SWIS sector from the domestic market, as 
published by NASSCOM starting in the 1980s. The line plots the revenues 
NASSCOM members collected from the domestic market in current Rs. crore, and the 
bars show growth in the same revenues. This author has carefully extracted these 
statistics from multiple publications; their assembly into a time series of 26 years is 
itself an important contribution to the state of knowledge on the sector. What becomes 
undeniably clear when looking at this time series is that the domestic market for 
SWIS has been growing at a respectable rate since the industry’s inception in the 
1980s. At an estimated Rs. 65,500 crore (US$14.6bn48), the domestic market in 2010-
11 is more than 125 times larger than it was 20 years previously. This represents a 
compound annual growth rate of 27.4% over 20 years, an achievement which is 
difficult to describe as “inadequate” (Kumar and Joseph, 2005: 99), or “weak” or 
“constrained” (D’Costa, 2003: 222). 
 
                                                 
48
 Estimated by NASSCOM (2011) in February 2011, for the year ending April 2011. 
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Figure 5.15: SWIS Revenue for Indian IT Sector from Domestic Market  
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Sources: Athreye (2005: 34); Hanna (1994: 100); Heeks (1999b:2); Kenney and Dossani (2002: 237); 
Kumar & Joseph (2005: 94); NASSCOM (2008a:1); NASSCOM (2009a: 6, 203); NASSCOM 
(2011:7,8); Sridharan (2004b: 34,37). 
Note:. The original source of all data is NASSCOM, and it reflects the revenues of their members. The 
data is published in US$ and has been converted by this author into rupees using exchange rates from 
RBI (2010). The dotted line denotes two missing data points in 1991-92 and 1992-93. 2010-11 is 
estimated by NASSCOM as at February 2011 for the year ending April 2011. Figures exclude sales of 
SWIS to ITES-BPO producers. Rs 1 crore equalled US$221,900 in 2005. 
 
If it was ever correct to portray the SWIS sector’s domestic forward linkages in 
negative terms, Figure 5.15 reveals that period was in the 1990s and perhaps into the 
first years of the 2000s. It is clear from the chart that this earlier period saw both 
smaller revenues from the domestic market and smaller annual growth rates in those 
revenues. However, in the most recent period, growth has been strong, with, on 
average, expansions of over Rs. 5,000 crore, or US$1.1bn per year49. It is a pattern 
which is suggestive of a possible structural break in the sector’s growth, but it is not 
clear a priori which year such a break might have occurred. The next step in the 
                                                 
49
 The exception to this growth was for 2008-09, when the global recession led to lower growth in IT 
outsourcing in India, as with the rest of the world (NASSCOM 2009c: 6).  
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current research on forward linkages, then, was to test for such a structural break and 
to identify in which year it occurred. 
 
The methodology used is based on the classical Chow test for structural change 
(Chow 1960). Applied to the current problem, this test would involve splitting the 
time series of domestic revenue growth data into two sub-samples, one before and one 
after a candidate break year. Then an econometric model for growth of domestic 
market revenues would be estimated based on explanatory variables including a 
constant, its own past values and any other relevant controls. A dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for one of the sub-samples and 0 for the other would also be 
included and the significance of this dummy variable assessed using an F-test. If this 
dummy’s coefficient was found to be significantly different from 0, the test would 
demonstrate the existence of a breakpoint in the year that split the data. Of course, the 
Chow test pre-supposes a candidate breakpoint year, whereas in the current research it 
was desirable to identify the breakpoint from the data. For this task, Quandt (1960) 
suggested a procedure which applies the Chow test iteratively to all possible splits of 
the sample. This procedure involves estimating T-1 equations, where T is the sample 
size, and assessing the significance of T-1 dummy variables corresponding to T-1 
breakpoint years by calculating T-1 F-statistics. The largest of these, supF, can then 
be the subject of a test whose null hypothesis is no breakpoint, versus the alternative 
that there is a break in the year where the maximum F-statistic is found. This 
procedure involves estimating substantially more parameters than a one-equation 
version of the Chow test; Quandt recognised that this would leave the critical values 
for a one-equation Chow test inappropriately small. Andrews (1993) moved Quandt’s 
work forward by deriving the correct critical values for the procedure, and Vogelsang 
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(1997) and Hansen (1997) extended the theme further by modifying the critical values 
for models with serial correlation, and by deriving asymptotic p-values, respectively.  
Figure 5.16: Test Equation for Domestic SWIS Revenue Growth 
Dependent Variable is Domestic Market 
Revenue Growth (Rs. crore)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 2618.96 740.16 527.35
3.99** 1.34 1.12
0.84 1.04
5.96** 7.44**
Outlier -6145.40
2008-09 -2.91**
R-Squared 0% 62% 73%
Sample 25 24 24
Domestic Rev 
Growth(-1)
 
Sources: Author estimates; adapted from Athreye (2005: 34); Hanna (1994: 100); Heeks (1999b:2); 
Kenney and Dossani (2002: 237); Kumar & Joseph (2005: 94); NASSCOM (2008a:1;, NASSCOM 
(2009a: 6,203); NASSCOM (2011:7,8); Sridharan (2004b: 34,37). 
Notes: t-stats in italics; ** denotes significance at 1% level. This analysis is based on growth in Rs. 
crore rather than percentage growth rates because in the early years of the industry, the data included 
very large percentage growth from a very small base. The insignificant constant term is retained in the 
regression to facilitate the Q-A test. 
 
Figure 5.16 shows the equation constructed for the purposes of undertaking the 
Quandt–Andrews test on the domestic SWIS revenue data. Column 3 is the preferred 
test equation. It models growth as an auto-regressive process of order one. A dummy 
variable is included for 2008-09 to correct for low growth in that year due to the 
global recession (NASSCOM, 2009c: 6). Figure 5.17 shows the results of carrying out 
the Quandt–Andrews test for a structural break in growth in an unknown year on this 
equation. The null hypothesis of no structural break is firmly rejected in favour of the 
alternative that there is a significant step change in growth of domestic SWIS 
revenues in the year 2005-06. In other words, there is a structural break in the size of 
the constant in equation (3) in the year 2005-06. 
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Figure 5.17: Quandt–Andrews Test for a Structural Break in Domestic Market SWIS Revenue 
Growth 
Quandt-Andrews Unknown Breakpoint Test
Sample 1987-88 to 2010-11
# Breaks compared 16
Maximum Wald F Statistic: 27.92
P-value 0.00**
Year: 2005-06
 
Sources: Author estimates; adapted from Athreye (2005: 34); Hanna (1994: 100); Heeks (1999b:2); 
Kenney and Dossani (2002: 237); Kumar & Joseph (2005: 94); NASSCOM (2008a:1); NASSCOM 
(2009a: 6,203); NASSCOM (2011:7,8); Sridharan (2004b: 34,37). 
Notes: ** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 
Figure 5.18 shows the implications of this finding for the model of growth in 
domestic forward linkages from the SWIS sector. Column 3 is copied directly from 
column 3 in Figure 5.16, whilst Column 4 shows the results of including a dummy 
variable with the value 0 before 2005-06 and 1 thereafter into the equation. As 
expected from the Quandt–Andrews result, this variable is positive and highly 
significant. The magnitude of its coefficient indicates that since 2005-06, growth in 
domestic revenues from the SWIS sector has been, on average, around Rs. 5,750 crore 
(or US$1.3bn) higher it was between 1985-86 and 2004-05.  
 
 162 
Figure 5.18: A Significant Step Up in Growth of Domestic SWIS Revenues, 2005-06 
Dependent Variable is Domestic Market 
Revenue Growth (Rs. crore)
(3) (4)
Constant 527.35 785.69
1.12 2.48*
1.04 0.30
7.44** 1.83
Outlier -6145.40 -5237.67
2008-09 -2.91** -3.72**
Step Dummy 5754.61
2005-06 5.28**
R-Squared 73% 89%
Sample 24 24
Domestic Rev 
Growth(-1)
 
Sources: Author estimates; adapted from Athreye (2005: 34); Hanna (1994: 100); Heeks (1999b:2); 
Kenney and Dossani (2002: 237); Kumar & Joseph (2005: 94); NASSCOM (2008a:1); NASSCOM 
(2009a: 6,203); NASSCOM (2011:7,8); Sridharan (2004b: 34,37). 
Notes: t-stats in italics; ** denotes significance at 1% level; * denotes significance at 5% level. 
Insignificant constant term retained in equation (3) to facilitate Q-A test. 
 
 
It is a substantial acceleration and one which has succeeded in placing the domestic 
market for Indian SWIS on equal terms with the export market in terms of its 
percentage growth performance. This means that although export revenues remain 
larger than domestic revenues in absolute terms, comparisons between the two 
destinations for Indian SWIS no longer paint a picture of a “neglected” (Heeks, 1996: 
72) domestic market. To illustrate this point, Figure 5.19 plots the SWIS sector’s 
export versus domestic revenues. The graph plots total SWIS revenues in current US 
dollars in bars, split between those coming from the domestic market, in black, and 
those coming from export markets, in grey. Superimposed over the bars, the line 
shows the share of revenues coming from the domestic market. In the earlier periods, 
this chart shows clearly the story that the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 lamented—
the growth in the sector was indeed mainly being driven by exports and the share of 
 163 
the domestic market was falling rapidly. What the updated picture shows, though, is 
that the domestic share has now stabilised. Starting around 2003-04, the domestic 
market’s share of revenues has stayed between 24% and 26% of the SWIS sector’s 
total revenues.  
Figure 5.19: SWIS Revenue for Indian IT Sector and Share Accounted by Domestic Contracts  
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Sources: Athreye (2005: 34); Hanna (1994: 100); Heeks (1999b:2); Kenney and Dossani (2002: 237); 
Kumar & Joseph (2005: 94); NASSCOM (2008a:1); NASSCOM (2009a: 6,203); NASSCOM 
(2011:7,8); Sridharan (2004b: 34,37). 
Note: See notes in Figure 5.15. Dashed line represents interpolation for missing data. 
 
Figure 5.20 re-charts the same data to emphasize the growth profiles of export and 
domestic revenues from the beginning of the new millennium until 2007-08, when the 
global recession began to impact the industry. It shows that the noted stabilisation in 
the share of the domestic market occurred because the domestic market caught up 
with the robust growth in exports. Both export and domestic revenues registered 
double-digit growth in the first decade of the new millennium, and during this period 
there was no waning in the growth performance of exports; if anything, export growth 
accelerated along the trend line.  
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Figure 5.20: Growth in SWIS Revenue, 2001-02 to 2007-08 
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Sources: Athreye (2005: 34); Hanna (1994: 100); Heeks (1999b:2); Kenney and Dossani (2002: 237); 
Kumar & Joseph (2005: 94); NASSCOM (2008a:1); NASSCOM (2009a: 6, 203); NASSCOM (2011:7, 
8); Sridharan (2004b: 34, 37). 
 
What this combined new analysis shows is that the most recent five to eight years 
(approximately 2003 to 2008) have witnessed a marked change, with dramatically 
improved growth performance relative to both the sector’s historical trajectory and to 
the continuing expansion of forward linkages abroad.  
 
Not surprisingly, these achievements also show up in the current research on the 
onward impetus that the SWIS–ITES-BPO sector’s sales create through indirect 
forward linkages in the Indian economy. Leontieff (1951) was the first to offer a 
method for calculating the size of such linkages for a sector. He described his method 
as a means of calculating the consequences of changes in a country’s economic 
system by following the ramifications of the change through the “chain of 
transactions” that make up the system (p. 14). Leontieff’s model was demand driven, 
and thus designed primarily to quantify the size of total backward linkage. Ghosh 
(1958) adapted Leontieff’s model to provide a supply-driven version which was 
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similarly well-suited for understanding the full extent of direct and indirect forward 
linkages50. Ghosh’s methodology traces expansion in a particular sector through to 
those sectors that purchase its outputs, and then from those to a second “layer” of 
purchasing sectors, and onwards again into all subsequent layers. It is important to 
identify at each layer how much of the output of each sector is purchased by another 
sector within the domestic economy as an input to production, rather than purchased 
as a consumable or for export. In other words, how much of each sector’s output 
provides an impetus for another sector’s output expansion.  
 
This complex task is simplified through the use of an assumption which states that 
each sector sells its output to one of several destinations in fixed or very slow-moving 
observable proportions. Output can be sold as either an input to other sectors, for use 
by government, or for consumption by citizens all within the domestic economy; or 
sold abroad as exports. The assumption that the proportion of output going to each of 
these destinations is fixed enables the process of sharing output between them to be 
modelled as a stable linear equation. Once such an equation has been created for the 
output of all sectors of the economy, the resulting large yet simple system of 
simultaneous equations is capable of mapping all the input–output transactions in the 
whole economy. It is a system which is immediately amenable to identifying the 
extent of forward linkages from a particular sector at every layer because the system 
specifically identifies the proportion of output being consumed or exported versus the 
proportion being used as an input in the domestic economy. The clever part of 
Leontieff’s (1951) methodology and its adaptation to a supply-driven context by 
                                                 
50
 There remains some controversy over whether Leontieff’s and Ghosh’s methodologies can be used 
consistently for the same example at the same time (Cella 1984; Rose and Allison 1989). For this 
reason the application of Leontieff’s method for backward linkages in Section 5.2 by NASSCOM and 
CRISIL (2007) which used the 1998-99 input output tables and survey data on purchases by the sector 
from 2005 is kept separate from the results on forward linkages here which use the 2003-04 and 2006-
07 input output tables.   
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Ghosh (1958) is the expression of the system in matrix terms and the use of its 
solution51. Once found, the solution identifies the total forward linkage effect for a 
one-unit increase in production in each particular sector of the economy. To make 
comparisons between different sectors, an index is usually constructed with 1 
representing the average sector, and any score greater than 1 representing an above-
average score on forward linkages. Comparisons between different years can be made 
by identifying how the index changes over time (Miller and Blair 2009, 543–549; 
Pradhan, Saluja, and Singh, 2006: 47).  
 
The application of Ghosh’s method to the measurement and benchmarking of 
domestic forward linkages from Indian SWIS–ITES-BPO undertaken during the 
research project began with the need to understand the flow of output between 
industries and to final consumption within the Indian economy. Ghosh’s method uses 
these quantities of output to identify allocation coefficients which form the basis of 
the linear system, which must be solved to measure total forward linkages. The flow 
quantities are published in India, as in other countries, as a matrix measured in 
monetary terms known as the input–output flow or absorption table. In India they are 
published by the Ministry of Statistics of the Government of India (GOI) every three 
years (GOI, 2010). This matrix included “Computer & Related Activities”, or SWIS–
ITES-BPO, as a separate sector for the first time only in 2003-04 (2–3); as of 2011, 
only 2003-04 and 2006-07 were published with the industry included (GOI 2010: 53; 
United Nations, 1999).  
 
As a first step in the new analysis undertaken on these issues, Figure 5.21 (for 2003-
04) and Figure 5.22 (for 2006-07) show the sales of domestic SWIS and ITES-BPO 
                                                 
51
 Miller and Blair (2009: 543) give an accessible account of this method.  
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combined, split by the buying sector. Both charts show the data from the input–output 
absorption tables from the appropriate year (darker bars) and, as a back-up, the same 
information as sourced from NASSCOM’s surveys of its members. The data is shown 
in current lakh rupees (Rs.1 lakh equals US$2,270 using 2005 exchange rates) in 
order to be consistent with the input–output flow tables. 
Figure 5.21: Destination for Domestic SWIS and ITES-BPO in 2003-04, Current Rs. Lakh 
0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000
Financial Services
Communications
Retail
Manufacturing
Others
Input Output Flow Tables NASSCOM Member's Survey
 
Sources: Adapted from GOI (2010: 68–99); NASSCOM (2008a:1); NASSCOM and IDC (2006: 18).  
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Figure 5.22: Destination for Domestic SWIS and ITES-BPO in 2006–07, in Current Rs. Lakh 
0 400,000 800,000 1,200,000 1,600,000
Financial Services
Communications
Retail
Manufacturing
Others
Input Output Flow Tables NASSCOM Member's Survey
 
Sources: Adapted from Government Of India (2010: 1-32); NASSCOM (2009a: 203). 
 
It is not an unproblematic first step. What emerged from the analyses shown in these 
two charts is that there is actually quite a large discrepancy between the two data 
sources. NASSCOM’s member surveys find that, for 2003-04, SWIS and ITES-BPO 
sales to other sectors in the domestic economy are 55% higher than the Government 
of India (GOI) estimates, and are 67% higher for 2006-07. Perhaps even more 
important for the application of Ghosh’s method, in both years the two sources also 
identify different allocations of output from the sector amongst destination sectors. 
The most obvious discrepancy in this respect is the vast difference in the share of 
sales going to financial services. NASSCOM’s data shows finance as the biggest 
domestic buyer of SWIS and ITES-BPO in both years, but the input–output tables 
show this sector as only purchasing a very small proportion of the sector’s output. A 
similar discrepancy appears in purchases by the retail sector in 2006-07. NASSCOM 
data shows that retailers purchased 8% of total domestic SWIS and ITES-BPO sales 
in 2006-07. The GOI’s figures put the same share at closer to 2.5%.  
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Before moving to the second step in the analysis, it was important to evaluate the 
reliability of these two data sources. This analysis indicated that there were several 
reasons why NASSCOM’s data is more accurate. The first is that NASSCOM asked 
the question about where IT sector outputs go directly to IT companies, whilst the 
GOI asked it indirectly through many different surveys sent to many different 
industries that might potentially buy SWIS-ITES-BPO (Pradhan, Saluja and Singh, 
2006: 146-158)52. For example, in agriculture, the main source of GOI data is the Cost 
of Cultivation census undertaken by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics in the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Judging by its name, it seems clear that this survey’s main 
concerns were the costs of inputs to agricultural production. In manufacturing, the 
Annual Survey of Industries census study published by the Central Statistical 
Organisation similarly gives “detailed information on item-wise inputs in terms of 
quantities and values and products and by-products” (p. 149). This use of data on 
inputs to understand where the IT sector’s outputs are used would not cause a problem 
in certain circumstances. If outputs are sold in a single transaction with no 
intermediary, no transaction costs, and no other frictions, asking about inputs to the 
destination industry rather than outputs of the producing industry would yield the 
same numbers. However, if any of these issues do arise and their impacts are not 
properly captured by the research strategy, there is the potential for distortions in the 
data. 
 
The second reason to use NASSCOM’s data on output allocations from SWIS and 
ITES-BPO is that data collection methods on inputs, in the particular industries that 
are substantial buyers of SWIS–ITES-BPO, often rely on sample surveys rather than 
                                                 
52
 This is not an oversight on the part of the statistical authorities in India. Input– output tables are more 
often used for Leontieff’s demand-driven method, and in this mode, asking about inputs is more 
appropriate.  
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censuses (p. 150–153). For example, Figure 5.22 revealed a discrepancy between the 
two data sources on the extent of purchases of SWIS and ITES-BPO by the Indian 
retail sector in 2006-07. On measurement of retail, Pradhan, Saluja and Singh find 
that “there are certain problems, especially in the case of retail trade, where there are 
innumerable establishments and no census is possible. In such cases sample surveys 
can be done to obtain the required data” (p. 153). It seems clear that in a country with 
innumerable retail establishments and a much smaller number of SWIS or ITES-BPO 
companies53, a sample-based survey of the latter is a better indicator than a sample-
based survey of the former for identifying the extent and value of transactions 
between the two.  
 
The final reason to trust NASSCOM’s data is that it appears much more consistent 
with what might be expected, given experiences from elsewhere in the world. It has 
been well documented that both finance and retail were enthusiastic adopters of IT in 
the United States in the 1990s (Baily and Lawrence 2001: 309; Mann 2003: 4; Stiroh 
2001: 19; Triplett 1999: 318,). Figure 5.23 details the sectors which made purchases 
of IT in 1992 in six Asian countries. This indicates that these same industries have 
been enthusiastic adopters of IT throughout Asia too.  
 
                                                 
53
 http://www.nasscom.in/ (accessed 15 January 2011) reports that 1,200 NASSCOM members 
comprised an estimated 95% of the entire IT industry’s revenues.  
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Figure 5.23: Proportion of Total IT Expenditure by Sector for 6 Asian Countries in 1992 
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Source: Hanna (1994: 40).  
 
These three reasons together made a compelling case for using NASSCOM’s data on 
output from SWIS–ITES-BPO in this research rather than that available from the GOI 
input–output flow tables. To do this, however, the revenues reported by NASSCOM 
had to be allocated to the 130 sectors on the input–output flow tables, and the Ghosh 
allocation coefficients had to be recalculated. Unfortunately, NASSCOM only 
publishes sector-wise destinations of output from SWIS and ITES-BPO in the five 
aggregate sectors listed in Figures 5.21 and 5.22. Using NASSCOM’s data in the new 
research necessitated splitting the revenues into smaller categories to match the input-
output tables. This was done using the share that each individual industry took of the 
larger category in the input–output flow table for the relevant year54. The other 
                                                 
54
 For example, the category Financial Services is made up of 2 sectors on the input–output tables: 
Banking and Insurance. In 2003-04, the input–ouput tables show that these two sectors purchased Rs 
30,300 Lakh of SWIS or ITES-BPO; of that total, 95% was purchased by the banking sector and 5% by 
the insurance sector. For the same year, NASSCOM reported domestic SWIS and ITES-BPO sales in 
the domestic market of Rs. 545,500 Lakh. In order to use this figure to measure forward linkages in 
that year, it was necessary to apportion that amount (Rs. 545,500 Lakh) to Banking and Insurance. The 
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methodological issue to resolve was to choose an assumption regarding the treatment 
of secondary products in the input–output tables55. The commodity technology 
assumption56 was adopted because it was the most logical in terms of economic 
interpretation (United Nations, 1999). 
 
Figure 5.24 shows the index of total forward linkages arising out of this analysis. The 
index number plotted represents the extent of total (direct plus all indirect) forward 
linkages relative to the average sector in the Indian economy. A score of 1 on the 
index would indicate that SWIS–ITES-BPO had forward linkages to the same extent 
as the average sector. What is important about the findings in Figure 5.24 is that in the 
three years between 2003-04 and 2006-07, this index increased by close to 20%57. In a 
list of 130 sectors ranked by the total size of their domestic forward linkages, SWIS–
ITES-BPO moved from number 101 in 2003-04 to number 92 in 2006-07. To give 
this improvement context, in 2003-04 SWIS-ITES-BPO was between Wooden 
Furniture and Eggs & Poultry on the list, whilst in 2006-07 it was between Motor 
Vehicles and Construction.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
pragmatic choice taken here is to apportion 95% of it (Rs. 518,200 Lakh) to Banking and the remaining 
5% to Insurance (Rs 27,300 Lakh).  
55
 Miller and Blair (2009: 208–210) offer a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the treatment of secondary products. 
56
 This assumption is needed for the treatment of industries that produce more than one product. For 
example, the automobile components industry may also produce certain machine tools. The commodity 
technology assumption states that production of the secondary product (machine tools) uses the same 
inputs as are used by firms which produce that product as their main output (i.e. firms in the machine 
tool industry). The alternative industry technology assumption states that production of the secondary 
product uses the same inputs as the rest of the industry that actually produces it (i.e. the same inputs as 
automobile components). 
57
 The finding that total forward linkages are growing very quickly is robust to data sources. With data 
from the input–output tables, the index calculated for 2003-04 is 0.40, and for 2006-07 it is 0.59. 
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Figure 5.24: Index of Total Forward Linkages for SWIS and ITES-BPO, 2003-04 and 2006-07  
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Sources: Calculations based on from GOI (2010: 1-32); NASSCOM (2009a: 203); NASSCOM 
(2008a:1); NASSCOM and IDC (2006: 18) 
 
 
It is yet another piece of strong evidence to show that SWIS-ITES-BPO from the IT 
sector is becoming more important in the Indian domestic economy. The analysis of 
Figure 5.24 suggests that SWIS-ITES-BPO is both being used in more sectors and 
being used in sectors which are themselves becoming more pervasive.  
 
It is premature at this stage to make any decisive statements about output or 
productivity effects of these forward linkages for two reasons. The first is that the 
analysis in Figure 5.24 is in need of updated data which may or may not reveal a 
sector with above-average forward linkages as of 2011. The second is more esoteric, 
and arises from theoretical controversies in the Ghosh methodology. The assumption 
that the output of a particular sector would be allocated according to fixed proportions 
in this model implies that an expanding sector will always be able to sell its expanded 
outputs to the same set of customer sectors and that its existing customers will expand 
with it (Miller and Blair, 2009: 549). Hirschman, however, was not positive that this 
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would always be the case. According to Hirschman, an expanding sector which was 
short of inputs for production may well be compelled to invest in sectors which 
produce those inputs, or, in other words, backwards linkages. On the other hand, for 
forward linkages, the same urgency may not necessarily be felt. The expanding sector 
may or may not invest into sectors which constitute forward linkages58. Hirschman 
described what would happen if neither the expanding sector nor the linked sector 
choose this investment with an analogy: if the forward linkage is a road which invites 
traffic, it may or may not actually find that traffic (expanded output) arriving (1958: 
100). What this means is that for forward linkages, input–output analysis is only 
sufficient to establish that a sector’s output is becoming more pervasive or that it is 
being used in sectors which are themselves becoming more pervasive. It is not, 
however, sufficient to prove that these input–output transactions are a causal 
mechanism for increased output growth. For SWIS in India, this question is addressed 
in Chapter 7.  
 
To conclude then, the research described in this section has established that at an 
estimated US$14.6bn59 of SWIS, the domestic market in 2010-11 is now a significant 
industry in absolute terms. Its history reveals strong growth for well over 20 years 
and, importantly, it also shows that there was a significant upwards breakpoint in 
2005-06. From that time, growth in the domestic market has been so vigorous that the 
traditional literature is now inconsistent with current statistics. Even the comparison 
of domestic versus export revenue growth, the staple empirical evidence for 
pessimistic views of the sector in that literature, has witnessed a turnaround since 
2003. Growth in the domestic market has now caught up with the robust expansion of 
                                                 
58
 See Chapter 1.   
59
 Estimated by NASSCOM (2011) in February 2011, for the year ending April 2011. 
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SWIS exports. Internally, the sector’s output has become more pervasive, allowing 
the sector to climb the rankings of most forward-linked industries. According to 
Ghosh’s methodology, it has improved by 20% in a period of only three years 
between 2003-04 and 2006-07. As of 2006-07, SWIS and ITES-BPO had a similar 
reach in the domestic economy as the motor vehicles or construction industries. 
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5.3 Conclusion: An Urgent Need for More Answers on Forward 
Linkages 
 
This chapter documented the results of exciting new research on the current extent of 
linkages. It first provided a new synthesis of recent research (published and 
unpublished) from the private sector, the government, and academia. This showed for 
the first time that there is now sufficient evidence to be confident that backwards 
linkages from SWIS-ITES-BPO have emerged. It also showed that backwards 
linkages and are beginning to provide both a stimulus to India’s economy and 
opportunities for low-skilled and disadvantaged workers. The second part of the 
chapter detailed the results of an even more important set of research. This presented 
a complete set of time series data, which has either not been collated or not been 
previously reported in the literature, on the size of forward linkages from the SWIS 
sector. It also included new econometric analysis of that time series, and original 
input–output research to assess the extent of indirect forward linkages. What these 
new data sources and analyses show is that forward linkages are, in fact, both large 
and fast-growing. They also show that something changed in the domestic market 
around 2005-06, and since then, growth has been significantly faster.  
 
Uncovering the true extent and dynamics of forward linkages is the most important 
original contribution of this research project. One reason for the importance of these 
findings is that they shed new light on the literature reviewed in Chapter 3. There, it 
was argued, the literature is very pessimistic on forward linkages and, consequently, 
on the role of the IT sector as a whole. In fact, on the question of IT being a leading 
sector, the literature answered with a resounding no, and even argued that the sector is 
more like an enclave, which is the opposite of a leading sector (Balasubramanyam and 
Balasubramanyam, 1998). To some extent, authors in this literature cannot be blamed 
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for their pessimism. Extensive backwards linkages have emerged predominantly 
because of the shift from the onsite to the offshore provision of SWIS and ITES-BPO. 
This shift has been taking place slowly since the mid 1990s, but evidence of its impact 
has been visible only since SWIS–ITES-BPO was incorporated into India’s input–
output tables in 2003-04. On the other hand, the domestic market for SWIS has been 
growing quickly for the last decade, so the authors published in more recent years, 
including some of those contributions reviewed in chapter 3 (section 3.3), should have 
noticed this growth. In many cases, the pessimism arose from the comparison to 
exports from the sector. Judged relative to exports’ stellar trajectory prior to 2003-04, 
the domestic SWIS market did indeed look neglected. Judged in relation to any other 
industry, though, a 27% compound annual growth rate over 20 years with a revenue 
expansion from nearly zero in 1985-86 to US$14.6bn in 2010-11 can hardly be judged 
as weak.  
 
The findings in this chapter on the extent and rapid growth of forward linkages 
demand further investigation into both their causes and their effects. This chapter’s 
work reveals that there is a serious need for explanations of the extent of forward 
linkages. The theorising that already exists on this issue, in Dahlman and Utz (2005) 
and D’Costa (2003), is based on the out-of-date perception that forward linkages are 
“constrained” and “weak” (D’Costa, 2003: 222). These existing analyses implied a 
future for forward linkages which is far from the sector’s actual experience. D’Costa 
(2003) and Dahlman and Utz (2005) each suggested that there would be no 
accelerated expansion in the domestic market in the short- to medium-term future—
but since their publications, this has, in fact, happened.  
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It is a development that raises another burning question: What does this accelerated 
expansion in forward linkages mean for India’s economy? On the one hand, some 
authors (e.g., Mody and Dahlman, 1992; Miller, 2001: 12) remain unconvinced that 
IT is appropriate for countries at India’s stage of development. The implication of 
such analyses is that the money spent on IT in India identified in this chapter may 
well have been better spent elsewhere. On the other hand, if these authors are too 
negative, there is the potential for a positive ending. Many of the contributions 
reviewed in Chapter 3 argued that a larger domestic market for SWIS would be good 
for India’s development (Chandrasekhar, 2001: 1; Heeks, 1999b: 9; Kumar and 
Joseph, 2005: 99: Joseph, 2002: 2: McCartney, 2006: 10; Singh, 2002: 34; amongst 
others), The evidence from developed countries, covered in Chapter 2, also confirmed 
that it is possible to get a strong return in terms of output and productivity from using 
IT.  
 
These questions are taken up in the next two chapters. Chapter 6 begins by reporting 
what the new research undertaken in the project found on explanations for the true 
extent and growth trajectory of forward linkages. Chapter 7 covers the new research 
on the impact of IT from the sector in India’s economy. 
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6. Results: Software and IT Services Become Appropriate 
for India  
 
“Indian entrepreneurs big and small were at this point focusing on the 
possibilities of building a unique business approach—based on the idea that 
you could vastly expand the pool of Indian consumers if you were willing to 
focus on extremely low-cost products. When IT met this strategy, its presence 
exploded.”  
Nandan Nilekani, Imagining India, (2009: 346) 
 
 
This chapter provides the second major contribution of the thesis. It describes the 
results of the current research on explanations for the extent and growth of forward 
linkages from the SWIS sector. The research found that there are two different but 
overlapping periods of growth in forward linkages. The first has been ongoing since 
the 1980s, and the second started in 2005-06 with the significant acceleration in the 
sector’s growth rate60. Section 6.1 covers the reasons for the ongoing, yet slower, 
growth started in the earlier period. It attributes this growth to a process of private 
sector investment arising from a particular sequence and style of liberal economic 
reform. Section 6.2 contains the most important research findings of the chapter that 
explain the faster growth in forward linkages since 2005-06. The section finds that the 
acceleration occurred when, starting at the end of 2004-05, the SWIS sector entered 
into new types of deals with India’s SWIS-buying sectors. These deals both persuaded 
Indian companies to invest into SWIS and demonstrated an emerging appropriateness 
of the technology for modern India, referred to by Nandan Nilekani in the epigraph. 
Section 6.3 contains a short discussion of other explanations which were investigated 
                                                 
60
 The existence of this acceleration was established in Chapter 5 
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but which proved themselves to be, at best, only contributory factors, and at worst, 
irrelevant. Section 6.4 concludes by contrasting the narratives arising from the 
research with debates in the literature. 
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6.1 Liberal Reform Led to Some Investment into IT 
 
When asked for reasons for growth in the domestic market, 14 of the 30 of the 
carefully chosen experts, interviewed in 2009 as part of this project’s qualitative 
research, mentioned, without being explicitly prompted, liberal economic reforms in 
India’s potential or actual SWIS-buying industries. Given that nearly 50% of the 
interviewees cited economic reforms and their effects on SWIS purchasing behaviour, 
this is a strong finding.  
 
Government policy in potential SWIS-buying sectors in India has been of the same ilk 
as that which was followed for manufacturing and other industries (outlined in 
Chapter 2). The literature on these sectors shows that liberalisation has been pursued 
in a piecemeal fashion, with each episode of government reform removing or relaxing 
an aspect of control on what firms in the sector can do, but never retracting the 
influence of the state completely61. Section 2.2 describes the sequence of piecemeal 
liberalisations as being “pro-business” starting in the 1980s, and only turning to be 
“pro-markets” in 1991 (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004). Pro-business reforms 
included de-licensing and removing or relaxing controls on private sector entry in 
industries previously reserved for the state. They also included the removal or 
relaxation of tariffs and other protections on intermediate goods62, but not on final 
consumption goods. These liberal reforms were beneficial for Indian firms as they 
reduced obstacles and bureaucracy, freed them to make business decisions as they 
wished, and reduced the cost of their capital inputs. Pro-market reforms, on the other 
hand, included the removal of tariffs or other protections on final consumption goods, 
                                                 
61
 See Okada (2004) and Virmani (2006) for manufacturing; Banga (2005), Chakravarty (2004), and 
Virmani (2004b) for telecommunications; Banking Frontiers (2007) and Talwar (2001) for banking; 
and Carpenter (2004) for insurance. 
62
 Intermediate goods are products or services which are used to create another final product. 
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and on controls on foreign firms trading in India (Virmani, 2006). Amongst other 
effects, these reforms posed a threat to many Indian firms because they exposed them 
to competition from foreign companies. In the context of explaining the upturn in 
growth in the 1980s, Virmani (2006) argued that this particular sequence of reform 
was important in prompting investment in manufacturing and, in turn, economic 
growth. During the pro-business period (but before pro-market reform was enacted), 
Indian firms understood that they had a window of opportunity in which to prepare for 
the upcoming threat of competition from abroad (p. 35). The argument goes that the 
carrot of pro-business policy, together with the impending stick of pro-market policy, 
successfully convinced many incumbent businesses that there was an urgent need for 
investments in upgrading. This increase in investment was part of the reason for the 
increase in economic growth in the 1980s, and a major reason for Indian companies’ 
success when foreign competition did arrive after the 1991 reforms.  
 
What emerged from the 2009 fieldwork is that, given this window of opportunity to 
invest, upgrade, and secure a position from which to compete against foreign entrants, 
one strategy that Indian firms in potential SWIS-buying sectors identified was to 
invest into IT. This became a key reason for the growth of forward linkages from 
SWIS into India in the early years of the industry. Perhaps the best example 
highlighted in the research of a defensive use of SWIS purchasing comes from the 
same example that Virmani (2006) focussed on: manufacturing firms’. A senior IT 
consultant involved in SWIS projects in Indian manufacturing in the 1980s said: “It is 
all about liberalisation.... Gone are the days when you are in a protected market…the 
consumer has a choice now; if you are not as efficient in making refrigerators as 
Korean companies, you will have trouble” (Ashank Desai, 17 February 2009, 
Mumbai).  
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More recently, other potential SWIS-buying sectors such as insurance, banking, 
telecommunications, and wholesale/retail, have experienced the same sequence of 
reform as manufacturing, but much more gradually. These sectors have experienced 
pro-business reform including some de-licensing and private sector entry into markets 
previously reserved for the state. There have been some pro-market reforms, too, and 
in some cases, an opening of protected markets to foreign competition. Where pro-
market reform has not yet arrived, there is a clear and generalised expectation 
amongst business people that it will, in fact, arrive soon (Pederson, 2000: 276). As of 
2009, when the interviews took place, the different potential SWIS-buying sectors 
were at different stages in their reform stories. However, the interviewees were still 
able to link episodes of reform to spurts in SWIS purchasing for many of them. 
Insurance was a particularly interesting example, because, at the time of the 
interviews, it was experiencing a window of opportunity like those described by 
Virmani (2006).  
 
In insurance, pro-business reform contained in the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority Act of 1999 opened up the legal possibility of private 
companies selling to Indian consumers for the first time since 1972. At the same time, 
the Government of India (GOI) undertook to reduce its share of the market from 
100% to 55%. New entrants to the market could accept foreign investment, but only 
up to 26% ownership by the foreign company (Sinha, 2005: 6). This meant that many 
of the eight to ten companies which entered the market at that time were joint 
ventures between Indian and multi-national companies, with the multi-national 
companies decidedly in the role of junior partner. For the following ten years, these 
entrants to the insurance market remained protected from foreign competition, 
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although exposed to foreign practices through their junior partners (see the Birla Sun 
Life advertising in Figure 6.1). They were also given space to grow as the share of the 
previously monopolistic state insurers diminished. It was not until 2008 that an 
amendment to the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act was 
proposed in parliament. The amendment would not bring unfettered competition from 
foreign insurers to the Indian market, but would “provide for the increase in 
shareholdings by a foreign company from the current limit of 26% to 49%” (India 
Brand Equity Foundation, 2010).  
Figure 6.1: Birla Sun Life Advertising in Mumbai 2009 
 
Source: Author’s photo. 
 
An IT consultant who works with insurance companies in India explained how reform 
shaped the IT and, particularly, SWIS-purchasing needs of these companies. The 
insurance players who entered around 1999, under the guidance of their foreign junior 
partners, all purchased “core platform” systems to automate collections of premiums 
and payments of claims. These necessitated the purchase of hardware, as well as 
substantial SWIS projects to set-up and maintain the software systems.  In 2009, 
insurance once again became a growth area for domestic SWIS sales. One interviewee 
referred to the recently proposed (2008) amendment to the 1999 act, and said that it 
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implied that insurance was about to be “opened up further”. His understanding was 
that this meant that there were now “35 to 40 players in the market…all needing to do 
something different” to defend their positions against competitors which would soon 
be receiving large capital and know-how investments from abroad. In these 
circumstances, he said, “anyone that can use IT as a differentiator will be able to 
create enough of a customer service differentiation that they are able to take or even 
just preserve market share”. He reported that these additional players were buying 
software and complementary IT services aimed at delivering good customer service. 
In particular, his consultancy company was advising several insurers on the purchase 
of customer relationship management63, policy administration, and underwriting 
systems (Adarsh Parekh, 27 February 2009, Bangalore).  
 
A similar story played out in banking during the 1990s. The beginnings of liberal 
reform in the sector in 1991 were decidedly pro-business, but the threat of later pro-
market developments was made clear from the start. On the pro-business side, 
national banks were partially privatised, with the stake of the government permitted to 
fall below 51% and Indian private sector investment allowed to hold the remaining 
share (Talwar, 2001: 76). New, wholly private sector-owned banks were also allowed 
to enter the Indian market for the first time. On the pro-market side, foreign banks 
were, in the letter of the law, allowed to invest in the country. In practise, this has 
taken place on such a limited case-by-case basis that it has not represented a serious 
competitive threat to Indian incumbents. By 2001, foreign firms’ share of total assets 
in the banking system had only reached 8%, and by 2007, only one foreign company 
had been allowed to own more than 10% of an Indian bank (Banking Frontiers, 2007; 
Talwar, 2001:75). However, it is clear to Indian banks that at some point there will be 
                                                 
63
 Customer relationship management is explained in Section 6.2.1. 
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more foreign competition in the banking sector. Despite this particular threat seeming 
a fairly long way off, the 2009 fieldwork interviewees related spurts in IT- and SWIS-
buying in the 1990s to banking reform. Perhaps the most obvious example was the 
round of purchasing that followed the entry of the new private sector banks in the 
early 1990s. These banks were well-known amongst the interviewees to be high tech 
and to have the best IT systems for handling money into and out of bank accounts64: 
 
Banks are another good example, the private banks which arrived in the ’90s 
like ICICI and HDFC [Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India 
and Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited]…. They were new, 
they had no legacy systems, and they didn’t want to hire lots of people…. So 
they didn’t want manual processes, they wanted to optimise their use of 
people; they saw technology as the solution. [Sudha Kumar, CEO of an IT 
strategy consultancy, 4 March 2009, Bangalore] 
 
ICICI? The core banking system they installed in the ’90s is world-class. They 
still need to do more on customer service. But on core banking, what they 
have is top-of-the-range. [Harsh Gulati, IT consultant and sales executive, 20 
February 2009, Pune] 
  
According to the interviewees, the entry into the market of these new private sector 
banks prompted a round of purchasing of these types of systems, with even the public 
sector banks eventually following suit. It is a pattern that interviewees have seen in 
several different industries as a result of reform. As one IT consultant with over 30 
years experience in the domestic market put it, “Every time there is a liberalisation, 
you will see that spike" (Rajesh Varrier, 24 February 2009, Bangalore).  
                                                 
64
 These are called Core Banking Systems by these particular IT experts. 
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Carrying the case study on banking through to the present day reveals an interesting 
story. Adarsh Parekh gave a detailed description of Axis Bank, a private sector bank 
which entered the Indian market in the 1990s. According to Parekh, Axis has a world-
class core banking system, and is a close competitor to ICICI, but is short on customer 
service. He explained that he would like to sell a “mobile banking” system to Axis. 
With it, customers would be able to get their balances, pay bills, and do other basic 
banking transactions via SMS65.  Parekh was sure that this would give Axis a clear 
advantage over ICICI because of these better customer services. However, he was not 
having any luck in this particular sales pitch despite its obvious benefits: Axis saw no 
imperative to make this investment (Adarsh Parekh, 27 February 2009, Bangalore). 
 
According to Parekh, and several others who expressed similar views, the problem 
arises from the use of reform to push firms into making investment decisions. Firms 
invest when there is a clear economic threat to do so, but will not when no such threat 
exists. To put it another way, incremental reform, when sequenced correctly, may 
bring about investment, including investment into IT and SWIS, but when there is a 
break in reform, there is also a break in investment. Parekh said that this is the 
situation that now applies to banking: “Banking has been de-regulated for some time, 
so that the opportunity to use IT as a competitive edge has passed” (Adarsh Parekh, 
27 February 2009, Bangalore). He suggested that the short-lived nature of the effect 
of reform means that no single reform, or even group of reforms, has been capable of 
bringing long-lasting change in the growth rate of SWIS-buying in any particular 
industry. If he is correct, and it is an assertion which needs to be verified with future 
                                                 
65
 Short message service via mobile phone. 
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research66, it would be an important finding. It would mean that although reform has 
been an important driver of investment and growth into SWIS, it is not a strong 
enough force to drive consistent or ongoing change. This assertion is in agreement 
with certain theoretical critiques of liberal reform which argue it is an ineffective 
means for achieving long-term economic growth. For example, Deranyiagala (2001: 
81-85) re-evaluates the effects of trade liberalisation using a general equilibrium 
framework, and finds the argument that long-run growth should follow such reforms 
has a “shaky” theoretical basis (p. 82).  
 
Unfortunately, a full investigation of these issues and a validation of whether and how 
they apply in India is outside the scope of this research. The current project’s attention 
now moves to Section 6.3, which is an explanation of growth in forward linkages 
around and after the significant acceleration in 2005-06. 
 
                                                 
66
 This avenue for further research is discussed in Chapter 8. 
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6.2 SWIS as an Appropriate Technology and “Pay-per-use” Deals 
 
This section provides the most important findings of this chapter, and the second 
original contribution of the thesis itself (following the analyses in chapter 5 that 
disprove much of the traditional literature). It explains the acceleration in forward 
linkages in 2005-06 and their faster growth thereafter. It is an important section for 
two reasons. The first is that it addresses a significant gap in the literature. The extent 
of forward linkages after 2005-06 was neither predicted nor noticed in the academic 
literature, and, perhaps for this reason, it has been met with a dearth of explanations. 
None of the analyses of the domestic market for SWIS reviewed in Chapter 3 
predicted a rapid expansion. In fact, both D’Costa (2003) and Dahlman and Utz 
(2005) indicated that it was unlikely, if not impossible, to occur in the short- to 
medium-term future. The second reason is that the findings on how the SWIS sector 
came to have extensive forward linkages in the domestic economy teach lessons that 
are important indicators for the future. These lessons identify particular circumstances 
that need to occur if the impressive growth in forward linkages is to continue along its 
current trajectory.  
 
Section 6.2 is split into three parts. The first introduces the trigger for the acceleration: 
a landmark deal between IBM and Bharti–Airtel at the end of 2004-05. The second 
and third sections explore, respectively, two conditions: the nature of software, and 
the nature of Indian society, which combined to make this deal, and others like it, so 
successful. The final section concludes by comparing the analysis of this section to 
the existing literature, and makes comments about the future for the domestic market.  
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6.2.1 A Deal between IBM and Bharti–Airtel  
 
The initial trigger for the acceleration in domestic SWIS was an innovative agreement 
between IBM India, a SWIS firm, and Bharti-Airtel (BA), an Indian mobile telephony 
provider, which was reached at the end of 2004-05. This deal marked an “inflection 
point”, according to the chairman of NASSCOM (Ganesh Natarajan, 12 February 
2009, Mumbai), and a “very significant event that changed the market dynamics”, 
according to a senior IT industry analyst and consultant (Praveen Sengar, 30 January 
2009, Delhi). The deal comprised an agreement that IBM would handle BA’s entire 
SWIS needs for a ten-year period and was subject to other agreements, some of which 
are included in Figure 6.2, which is from a study of the Indian domestic market 
conducted by NASSCOM in 2006.  
 
Figure 6.2: IBM and Bharti-Airtel Deal, 2004-05 
 
Source: NASSCOM and IDC (2006: 15). 
 
The most important aspect of the deal was that it introduced a new way of paying for 
IT outsourcing. IBM set up the systems and provided maintenance and support to BA 
without charging any upfront fixed cost. After that, BA paid IBM a percentage of 
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their revenue. If IBM adhered to the service-level agreements, they would get 100% 
of that share of revenues; if not, they would get a lower share. Several interviewees 
said that this financing arrangement, which many of them referred to as “pay-per -
use”, was instrumental in allowing the deal to move forward. BA was able to avoid 
the type of large upfront investments into IT systems which often worry potential 
Indian IT buyers, because they are thought to be risky. As Adarsh Parekh put it: 
“Indian businesses are very cost and cash conscious. They say ‘What’s the real 
difference it’s going to bring? Why should I invest another 100 crore or 50 crore67 or 
whatever the amount is. Why should I?’ You’ve really got to show them” (27 
February 2009, Bangalore). Kiran Karnik, chairman of one of the biggest IT firms in 
India, agreed: “You need to look at a different model in a lot of places in India 
because the user perceives an upfront payment as expensive and risky. People are not 
sure that it will be useful. That’s the India cultural mindset. We are more risk averse 
than Americans” (13 February 2009, Mumbai). 
 
This attitude amongst Indian IT buying clients is similar to Hirschman’s description 
of entrepreneurs in developing countries (1958: 10–14)68. Since they have not 
themselves previously witnessed the return from a particular developmental 
investment, in this case a software system, they are reticent about making that 
investment. What the terms of the IBM–BA deal did was to excuse BA from taking 
that entrepreneurial risk. Instead, in a clear echo of Hirschman’s (p. 67) description of 
how linkages should work, IBM made an investment into BA’s business by building a 
system which was an output of the SWIS sector and an input to the mobile telephone 
sector. This meant that IBM was able to fully demonstrate to their client the benefits 
                                                 
67
 Rs.50 crore was equivalent to just over US$10m, and Rs. 100 crore was equivalent to just over 
US$20m in 2009. 
68
 Discussed in Chapter 1. 
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of the system in situ. Any worries that BA had about whether such a system would 
work in India, and for them in particular, were duly avoided.  
 
This was not the only reason why the new financing method was so important, 
however. More significant were the implications of the financial structure of the deal 
for the cost of BA’s SWIS use. The terms of the deal allowed a positive profit for 
IBM only if their negotiated percentage of BA’s revenue stream, minus the costs of 
the SWIS needed to service that revenue stream, left enough of a margin. Since the 
percentage of revenue that IBM might claim could only decrease under the terms of 
the deal (see Figure 6.2), IBM would do well only if the SWIS cost of servicing BA’s 
customers decreased quickly and/or BA’s revenue increased quickly. What happened 
was that both of these outcomes occurred, allowing IBM to do particularly well. In 
fact, it did so well that a typical comment in the interviews described IBM as 
“laughing all the way to the bank” (Kris Lakshmi, 23 February 2009, Bangalore). 
Several of the experts explained that this positive outcome for IBM depended on 
certain conditions being in place. The first set was that the system IBM installed at 
BA have significant economies of scale (defined and discussed in 6.2.2), and that 
IBM engineer the system to maximise them. The second set was that BA find a ready 
market for their mobile communications, and be able to attain scale quickly 
(discussed in 6.2.3). When these conditions combined, BA’s operations grew quickly, 
allowing economies of scale to occur. This meant not only that BA’s revenue 
increased, but also that their average SWIS costs of servicing customers became very 
low.  
 
This chain of events not only secured a healthy profit for IBM, but also had major 
benefits for BA. BA was assured that the proportion of their revenue that was spent on 
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SWIS was guaranteed to stay at a particular, acceptable, and pre-negotiated 
percentage. It had a system which had a very low SWIS cost-per-customer and was 
capable of adding more customers quickly. According to many of the interviewees, 
this was an integral reason why, throughout the contract period, BA was able to 
charge relatively low prices whilst remaining profitable and expanding rapidly both 
inside and outside of India. As of March 2010, this strategy has led to BA being the 
fifth largest mobile operator in the world, with 165 million subscribers in Africa and 
South Asia (Leahy, 2010: 1). More important for the current context, it has provided a 
clear example of a success story from SWIS use in India. The IBM–BA deal 
demonstrated to India-based IT companies that it was possible to make money in 
India, and demonstrated to potential Indian IT buyers that it was possible to automate 
their businesses for a risk-free and acceptably low cost by partnering with an IT-
company. 
 
Not surprisingly, deals with a pay-per-use structure between the Indian SWIS sector 
and many other Indian sectors proliferated after the IBM–BA deal, with a clear 
increase in 2005-06. Through these deals, it has become evident that the combination 
of necessary conditions—significant economies of scale and systems to maximise 
them, and a ready market able to attain scale quickly—is relevant more generally in 
India. Software systems installed in the country are routinely engineered to maximise 
already inherent economies of scale, and many different SWIS-intensive products find 
widespread demand within India’s borders. This combination has led to pay-per-use 
deals being so successful and so commonplace, that a typical response from IT 
executives working in the domestic market is that this is “the only way” to structure 
any deal (Harsh Gulati, 20 February 2009, Pune). The following two sub-sections 
discuss these conditions in turn. The first discusses how economies of scale and other 
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beneficial scale effects arise from and are engineered into software systems used in 
India. The second discusses how a large demand for SWIS-intensive products has 
arisen as a result of changes in India’s economy and society. 
 
6.2.2 Software Used in Production and Beneficial Scale Effects 
 
Figure 6.3 offers some examples of how SWIS is used in India. The examples 
included are of Indian companies in the SWIS-buying sectors which comprise the 
domestic market for SWIS (that is, they match the SWIS buying sectors identified in 
chapter 5). These companies and their software systems have been specifically 
selected to illustrate a wide range of uses offered by the Indian SWIS sector.  
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Figure 6.3: Examples of SWIS Use in SWIS-buying Sectors from India 
Year Client Firm Client's Business SWIS Firm Project
2004 Mobile Telecoms 10-year contract for hardware, software and IT services to cover 
billing, customer relationship management, data warehouseing, 
email, Intranet services, IT helpdesks, disaster recovery.
2005
Manufacture of large 
motor vehicles 
(buses, trucks, 
defense vehicles)
30-month contract for strategic cost reduction. Includes supplier 
management and dynamic pricing. Wipro will train the purchasing 
team to use best-in-class purchasing practices and technologies, and 
assist with knowledge transfer to these tools.
2005
Central Bank of 
India 
Retail and corporate 
banking. 
Core banking solution covering 1,000 branches and including 
implementation of technologies from Australia and China. Provision 
of Internet banking, phone banking, and mobile banking. Data center 
and disaster recovery. 
2005 Retail and corporate banking. 
7-year deal for outsourcing of entire technology requirements. 
Includes implementing core infrastructure and hardware, branch 
rollouts, networking, data warehousing, and disaster recovery. 
2006
"Linking Indian 
fields to the world". 
New joint venture 
for export of 
agricultural products 
from India.
Supply-chain management requirement, including financial, 
inventory, sales, procurement, and corporate performance 
management. Tailor-made components including aircraft space 
availability, farm accounting, transportation-related requirements, 
and farm maintenance.
2007
India Police
Policing
Solution to track telephone calls made in 18 cities, and to record 
complaints registered by phone. Automated police control rooms, 
improvements in communications with police response vehicles. 
Conferencing facilities with control rooms in different cities. 24-7 
response facilities.  
2007
Pharmaceutical 
R&D, primarily 
outsourced.
Using Uhuroo collaboration suite (web 2.0 technology) to improve 
information sharing between researchers working on different 
projects across different labs. Reduction of information clutter. 
Providing records of information which previously only existed in 
someone's head and was getting lost when people left.
2008
Non profit 
international 
development. 
Improving efficiency 
in agricultural 
supply chain.
Supply chain management from profiling of farmer clusters to crop 
planning, scheduling, tracking and forecasting. The application 
allows farmers to access technical information including database 
searches for data and images, access to region-specific weather 
updates and market information, i.e., daily sales volumes and 
average prices.
  
Sources: Adapted from CII & Accenture (2007); Collcraft Technologies (2008); Dataquest (2008); 
Hindu Business Line (2006); Infosys (2008); NASSCOM and IDC (2006). 
Note: These case studies have been taken from industry body reports, IT company websites, and news 
reports. 
 
All the examples in Figure 6.3 are systems with a different cost and/or benefit 
structure as compared to other, more traditional technologies used in production. In 
particular, they all offer some benefit in terms of lower costs or higher returns as the 
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size of the SWIS-buying firm increases. This section uses these examples to illustrate 
how these scale effects occur. 
 
The most important beneficial scale effect from IT systems is the one which was 
important in the IBM and BA deal: economies of scale. Economies of scale, arising 
from high fixed costs and low marginal costs, mean that as the scale of production 
gets larger69, average costs get lower. This effect arises in software systems because 
of how they work and because of the nature of software itself. Many business 
software systems organise the information that a firm holds about another entity with 
which the firm does business, and automates the information tasks that the firm 
performs with or for that entity. So, for example, manufacturers and wholesalers (such 
as Ashok Leyland or Field Fresh) organise all their information relating to each 
supplier and/or buyer and automate their inventory procurement or sales tasks. 
Telecoms firms (such as Bharti-Airtel) install systems which organise all their 
information pertaining to each customer and automate functions like call routing and 
billing. Banks’ (such as Central Bank or Yes Bank) “core banking” systems organise 
all their information by customer/account and automate functions like deposits into 
and payments from accounts, as well as paying interest, charging overdrafts, and 
cashing cheques.  
 
These types of systems introduce economies of scale into production because for its 
owners, software code is free to copy70. Once a line of coded software has been 
                                                 
69
 Here the focus is on internal economies of scale, i.e. one company with one IT system dealing with 
lots of customers. The same benefits of scale are also available if one IT system is used by lots of 
smaller firms to deal with lots of customers. This possibility has not, so far, been utilised very much in 
India, but it may become relevant in future and is discussed in Section 6.3.4. 
70
 Software is not free to copy if copyright law and licensing arrangements prevent it. This is rarely a 
consideration within the large software systems created by Indian IT outsourcing firms for their clients, 
because the software is owned either by the IT firm or the client company, and within the terms of their 
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created, it can be used repeatedly without incurring any additional costs and without 
being degraded. This is important because it means that once a system has been 
designed for one person or entity that a firm does business with, the cost of adding 
data on subsequent suppliers or customers or accounts is negligible. The code or 
programming written to manage the first entity can simply be copied and used again 
to insert more data and so manage a larger business. In this sense, the software costs 
of doing business are subject to economies of scale. There is a large fixed cost to 
initially purchasing and installing the software system, but the variable cost of 
expanding the quantity of data as the firm grows is so small that the reward for 
investing in that first large fixed cost is both a declining average and a negligible 
marginal software cost as the company grows.  
 
A second beneficial scale effect is the ability to learn from gathered data. Typically, 
any system like those described in Figure 6.3 not only organises a company’s 
information, but it also stores this information and, in many cases, can analyse it on an 
ongoing basis. In the case of manufacturers and wholesalers, once sufficient 
knowledge of suppliers and buyers behaviour has been accumulated, analyses with 
names like “corporate performance management” or “supplier management and 
dynamic pricing” can be undertaken. These analyses identify which suppliers are or 
are not performing well on criteria that matter for the firm’s own profitable 
functioning, and identify what prices to set for the firm’s output for different 
purchasers at different times. Once these analyses are completed, the firm can use the 
results to make informed decisions on how best to manage, for example, the supply 
                                                                                                                                            
particular agreement, they do not restrict one another from copying parts of the coding or programs 
when the relevant copying is part of what the system is designed to do (for example, to add new 
customers, accounts, or suppliers).  
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chain71. In the case of telecommunications and other firms with customer-centric 
systems, collection and storage of customer data and analysis called “Customer 
Relationship Management” (CRM) is possible. Data on services purchased and 
revenues collected by different types of customer are analysed for the purposes of 
targeting marketing and sales communications. These targeted communications 
enable firms with these systems to earn more money from each customer than would 
be possible without the system in place. In both cases, increasing returns to scale 
occur because these analyses are not possible without a critical mass of data collected 
from a critical mass of suppliers, customers, or accounts. Once this critical mass has 
been reached, more learning is available from additional analyses as the size of the 
dataset grows. As the company using the software system gets bigger, the system 
continues to collect and analyse ever-more data, allowing the company to continue to 
make better decisions and, therefore, higher profits. It is a source of increasing returns 
to scale that is an explicit and conscious version of “learning by doing”, which plays 
an important role in endogenous growth models such as that of Lucas (1988). In those 
models, the source of learning by doing is knowledge and experience that is 
remembered by workers who repeat tasks many times. Here, the software, databases, 
and analytical tools play an analogous role. Together, they store the results of 
repeated tasks, and analyse this data, so that the firm can learn from its experiences.  
 
There is a third type of scale effect arising from the use of software systems of the 
kind often found in Indian SWIS-buying industries. While this scale effect likely 
arises with all of the projects in Figure 6.3, it is particularly relevant in two which 
have not yet been mentioned in this sub-section. These are the projects undertaken by 
                                                 
71
 Decisions like these were shown in Chapter 2 to be of prime importance for profitability and 
competitive advantage wherever outsourcing of non-core business is the dominant mode of 
competition. 
 199 
Arch Labs and Uhuroo—Internet technology designed to improve information-
sharing between researchers working on different projects across different labs—and 
undertaken by India Police and Hindustan Computers Limited—to track telephone 
calls and register complaints. These are both examples of systems which were 
installed to enable firms to improve handling information on entities which remain 
internal (e.g., lab projects, police investigations) rather than, as with the examples 
discussed above, on entities such as suppliers and customers which are external to the 
firm. These types of systems are specifically designed to alleviate problems of co-
ordination and communication that might otherwise occur as the firm grows. In fact, 
these are problems which have been recognised in the literature for a long time. The 
classic argument is that as firms get larger, it becomes more difficult for workers 
within the firm to co-ordinate activities with one another without transaction costs 
increasing disproportionately. Similarly, over a certain threshold size of firm, it also 
becomes more difficult for managers to monitor all their staff (Alchian and Dempsetz, 
1972; Coase, 1937). That software systems can help in alleviating these sources of 
diminishing returns to scale is well documented in the literature on IT (Radmer and 
Van Zandt, 1992: 267). 
 
It has been argued here that economies of scale arise simply because of the nature of 
software code, and that the other two scale effects can arise within software systems 
designed to handle specific tasks. What also emerges from the 2009 fieldwork is that 
there are decisions that can be made within the software engineering process to 
maximise all of these scale effects. SWIS firms working in the domestic market under 
pay-per-use deals reported that wherever possible they always choose to maximise 
benefits from scale in the systems they create. These decisions are made because of 
financial incentives present in the terms of these deals: IT firms make more profit if 
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the per-use cost of servicing their client’s business falls.  When asked to comment on 
the implications of these types of deals, the president for the domestic market business 
for one of India’s biggest IT firms confirmed, “It forces you to get economies of 
scale” [S. Venkatramani, 17 February 2009, Mumbai]. He added that finding ways to 
maximise economies of scale was an important focus of research and development in 
his firm, and in other firms focussed on the domestic market: 
 
“The number of people in India is just amazing…10 million transactions a 
day, 70 million accounts…when you test, when you configure, when you 
adopt, when you test your product…you really, really learn some wonderful 
experiences of what I call performance engineering in systems. How do you 
get the maximum out of the systems?”  
 
As a result of all this research and development, several of the interviewees said that 
SWIS-buying industries in India were using some of the most easily scaleable systems 
in the world, with the lowest unit servicing costs. An IT industry veteran who is 
familiar with systems in the mobile telephony industry reported, “In India, mobile 
phones have the lowest call costs in the world, but are incredibly profitable because 
they have scale. They count on volumes. They made the trade-off between volume 
and margins, and they are winning” (Kiran Karnik, 13 February 2009, Mumbai). 
 
In Indian banking, a similar situation is occurring. An interviewee working for a 
Western bank, using ICICI as an example, explained:  
 
“They’ve proven scale right. The issue is for an ICICI bank with 100 million 
customers, adding another million in another country is basically not a big 
deal…for example…they give you the highest rates in London on deposits. 
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There’s a reason for that. It’s because the cost of service is so low.” [Arindam 
Banerjii, 4 February 2009, Mumbai] 
 
There remains one more condition which must also be satisfied for beneficial scale 
effects of SWIS to be useful to Indian SWIS-buying firms: sufficient demand for the 
products that they make. Significant demand for mobile phones was important in the 
IBM–BA deal because it was this demand that guaranteed increasing revenues, and so 
increased IBM’s revenue. Similarly, in other pay-per-use deals, increasing demand is 
essential both for the resulting system to be used enough to activate scale effects and 
for IT companies to make profits. The next section covers this second condition.  
 
6.2.3 India’s middle-classes and demand for SWIS-intensive products 
 
There is another special characteristic - as well as being free to copy - of software and 
SWIS-intensive products which sets them apart from other products. This time, the 
special nature of software has implications not only for its use in production, but for 
its consumption and, in particular, the circumstances under which it will be 
consumed. Quah (2002) investigates this aspect of software. He classifies software 
and many other SWIS-intensive products as “knowledge products” or products whose 
properties resemble the properties of knowledge itself. He argues that the most 
important aspect of this similarity is there is a requirement with knowledge products 
for the consumer to learn something in order to use it (2002: 72). Quah explains what 
he means using a contrast with knowledge in endogenous growth models; in these 
models, new knowledge reaches the consumer through two filters. First, it is patented 
and then it is embodied in a machine that does a particular job. Consumers buy this 
machine, and the task is completed without the consumer having to engage with the 
new knowledge itself (p. 76–77). With knowledge products, Quah argues, consumers 
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are not able to be so passive. Using applications like online retailing or banking with 
SMS, as examples, he argues that it is not possible to package these types of products 
in a way that exempts consumer engagement with new knowledge. Instead, 
consumers must learn “norms and conventions”, and they must identify and master 
“subtleties” before they can use the product. Even then, completing any task will 
involve the user learning some of the new knowledge (such as how to fill in an online 
form, or how to send an SMS to the bank) and doing part of the work. All this 
presents a cost to the consumer, in addition to the cost of the product because the 
consumer must invest time and effort into learning how to use the product (p. 78). 
Quah argues that different people will find this cost uniquely burdensome, depending 
on the cost of their time, their background, and their level of education (p. 87).  
 
There is an important implication of these requirements on the part of consumers. If, 
for some reason, consumers are not willing or able to commit the time or do not have 
the ability to learn how to use the product, knowledge products will simply not sell. 
This will hold true regardless of what suppliers offer. Quah explicitly recognises that 
at the time of his research, empirical evidence that this situation applies to software 
was not available (p. 72). However, he explores the implications for developing 
countries under the assumption that it is true with a mathematical model (p. 82–88). 
The model begins with producers who create products over two periods, and can 
choose in each period whether to produce knowledge products as an entrepreneur, or 
take a traditional job producing a composite good in return for a wage72. Because 
knowledge products by definition use and commercialise new knowledge, it is 
assumed that the process of creating them is uncertain and involves much trial and 
                                                 
72
 The composite good is an abstraction which represents all alternative goods which could be 
produced, besides knowledge products. 
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error. For this reason, the knowledge product producer can only create an 
experimental product in the first period. In the second period, if he continues as a 
knowledge worker, he may build on this experience to produce a final, finished, 
product which may or may not turn out to be commercially viable. Profits in each 
period are determined by how successful the (experimental or final) knowledge 
product is, and an assumption is made that this success is not dependent on how much 
the items or services cost to produce, but on how many of them consumers 
collectively buy73.  
 
Producers are rational and profit-oriented, so they determine in the first period how 
much of the experimental (in the first period) and final (in the second period) 
knowledge product they would supply to the market under the assumption that the 
final product is a success. They then work out how much profit this would earn 
overall74. If this earned amount exceeds the total wage they could earn for producing 
the composite good in both periods, they decide to produce the knowledge product; if 
not, they opt for the waged job and no knowledge products are produced. Consumers 
are also assumed to be rational. They choose how much of different versions of the 
knowledge product and how much of an alternative, composite good to buy, given 
their monetary budget and the price of these products. Importantly, they also take into 
account the additional cost of knowledge products (on top of their ticket price), which 
comes from the time and effort that each consumer has to spend in order to learn how 
to use the product. This cost is always higher for the experimental product than for the 
                                                 
73
 A single fixed cost is assumed for all knowledge products regardless of experimental, finished, 
and/or economic success or failure. This is justified because software is free for its owners (the 
knowledge product worker in this case) to copy, so that variable and marginal cost is zero. It is also 
assumed that individual consumers cannot easily copy software (and it is illegal to do so), so they are 
willing to pay a price of more than zero in order to consume the knowledge product.  
74
 It is assumed that in equilibrium, producers know how consumers will react to their product so that 
they can work out how much of it they will sell and so how much profit they will make.  
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successful final product, and it is different for different consumers. Quah denotes this 
additional cost as v. 
 
Quah solves his model, and shows that in equilibrium producers never choose to bring 
a failed final product to market75, so consumers must choose to purchase the 
experimental knowledge product during the first period, the successful final product 
in the second period, or neither. He then diagrammatically explores the quantity of 
different knowledge products consumed in societies with different average levels of v. 
He finds that there is a threshold level of average v above which the cost of learning 
or the amount of time required for a particular society is too high, so that neither the 
experimental nor the successful knowledge product is consumed (p. 89–90). This 
might well correspond to the situation where the majority of people do not have the 
ability, time, money, or energy to engage with the new knowledge, perhaps because it 
is a developing country where many people are poor and poorly educated. Importantly 
though, the model also identifies a middle range of a society’s average v which is 
ideal for supporting the expansion of knowledge product sales. This range arises in a 
society with a large number of consumers with middling personal v’s. This group is 
important because it includes people interested in purchasing the experimental 
knowledge product during the first period and people interested in purchasing the 
successful final product in the second period. Quah’s model finds that no knowledge 
product producers would continue to the second period, where success is possible, 
unless they get a return in the first period from the experimental product. Similarly, no 
producers will create the experimental product whose return is less than the wage 
available for producing the composite good, unless there is a possibility of a later 
                                                 
75
 It is never rational to bring a failure to market because this step incurs a fixed cost which will not be 
outweighed by revenues from sale of the product. 
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success. Quah labels the crucial group with middling v’s “the middle class” (p. 90), 
and he argues that in a developing country, large markets for knowledge products 
depend on this group being large. For our context, this implies that a large middle 
class is also essential for pay-per-use deals to be successful. Large markets for SWIS-
intensive products in India depend on having enough people in the population with 
the time, energy, background, and willingness to invest in the learning process that is 
required to use them.  
 
By 2005-06, India’s economy and society had been slowly experiencing an increase 
in the size of the middle class for some time. For reasons outlined in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2, the pattern of economic growth in India since 1980 had both favoured the 
existing middle class and enabled many poor people to become middle class. This led, 
in 2005, to the middle class numbering between 50 million and 274 million people76. 
The original research carried out in the current project validates that this growth, as 
Quah’s model predicts, has indeed led to an increase in demand for knowledge 
products in India. The detailed data from the interviews repeatedly finds that it is the 
mass of middle-class consumers that buy SWIS-intensive products in India. In turn, 
the project also finds that their demand for these products is an important causative 
factor in explaining the acceleration in forward linkages.  
 
Twenty interviewees, or nearly 67% of those interviewed, without being prompted, 
raised the subject of the new middle class, discussing increased disposable incomes, 
growth in the number of Indian consumers that can afford non-essentials, or the rise 
of the middle class as a reason for acceleration in growth of forward linkages in 2005-
                                                 
76
 Numbers are dependent on how the middle class is defined. See the discussion in Section 2.2. 
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06. The chief executive officer of a consultancy working on marketing and strategy 
for several SWIS-buying firms put it this way: 
 
Starting [in the] 2000s, all of [the firms in potential IT-buying industries] 
started classifying India as a strategic market…these are growth markets, and 
these are large markets…so they started saying that they needed specific 
growth and marketing plans for the Indian market…. I think the need to 
service the demands that are arising just locally, because of population and 
growing middle class, will definitely keep the [domestic SWIS outsourcing] 
market going, I am confident about that. [Sudha Kumar, 4 March 2009, 
Bangalore] 
 
An IT executive who works in domestic market sales concurred:  
 
“The middle class is expanding, led by the knowledge [SWIS, ITES-BPO] 
industries, they have more money to spend…[and] there is a requirement for 
IT there”.  [Harsh Gulati, 20 February 2009, Pune]. 
 
What emerged from the interviews is that the middle class in India is enthusiastic 
about IT and about SWIS-intensive products. They are even effusive about 
experimental and sometimes complicated products. An important example which was 
often cited is that of the Indian railway’s automation. It is a significant example 
because online selling was identified by Quah as a key example of a knowledge 
product that requires effort, learning, and time on the part of consumers (2002: 72). 
Despite this, the interviewees agreed that the automation of ticket sales for long-
distance train travel had a huge impact amongst middle-class consumers in India. 
Eleven of the 30 (36.6%) experts said, without being asked specifically, that it was 
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something that middle-class consumers were incredibly enthusiastic about and had 
quickly adopted.  
 
Interviewees with expertise on marketing to the middle class said that the enthusiasm 
for IT and SWIS-intensive products was a general one that applied to all groups 
within the middle class. A market research executive with 20 years experience in 
India illustrated the difference between Indian and Western middle-class consumers. 
He explained that, after having undertaken a cluster analysis on attitudes towards IT 
in India, his company attempted to label the clusters: “We once tried to impose some 
Western ideas, like ‘computer-inept’ or ‘computer-scared’ [but] there’s nothing like 
that. There’s only people who don’t know and would like to know, or people who 
know and love it; [those are] the only two segments” (Mohan Krishnan, 19 January 
2009, Delhi). India’s middle-class consumers also have the background and time 
which offers them the opportunity of learning how to use the technology. Krishnan 
gave a broad description of “typical middle-class consumers” based on research his 
firm had undertaken amongst this group77. Predominantly urban, he said, they 
typically live in areas well served by fast broadband. They are generally young and 
are fast learners with the technology, and feel comfortable using it. For some, 
familiarity with technology arises from work in the ITES-BPO or SWIS sector, whilst 
many others know of someone who works in the industry, or have seen Western uses 
of the technology on television. 
 
It is a situation which matches closely with Quah’s description of a society which has 
a middling range of v. India’s middle class has the time and opportunities (such as 
                                                 
77
 The demographic and geographic components of this description are verified by data presented in 
ADB (2010). 
 208 
access to broadband and education) required to constitute the right kind of market for 
SWIS-intensive products. They have also, by the definition of what constitutes 
“middle class”, enough income to be able to afford luxuries. In fact, the only note of 
caution on middle-class demand for SWIS-intensive products sounded by 
interviewees in the 2009 fieldwork was related to money. They took pains to 
emphasise that middle-class demand in India is highly dependent on the value 
received in exchange for money. This attitude is so widespread that Subbu Hariharan, 
a banker, labelled it the “Indian psyche”. According to him, and others, the Indian 
middle class demands quality products, wants to be seen consuming quality products, 
and is prepared to pay extra for quality, but they want the price to be as low as 
possible. This is not surprising given the income levels of Indian middle-class 
consumers. Of a total estimate of 274.13 million middle-class consumers in 2005 
estimated by ADB (2010: 8), an overwhelming majority, 223.82 million, earned 
between $2 and $4 per day, enough to put them above the poverty line used in that 
study ($2 per day), but not by much. These consumers have an “unflinching focus on 
price” (Subbu Hariharan, banker, 5 February 2009, Mumbai), and are “very focussed 
on value” (Alok Kumar, IT purchasing manager of a large conglomerate, 12 February 
2009, Mumbai). For them, high quality at a low price is essential for bringing them 
into the market for a particular product. 
 
It is because of this focus on value that a guaranteed low price per-use for SWIS, as is 
available to SWIS-buying firms through pay-per-use deals with the IT sector, is so 
important in allowing domestic market deals to be brokered. Although India’s middle-
class consumers want IT and IT-intensive products, and have sufficient time, money, 
and education to learn to use it, they are not wealthy by Western standards. What was 
so important about the IBM–BA deal was that it was the first to show that this does 
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not stop IT and IT-buying companies from making money by working together. If 
middle-class demand is sufficient to activate scale effects when the technology is used 
in production, then the price of the technology can be low: this allows the price of the 
final product to remain low, which in turn, because of the existence of a large middle 
class, ensures significant demand.  
6.2.4 A virtuous circle of scale effects and low prices 
 
This section has demonstrated that Indian SWIS-buying industries that have bought 
SWIS under pay-per-use deals since the IBM–BA agreement have been able to take 
advantage of a new appropriateness of the technology for the Indian context. Through 
a combination of new analysis of the nature of software and an application of existing 
models, the section has shown that there is a virtuous circle around SWIS use in India. 
If prices of SWIS-intensive products can be kept low, there will be a large market for 
them amongst India’s middle class. Prices can remain low even after purchase of 
SWIS because, whenever there is a large enough market, economies of scale built into 
the software systems can deliver automation for low per-unit costs. The IBM–BA deal 
was the first to demonstrate that this virtuous circle of large markets, scale effects, and 
low consumer prices could be successful in India. That the structure of that deal has 
been copied many times as domestic market growth has accelerated verifies that it is a 
virtuous circle that works in many other IT-buying industries in India too.  
 
This appropriateness of the technology for the Indian domestic context was not 
foreseen by analyses of forward linkages from the SWIS sector in the literature 
discussed in Chapter 3. Its possibility and implications have also been missed in the 
literature on the economics of IT. While several contributions have identified 
economies of scale or other beneficial scale effects as arising from the use of IT, 
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discussion of the implications of these has focussed on industry structure or on the 
location of industry and assumed that IT is sold directly to consumers, not used within 
firms (Quah, 2000, 2001; Varian, 2001). This section adds to that literature in two 
important ways. First, scale effects have been identified and explained in a new 
context, and in detail. Second, a new implication of scale effects—appropriateness in 
developing countries with large middle classes—has been identified. A useful 
extension to this analysis would be to understand whether and how this 
appropriateness exists in other developing countries with large, emerging middle 
classes. This avenue for further research is discussed in Chapter 8.  
 
In the meantime, the ability of Indian IT-buying industries and the SWIS sector to 
continue to capitalise on the appropriateness discussed here will be important for the 
future of the domestic market. The challenge for IT companies which wish to 
continue to expand in India is twofold. First, they must continue to provide SWIS to 
those large companies which have not yet become mature IT users. Second, they must 
identify ways of harnessing scale effects to enable affordability outside of these large 
companies78. The Indian IT industry is aware that small- and medium-size companies 
are far more numerous than large firms, and IT experts in the 2009 fieldwork 
frequently discussed possible ways to address this market. As of 2009, the IT industry 
and India’s smaller companies were experimenting with both novel technologies and 
new financial arrangements. In particular, one IT analyst explained that “cloud 
computing” will be important to the domestic market in the future (Seepij Gupta, 
Delhi, 30 January 2009). This will allow small- and medium-size firms to connect 
with one another and to share software online on a pay-per-use basis. An IT executive 
                                                 
78
 Evidence from the 2009 fieldwork that large companies constitute most of the domestic market 
addressed by NASSCOM members is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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working in Indian manufacturing also reported that plans are under way to provide 
business software similar to that used in large companies, but scaled down to fit the 
needs of small- and medium-size companies. This software would not be built for 
each individual company, but instead it would be developed and repeatedly copied so 
that thousands of identical products, applicable to thousands of similar small 
companies, would be produced and sold (Vasu Rao, Bangalore, 2 March 2009). 
Another interviewee, a senior vice president at NASSCOM, emphasized the value of 
new mobile technologies and cheap, widely applicable “apps” which can be delivered 
through mobile phones. He was positive that new devices with touch screens and 
voice recognition, both of which will be invaluable to illiterate Indian small business 
owners, will become incredibly important in the future (Rajdeep Sarawat, 22 January 
2009, Delhi).  
 
The responses from the interviewees suggest that there may well be room for 
continued growth in forward linkages. For its part, and as a leading sector must, the 
SWIS sector is actively investing into continued expansion of domestic forward 
linkages.  
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6.3 Other explanations are not much help 
 
This section briefly covers possibilities for growth in forward linkages which the 
research found to be either of secondary or of no importance. These possibilities were 
discussed during the 2009 interviews or investigated using secondary data, and as 
such, there is a reasonable amount of evidence to suggest that they are not major 
causes of growth in forward linkages. 
 
Comparative advantage and the relocation of production for global markets 
 
Section 3.3.2 discussed Dahlman and Utz’s (2005) analysis as one set of processes by 
which acceleration in forward linkages might occur. In their framework, if India 
scored relatively well on endowments and macroeconomic or regulatory environment 
measures, markets might efficiently allocate knowledge-enabled industry, services, 
and agriculture within its borders. This would mean that India’s IT-buying firms 
might then begin to supply global markets with their products, and that global firms in 
those sectors, would find it optimal to relocate to India. If this happened, these firms 
could possibly find it optimal to install complicated IT, including SWIS, and be 
willing to pay the price for the help they needed to do so. It was argued in Chapter 3 
that the process of accumulating endowments is generally a slow one. It was also 
argued that for India to score relatively well on these measures, it would need to 
overtake other countries on measures important for knowledge-enabled industries. To 
be certain that Dahlman and Utz’s (2005) mechanism is not also a contributory factor 
however, Figure 6.4 shows the change in the World Bank’s Knowledge Assessment 
Methodology (KAM) basic scorecard between 1995 and 2007-08.  
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The scorecard maps observations for India on 14 variables79. The data is normalised 
so that for a country to perform better over time on a particular score, it must not only 
improve in absolute terms, it must also improve faster than the rest of the comparator 
group of 140 countries. If Dahlman and Utz’s model was indeed the correct one to 
explain the trend break for the Indian domestic market for IT services, we should be 
able to observe a contemporaneous improvement in its endowments and macro-
environment relative to the rest of the world. 
Figure 6.4: Change in India’s Knowledge Assessment Methodology Scorecard from 1995 (dotted 
line) to latest data (solid line, data mainly from 2007-08) 
 
Source: World Bank (2009) 
Note: The dotted line refers to 1995. The solid line maps 14 variables labelled most recent as at 2009. 
 
According to the chart, India improved relative to the rest of the world on 8 out of the 
14 measures, but fell further behind on the 6 others. However, the magnitude of the 
positive changes are all smaller than the negative ones, so the chart seems to report an 
overall deterioration rather than improvement. This is reflected in the World Bank’s 
weighted aggregation of the normalised scores in Figure 6.6 into a single Knowledge 
                                                 
79
 Dahlman and Utz treat these measures as causal factors for emergence of a knowledge-based 
economy, and, by extension, the argument is that they are causes of increased use of SWIS. However, 
some of the variables cited (in particular GDP growth and human development) may also actually 
measure the results of use of SWIS. Since none of the variables where causality is debateable has 
altered to any degree in Figure 6.6, this should not affect the argument of this section.  
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Economy Index (KEI)80: Figure 6.5 plots the index in 1995 and its most recent value 
in 2008 for all 140 countries. The year 1995 is plotted against the x-axis and the most 
recent data against the y-axis. These two axes have the same scale, so that a marker on 
the 45-degree line indicates no change in the KEI. Markers above the 45-degree line 
indicate improvement, and below the 45-degree line indicate regression. The red mark 
for India is near, but below, the 45-degree line, indicating a minor deterioration 
between 1995 and the most recent data81.  
Figure 6.5: India (and other countries) performance over time on the Knowledge Economy Index 
from 1995 to latest data (mainly from 2005) 
 
Source: World Bank (2009) 
 Note: The x-axis refers to 1995. The y-axis refers to most recent data. Of the 12 variables that 
comprise the KEI, the “most recent” data is from 2002-03 in 1 case, 2005 in 5 cases, 2006 in 5 cases, 
and 2008 for the remaining 1 variable. 
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 The KEI includes all of the scores in Figure 6.6 except GDP growth or human development index. 
These 2 measures are excluded as they may also be interpreted as results of the use of SWIS rather than 
causes. 
81
 It is a result which would not be entirely surprising to Adrian Wood. His prolific research on 
comparative advantage has held that India’s endowments are best suited to labour-intensive 
manufactures. His 1999 article, co-authored with Jorg Mayer, concludes that this is a situation that is 
unlikely to change in the short term (1999: 35). 
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None of this analysis precludes the possibility of endowments (such as Internet 
access, or the prevalence of computers) increasing in absolute terms and being useful 
to the expansion of demand for SWIS which has been discussed in this chapter. What 
figures 6.4 and 6.5 demonstrate is that India has not experienced an improvement in 
knowledge-specific endowments and/or market environment relative to the rest of the 
world. This means that the kind of change that Dahlman and Utz’s (2005) analysis 
identified as needed if India is to become an ideal location for production of SWIS-
intensive products for world markets has not happened, and suggests that their 
theorising is therefore not useful for explaining the significantly improved growth 
trajectory of forward linkages since 2005-06. 
 
Uneven and combined development 
 
Another possibility arises from D’Costa’s (2003) dependency theory of uneven and 
combined development, which found that the extent of the domestic market remained 
small because both India’s potential IT-buying firms and SWIS firms were involved 
in a pattern of development that prevented them from learning how to work with one 
another. In particular, SWIS firms were generally prevented from upgrading the skill 
and value profile of their work in export markets, which in turn prevented finding 
ways to address the domestic market. If this explanation of a small domestic market 
was true, then any change to this systematic deterrent on domestic market growth 
could be an explanation for acceleration in 2005-06. 
 
Although D’Costa’s own work should be an obvious starting point for evaluating his 
theory, his many publications (2003, 2004, 2006)—which put forward the idea that 
upgrades in Indian SWIS are generally being thwarted by the nature of their export 
relationships—fail to offer significant and convincing empirical evidence to that 
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effect. Only one of these publications, a chapter in a book co-edited by D’Costa, 
offers any data on what Indian IT firms actually do (D’Costa 2004). The data is a 
breakdown of 400 companies’ claimed specialisations in 1988 into fairly broad 
categories (p. 63, Table 3.2). By D’Costa’s own admission, these categories could 
include both complex and less complex projects, but the commentary around the data 
argues, without supplementary evidence, that Indian firms’ specialisations are actually 
at the low end of each category82. What is perhaps more damning for his methodology 
is that he uses data from only one point in time six years prior to his publication date 
of 2004 to argue that there has been little improvement in IT firms’ capabilities over 
the lifetime of the industry. It is a difficult interpretation to accept, because in the 
previous chapter of D’Costa’s co-edited book, another author reports a doubling of 
export revenues (from US$75m to US$150m) for the high value “systems integration” 
category between 2001 and 2002 (Sridharan 2004b: 36-37, Table 2.3). It is a striking 
contradiction in narrative between the two authors and the two chapters in a single 
book.  
 
Figure 6.6 corrects for D’Costa’s empirical omission by reporting a time series on 
Indian IT Sector export revenues earned from higher-value project categories. 
Revenue from these exports has increased from $250m in 2000-01 to $1.9bn in 2009-
10. In other words, revenue from these categories is now roughly 7.5 times higher 
than it was 9 years ago.  
 
                                                 
82
 For example, D’Costa interprets the statistic that 46% of his sample claim specialisation in high-end 
“Enterprise Solutions” as evidence that these firms are specialists in legacy systems and the phasing out 
of old hardware, He writes that, “[U]nder ‘enterprise solutions’ (Table 2.3) we also have systems 
integration, an area of considerable technical complexities. However, the category is broadly 
understood to mean integrating various components, which not coincidentally includes not only various 
turnkey projects and ERP but also various legacy systems. For example, old hardware could be phased 
out or new software applications added on” (2004: 65).  
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Figure 6.6: Indian IT sector revenues from high value export projects 
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Source: Adapted from NASSCOM (2008: 203); Sridharan (2004b: 36-37, Table 2.3) 
Note: Financial years run from April to April. Data for April 2002 to April 2004 is unavailable. 2009-
10 is estimated by NASSCOM in 2008. This is denoted as E in the figure. 
 
In returning to the subject of learning, the IT sector experts interviewed for this 
research confirm the new evidence. They often repeated that learning occurs in their 
export relationships and can be applied in the contracts that they negotiate in India. 
Chapter 7 returns to this process of learning and cross-border knowledge transfer, and 
details how it is vital to the findings on the impact of forward linkages. For now, it is 
sufficient to note that D’Costa’s (2003) model of uneven and combined development 
was never, according to these interviewed experts, a significant drag on the extent of 
forward linkages. For that reason, changes in that mechanism could not have caused 
the acceleration. 
 
Government of India as an IT buyer 
 
The Government of India (GOI) is a substantial buyer of outsourced SWIS, and 
therefore it has had a direct effect on growth of the domestic market for IT. Figure 6.7 
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details a selection of government IT projects which use SWIS purchased from the IT 
sector. These projects are important because they promote IT usage in India as the 
population engages with these systems. They are also important because they 
demonstrate the capability of India’s SWIS sector and offer experience which 
enhances that capability83. Several of the projects undertaken by the GOI use IT to 
deliver services to businesses which may have had no previous experience using IT. 
These projects are often large and complex, and often need to address the same kinds 
of concerns as reported by all Indian businesses (NASSCOM and IDC, 2006: 21).  
 
Figure 6.7: Government IT Projects which purchased IT services 
 
           
Source: NASSCOM and IDC (2006: 21). 
 
However, government officials interviewed during the 2009 fieldwork reported that 
government spending on SWIS only began to rise significantly in 2006-07 when an 
                                                 
83
 Government purchasing was also important in technology-enabled growth in East Asia because of 
this mechanism, according to Wade (1990). 
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“e-government project”—designed to automate many government services—was 
launched. This took place later than the trend break in 2005-06.  
 
Other explanations 
 
During the fieldwork, other explanations for the acceleration in forward linkages were 
analysed, but then discounted. These include: saturated export markets (possibly true 
in the United States, but not in Japan and Europe); recession in export markets (which 
happened too late to explain acceleration in 2005-06); and pressure from global 
suppliers or buyers in potential client firms’ value chains (most Indian SWIS-buying 
customers seem more concerned with domestic, not international, sales). 
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6.4 Conclusion: A very different picture to that suggested in the 
literature 
 
The experience of the domestic market for outsourced SWIS covered in this chapter 
is, at first glance, an example of successful de-regulations and liberalisations. Reforms 
have led to a more open and less regulated economy and to private sector participation 
in many industries; in turn, this has led to investments into the tools that facilitate 
competition in a modern global world, namely, software systems. However, under 
closer examination, the theoretical model given to support such reforms in the 
publication by Dahlman and Utz (2005) cannot explain major dynamics in the market. 
The acceleration in the size of the domestic market for SWIS in 2005-06 does not 
correspond to any significant improvements relative to the rest of the world in either 
India’s endowments for hosting SWIS-intensive businesses or in its regulatory 
environment. In short, it does not correspond to any change in India’s comparative 
advantage in SWIS-intensive production. This chapter has found that there are, 
instead, two different causes of growth in domestic forward linkages from the SWIS 
sector.  
 
The first, covered in Section 6.2, outlined a role for reform, which saw gradual, 
piecemeal liberalisations in potential SWIS-buying industries as being responsible for 
the ongoing, slower growth in SWIS purchasing before 2005-06. What emerged from 
the 2009 fieldwork is a clear corroboration of the expected effects of this reform by 
India’s own policymakers, elucidated by a GOI economist (Virmani, 2006). Reform 
in potential SWIS-buying industries started with pro-business policies, and then, later, 
moved on to pro-market reforms. This particular sequence and style of reform gave 
potential SWIS-buying industries a window of opportunity to prepare prior to the 
introduction of competition from foreign companies. The section demonstrated that, 
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given this window, many Indian firms in potential SWIS-buying sectors decided to 
invest in SWIS. The second, which is the more important contribution to the thesis, 
was outlined in detail in Section 6.3. This gave the reason for exceedingly rapid 
growth since 2005-06. The section revealed that the cause of acceleration in forward 
linkages was a demonstration and realisation that SWIS had become an appropriate 
technology for the Indian context. The realisation occurred because of an innovative 
deal between IBM and Bharti-Airtel at the end of 2004-05. The appropriateness arose 
because a characteristic of the technology—economies of scale—closely matched an 
emerging characteristic of the Indian economy: large, middle-class markets. In 
introducing a new way of paying for SWIS outsourcing, the IBM–BA deal 
accomplished two things. First, it alleviated the need for Bharti-Airtel to make a risky 
upfront investment of the kind that Hirschman identified as difficult for developing-
country entrepreneurs. Second, it demonstrated that SWIS is sufficiently appropriate 
for the Indian context for it to be possible for IT companies to make profits whilst still 
delivering SWIS at an acceptably low per-use price. It was a great financial success 
for both IBM and Bharti-Airtel, and many similar deals have been struck in the 
domestic Indian market since 2005-06.  
 
Taken together, the findings of this chapter are revealing about how forward linkages 
from the SWIS sector came about. If it is also found that forward linkages from SWIS 
have an important impact in India, the findings are also revealing about how to get 
firms in developing countries to invest in productivity and growth-enhancing new 
technologies. Interestingly, neither of the two theoretical papers from the literature 
turned out to have much traction. The extremely market-oriented model of Dahlman 
and Utz (2005) and the Marxist model of D’Costa (2003) both placed too much 
emphasis on, respectively, the optimal or the power-brokered location for the supply 
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of SWIS-intensive products around the world. In doing so, both models missed the 
importance of the local story. Neither one of these two analyses suspected that SWIS 
might become appropriate for India, and so neither noted an important role for Indian 
domestic demand. It is an omission that may not have been so problematic if the 
subject of analysis was not SWIS and SWIS-intensive products. According to Quah 
(2002), for knowledge products, demand has veto power over sales, regardless of 
supply conditions. This means that the demand-side cannot be overlooked in favour of 
solely supply-side analysis. 
 
Another interesting outcome from this chapter concerns the role of the Indian 
government in bringing about domestic forward linkages from the SWIS sector. There 
is no doubt that the government’s own purchases of SWIS have been a contributory 
factor, and have provided demonstrations of what SWIS can do. In addition, the 
sequence and style of reform pursued by the Indian government has been shown to be 
one of two major causes of forward linkages’ expansion. The gradual, piecemeal 
reform discussed in this chapter has actually had results very similar to those expected 
of traditional infant industry policy. Potential SWIS-buying industries have been 
helped to invest and upgrade by “pro-business” reforms, while tariffs and other trade 
barriers remained in place. Full liberalisation and the threat of competition from 
technologically advanced foreign firms have been used as a threat to ensure that 
upgrading actually does happen, so that support from the government does not have to 
last forever. This intrusion of government into outcomes in potential SWIS-buying 
sectors is surprising, given that the idea of liberal reforms is ostensibly to roll back the 
influence of the state and end interventionist industrial policy. It is even more 
surprising given that these reforms were enacted during a period in which government 
interference in specific industries was politically constrained (Pederson, 2000: 276).  
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Still, the most important findings of this chapter are not about the role of government. 
The acceleration in forward linkages in 2005-06 has been attributed to leading sector 
behaviour on the part of the SWIS sector. In entering into pay-per-use contracts with 
India’s IT-buying sectors, SWIS firms have exempted their clients from taking the 
entrepreneurial risk of large, fixed-cost software systems. Instead, as Hirschman 
(1958) might have predicted decades earlier, a leading IT sector made investments 
into IT-buying industries by producing software systems which are outputs of the 
SWIS sector and inputs to IT-buying sectors. This has allowed SWIS firms to fully 
demonstrate the benefits of their software systems, and so alleviate concerns that their 
clients might have about the usefulness of the systems. By waiting until their clients 
use the system for payment, and agreeing to a per-use fee, SWIS sector firms have 
also been able to ensure that the system will never cost more than a known, acceptable 
proportion of the price of their customers’ final output.  
 
Chapter 7 moves to the final set of results from the research project, and covers the 
findings on the impact of SWIS use in India in terms of productivity and output. 
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7. Results: Forward Linkages have a big impact on output 
and productivity 
 
This chapter provides evidence that forward linkages from the SWIS sector lead to 
significant increases in output and productivity. Estimates from the new research 
described here demonstrate that these effects were responsible for between 1.3 and 2.4 
percentage points, or between 10% and 20% of GDP growth per year between 2005 
and 2008. This means that they have an impact which is comparable to that 
experienced from use of IT by the United States and Europe during the 1990s84.  
 
The work contained in this chapter has an important place in the literature. The most 
meaningful reason for this is because the chapter contains the third and final major 
contribution of the thesis, and completes the argument that forward linkages from the 
SWIS sector make an important contribution to India’s economy. The work contained 
here also contributes to the literature on the impact of information technology. For all 
the considerable effort expended in that literature, no previous publication has 
contained comprehensive empirical analysis of outsourced IT. Even on related issues 
which have received a lot of attention, in particular the impact of non-IT outsourcing 
or in-house IT, there are very few existing contributions which focus on developing 
countries85. Of these, none has as rich a quantitative dataset as that used here, and 
none includes, as this chapter does, complementary qualitative research.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is laid out as follows. Section 7.1 begins with an 
econometric examination of the impact of outsourced SWIS in production. Section 
7.2 complements this research with a qualitative account of why outsourced SWIS is 
so important to those firms and sectors that buy it. Section 7.3 discusses the results in 
                                                 
84
 See Chapter 2. 
85
 Literature on the impact of non-IT outsourcing and in-house IT was reviewed in Chapter 2. 
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different sectors and the impact of SWIS at the macroeconomic level. Section 7.4 
concludes by highlighting the importance of this chapter’s work and identifying 
several interesting avenues for further investigation. 
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7.1 Estimating the impact of forward linkages using econometrics 
 
This section forms the main body of new evidence on the impact of SWIS 
outsourcing. It describes research which analyses a large sample of firm-level data 
from India. The research first establishes the impact of forward linkages from the 
SWIS sector on output, and then goes on to investigate the implications of SWIS for 
specific aspects of firms’ total factor productivity. The section is split into four sub-
sections; these cover, in turn, methods, data, initial analysis, and econometric results.  
7.1.1 Methods 
 
The form of the econometric model which sets out to quantify the impact of SWIS on 
output is based on techniques which are used in the literature to research the impact of 
in-house IT and of general materials or services outsourcing86. It has been designed 
specifically for this project using a combination of approaches from both sets of 
literature. This combination of approaches was necessary because, on the one hand, 
outsourced SWIS plays a similar role in production as other outsourcing, in that it 
occurs outside the firm. On the other hand, though, outsourced SWIS also has the 
potential to either complement or substitute for IT used in-house by firms. This means 
that any evaluation of outsourced SWIS must include an evaluation of in-house IT or 
risk misattribution of output or productivity effects. Methods from both literatures use 
a framework in which output can be linked to the capital and labour used to produce it 
through a production function like equation (1)87.  
 
),,( MLKAFY =       (1) 
                                                 
86
 Introduced in Chapter 2 
87
 If there are constant returns to scale in the sample under consideration, equation (1) can also be 
expressed as a “per worker” version, where all variables are divided by L. This is common in the 
literature on developed countries, particularly for the United States, where the data supports constant 
returns to scale (e.g., Stiroh, 2002: 13).  
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Here Y refers to gross output; K to stocks of capital; L to the size of the labour force; 
M to intermediate inputs (including materials, energy, and any other purchased inputs 
to production) and F(.) to the function which determines the amount of output which 
is produced from a given quantity of inputs. A refers to total factor productivity (TFP) 
and measures the efficiency with which all inputs are converted into output.  
 
The literature on the impact of in-house IT modifies this production function to 
include IT assets, which typically include both hardware and software, as special 
types of capital (Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2007; Stiroh, 2002,). This yields a new 
production function in the form of equation (2). Here, K is re-defined to mean non-IT 
capital, and IT is hardware and/or software assets. 
 
),,,( MLITKAFY =       (2) 
 
The literature on non-IT outsourcing postulates that firms which outsource experience 
improvements in TFP88 (Olsen, 2006). This leads to equation (3) in which OSS refers 
to the outsourcing of services, and OSM to the outsourcing of manufactures or 
materials. Y, K, L, M and F(.) are defined as before. 
 
),,(),( MLKFOSMOSSAY =     (3) 
 
 
In both sets of literature, it is common to assume a Cobb-Douglas functional form for 
F(.) and then take logs. This gives a log linear production function, like equation (4) 
in the IT literature and equation (5) in the outsourcing literature, which is amenable to 
                                                 
88
 See Chapter 2. 
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quantification of parameters using either national accounts data89 or econometrics at 
the firm- or sector-level90.  
 
)ln()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( MLITKAY MLITK αααα ++++=   (4) 
 
)ln()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( 21 MLKOSMOSSY MLK αααγγ ++++=   (5) 
 
In equations (4) and (5), “ln(.)” is the natural logarithm, the γ’s are the elasticities of 
output to non-IT outsourcing, and the α’s are the elasticities of output to the other 
inputs. All other elements of the equations are defined as before.  
 
Combining equations (4) and (5) and replacing outsourcing of services and 
manufactures with outsourcing of SWIS, denoted as OSSWIS, leads to equation (6). 
This form is designed specifically for this project and is the basis of the empirical 
work below that sets out to measure the impact of SWIS on output.  
 
)ln()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( MLITKOSSWISY MLITK ααααγ ++++=  (6) 
 
Estimating equation (6) using macro-level data, as in the bulk of the literature on the 
impact of in-house IT, is inappropriate for the current context because the method 
relies heavily on neo-classical assumptions of frictionless factor markets and 
unconstrained profit maximisation (Oliner and Sichel, 2000) which are unlikely to 
                                                 
89
 Some examples from this large literature include Gordon (1998, 2000, 2003); Jorgenson and Stiroh 
(1995); Oliner and Sichel (1994, 2000, 2002). 
90
 Examples of econometric approaches from the fairly extensive literature on in-house IT include 
Baily and Lawrence (2001); Basant et al. (2006); Bresnahan, Brynjolffson and Hitt (2002); 
Brynjolffson and Hitt (1993); Greenan, Mairesse and Topial-Bensaid (2002); Sadun and Van Reenan 
(2005); Stiroh (2001); World Bank (2006). The much smaller literature which examines the impact of 
non-IT outsourcing using econometrics includes Amiti and Wei (2004, 2006); Banga and Goldar 
(2004); Criscuolo and Leaver (2005); Egger and Egger (2001); Gorg and Hanley (2003, 2005); Gorzig 
and Stephan (2002). 
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hold true in India91. Instead, gamma, the elasticity of output to SWIS, is quantified in 
the results below through the estimation of log-linear econometric models, a method 
which requires considerably fewer assumptions (Stiroh, 2001: 10–11), and which has 
the advantage of enabling the results to be subjected to a battery of robustness tests.  
 
To investigate the impact of SWIS on productivity in more detail, the research project 
then undertook a study of how SWIS impacts the technology component of firms’ 
TFP, that is, their technical efficiency92. This part of the project involved the 
estimation of a stochastic frontier model, a type of econometric analysis which was 
designed specifically to measure and then analyse aspects of TFP (Battese and Coelli, 
1992, 1995). The technique involves estimating a log-linear version of the production 
function, and identifying its parameters for those firms in the sample that use their 
inputs the most efficiently. In other words, it involves identifying the production 
function of those firms that are at the production possibilities frontier93. At the same 
time, the procedure also estimates, for each individual firm, a “distance” away from 
this production frontier. This distance metric measures the difference in output 
between what a firm would produce if it were as efficient as those high performers 
and what it actually produces; in other words, it is an output-based measure of 
technical inefficiency. In the work for this project, stochastic frontier modelling was 
used to estimate equation (7). The firm-level inefficiencies were then stored and used 
as the dependent variable in a regression with SWIS purchases and other variables 
which might affect technical efficiency. This is shown as equation (8).  
                                                 
91
 For example, Besley and Burgess (2004) find that that regulation in the labour market constrains 
firms and is deleterious for manufacturing output. 
92
 A technically efficient firm uses the most efficient technology for converting inputs into output. This 
means it cannot raise output without increasing one or more inputs. It also cannot produce the same 
output with less of any particular input, unless it increases the amount of other inputs used.  
93
 The set of maximum possible amounts of output which can be produced with a given set of inputs is 
referred to as the production possibilities frontier. It is referred to as a “frontier” because changes in 
this set occur as new, more efficient production techniques are discovered and the maximum possible 
amount of output increases. 
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In equation (7) the asterisked alphas denote elasticities at the frontier, and “-ln(E)” is 
the output measure of inefficiency. In equation (8), this measure is multiplied by -1, 
so that it can be interpreted as a positive measure of efficiency. The betas measure the 
elasticity of technical efficiency to SWIS purchases and also to a group of other 
controls denoted by z.  
7.1.2 Data  
 
The main source of data used to quantify equations (6), (7) and (8) is the PROWESS 
database, published by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE, 2009). 
This rich data source includes a panel of approximately 25,000 large- and medium-
size firms from 2005 onwards. Included firms are those registered on India’s major 
stock exchanges, as well as many public-sector enterprises. The CMIE (2009) reports 
that the database includes most organised industries, banking, and services, and, as 
evidence to support this claim, it estimates that the included firms contribute 75% of 
all corporate taxes and 95% of all sales taxes collected in India. PROWESS reports 
assets, expenditures, and outputs for these companies over several years, although not 
all years are populated with all of the relevant measures for all firms. Despite this 
patchiness, and despite the project’s timings precluding use of data from after 2008, 
the database still offers a large dataset for the purposes of estimating equations (6), (7) 
and (8). In total, there are an estimated 33,600 populated observations on nearly 
12,800 firms, with most firms reporting data in either two or three of the four years in 
the sample. Figure 7.1 shows the breakdown of these populated observations by year 
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and sector. Roughly half of the observations are from manufacturing firms, and the 
other half are split approximately equally between finance and non-financial services.  
 
Figure 7.1: Populated Sample by Sector and Year, Number of firms 
2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Manufacturing 5,594 5,054 4,122 2,510 17,280 (51%)
Finance 3,061 2,623 1,847 885 8,416 (25%)
Services 2,688 2,346 1,819 1,015 7,868 (23%)
Total 11,343 10,023 7,788 4,410 33,564 (100%)
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
 
Unfortunately, the PROWESS database, and, consequently, the sample used here, 
suffers from attrition, particularly in 2007 and 2008. This does not appear to have 
significantly affected the sector-wise composition of the sample, with the split for 
Manufacturing (50%) and Services and Finance (25% each) remaining consistent 
through all four of the years. Despite this, the potential for attrition bias does remain a 
concern and is the subject of robustness tests discussed below.  
 
Appendix A2.1 includes a detailed data dictionary for all dependent and independent 
variables used in the analyses, including an account of all transformations that were 
carried out on them. It illustrates that the data used here underwent a careful treatment 
designed to ensure accurate identification of the impact of SWIS outsourcing. Capital 
variables are net of cumulative depreciation so as to better capture their productive 
value rather than their cost at purchase. In addition, all of the production function 
variables measured in financial terms (output, capital (including IT capital), 
intermediate inputs, and SWIS outsourcing), have been corrected for inflation using 
individually appropriate price indexes. Price indexes for non-services variables have 
been sourced from the Reserve Bank of India’s (2011) Wholesale price indices. For 
services variables, GDP deflators have been constructed from real and nominal output 
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in the appropriate sector, as published in the Indian National Account Statistics 
(Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation 2011). Software, both in-house 
assets and outsourced, is deflated using a recent index of software prices constructed 
by Prud’homme, Sanga, and Yu, (2005) for Canada. No equivalent index exists for 
India, but a decline in software prices of approximately 6% per year, as was found in 
Canada, is broadly consistent with qualitative data on the price of domestic market 
SWIS collected during the 2009 fieldwork. 
 
Appendix A2.1 also gives a complete definition of the variable used to measure SWIS 
outsourcing in the analyses which follow. PROWESS does not report expenditure on 
SWIS separately, but instead includes it in the data field titled “Expenditure on 
Software and Other Professional Services”. The definition of this latter metric shows 
that it includes expenditures on SWIS and on all other “Expenses reported by a 
company on external professional services engaged by the company for services other 
than for audit, consultancy, software development, IT-enabled services, cost audit and 
legal services” (CMIE 2009). Using this metric as a measure of SWIS outsourcing is 
justified, because a major portion of what is included in it is SWIS outsourcing94. This 
is verified by the distribution of expenditure as measured by this variable across 
sectors in the sample. Average expenditure per firm is higher in sectors which are 
known to use IT-intensively in production around the world and which contributed a 
large share of the Indian SWIS sector’s domestic revenues in 2006-07 (see Appendix 
A2.2).   
                                                 
94
 There is some precedent in the non-IT outsourcing literature for using metrics, including the 
outsourcing of interest and miscellaneous expenditures which cannot be better classified elsewhere. 
Banga and Goldar (2004) use a similar composite variable to evaluate the impact of outsourced 
services amongst Indian manufacturers. Gorg and Hanley (2003) use an even wider metric, “other 
direct and indirect costs”, to measure the extent of outsourced services in the Irish electronics sector. 
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7.1.3 Initial Analysis 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the number and share of firms that purchased more than Rs. 1 
Crore95 of SWIS in the populated sample. It also shows their share of total output and 
profits during the sample period.  
Figure 7.2: Presence and Importance of SWIS Outsourcers 
Firms Spending 
<1 crore
Firms 
Spending >1 
crore
% of Sample 
Spending >1 crore
Output           
(%)
Profits          
(%)
2005 10700 643 6% 53% 64%
2006 9309 714 7% 57% 62%
2007 6969 819 11% 60% 65%
2008 3702 708 16% 65% 69%
Sample split by SWIS spending: Those using  >1 crore SWIS 
contribute (in real terms)…
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
Note: Figures reported are annual averages in the populated sample. Rs.1 crore was equivalent to 
US$221,900 in 2005. Profits shown are net of taxes. 
 
Column 4 in Figure 7.2 reports the percentage of the sample in each year that spends 
more than Rs. 1 crore on outsourcing. This proportion increased rapidly over the four- 
year sample, but had still only reached 16% by 2008. This confirms that SWIS 
outsourcing was not a widespread practice, but that its rapid growth in aggregate is 
reflected in this sample of firms. The share of output for those firms buying more than 
Rs. 1 crore of SWIS is much higher than those firms’ share of the sample. This 
illustrates both the large size of the firms which go in for SWIS and their importance 
in terms of their contribution to economic activity. The share of profits is even higher 
than the share of output, illustrating that firms buying SWIS are more profitable than 
other firms in the sample. 
 
                                                 
95
 Rs. 1 crore is chosen as a lower bound for the purpose of describing the data in Figure 7.2. This has 
the effect of separating firms with large purchases of SWIS from the many firms in the sample with 
very small expenditures of SWIS, as measured by the composite variable. 
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To begin an examination of the relationships between SWIS outsourcing, output, and 
productivity, Figure 7.3 compares the distribution of the natural logarithm of real 
gross output per employee in SWIS buying and non-SWIS buying firms. Figures are 
presented in per-employee terms to facilitate comparisons between the relatively large 
SWIS purchasing firms, and smaller firms in the rest of the sample96. It is clear from 
this analysis that the two distributions overlap for the majority of their range. 
However, the distribution for SWIS buyers (the solid line) is above that of the other 
firms in the sample (the dashed line).  
Figure 7.3: Distribution of Log Real Gross Output per Employee, SWIS Outsourcers vs. Others 
 
Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
Notes: Kernel density function for log of real gross output per employee, measured in 2005 Rs. crore in 
the whole of the pooled sample (2005–2008). Rs.1 crore was equivalent to US$221,900 in 2005.  
 
To explore this simple indicator of output and productivity alongside measures of 
inputs to production, Figure 7.4 shows averages of real gross output per employee and 
                                                 
96
 Summary statistics for production variables on a per-firm (rather than per employee) basis are 
reported in Appendix A2.3. 
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input usage per employee in the sample. The figures included indicate that, on 
average, employees in SWIS-buying firms produce 40% more real gross output and 
46% more value-added per employee than other firms. However, the chart also shows 
that, on average, in firms which purchase SWIS, each employee uses more than 
double the amount of capital as other firms. This suggests that the difference in output 
per employee is not simply the result of SWIS spending, but may also be a result of 
higher capital intensity in firms which buy SWIS. The final entry on the chart shows 
average wages; these are 16% higher in SWIS-buying firms than in others in the 
sample. This suggests that highly productive workers may also contribute to stronger 
output per employee in these firms. 
Figure 7.4: Output, Inputs per Employee and Wage for SWIS Outsourcers vs. Others, Rs. crore 
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0.25
0.26
0.84
0.59
0.32
0.60
1.19
0.86
0.04
Rs. 0.0 Rs. 0.5 Rs. 1.0 Rs. 1.5
Average Wage
Real Intermediate Inputs
per Employee
Real Net Capital per
Employee
Real Gross Output per
Employee
Real Value added per
Employee
Firms spending <1 Crore Firms spending >1 Crore
 
Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
Notes: Figures reported are averages over the entire pooled sample (2005–2008). Figures for gross 
output, capital, and intermediate inputs are in constant 2005 rupees crore. Capital is shown net of 
accumulated depreciation. Rs.1 crore was equivalent to US$221,900 in 2005.  
 
Figure 7.5 continues the summary of inputs by presenting averages of IT usage 
metrics per 100 employees. It shows that those firms which purchase outsourced 
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SWIS also use higher levels of IT capital in-house. This suggests that firms that buy 
SWIS have more IT-intensive production, and that it is important to investigate 
whether it is this IT intensity which drives the gains in output per employee shown in 
Figure 7.3, and not the SWIS outsourcing itself.  
Figure 7.5: IT Usage per 100 Employees, SWIS Outsourcers vs. Others, Rs. Crore 
0.11
0.04
0.18
0.15
0.08
1.71
Rs. 0.0 Rs. 0.5 Rs. 1.0 Rs. 1.5 Rs. 2.0
Real Net Computer
Capital per 100
Employees
Real Net Software Assets
per 100 Employees
Real SWIS Outsourcing
per 100 Employees
Firms spending <1 Crore Firms spending >1 Crore
 
Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
Notes: Firm-level unweighted averages over the entire pooled sample (2005–2008). All figures are in 
constant 2005 rupees crore. Software assets and IT capital are shown net of accumulated depreciation. 
Rs.1 crore was equivalent to US$221,900 in 2005. Employees do not include directors or owners. 
 
The econometric models laid out in the next section address these issues by 
disentangling the effects of SWIS outsourcing from the effect of other inputs. 
7.1.4 Results on output 
 
Figure 7.6 shows the results of estimating equation (6) using the populated sample 
from the PROWESS data. All variables in all columns are significant at the 0.1% 
level. This reflects both the strength of the production effects being measured and the 
precision benefits of having a large sample size. Column 1 shows a benchmark 
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estimate of the production function without outsourcing included and with in-house 
IT combined with ordinary capital. Column 2 splits out in-house IT from ordinary 
capital, and column 3 splits IT capital into hardware and software. Columns 4 and 5 
introduce SWIS outsourcing to the models in columns 2 and 3. These provide the first 
estimates of equation (6). In both column 4 and column 5, real SWIS outsourcing is 
highly significant, and its coefficient indicates that doubling expenditure on SWIS 
outsourcing leads to a 9% increase in real gross output.  
 
Figure 7.6: Econometric Estimates of Equation (6) 
Dependent Variable is Log of Real Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.1776*** 0.1520*** 0.1529*** 0.1382*** 0.1392***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
0.2123*** 0.2162*** 0.2214*** 0.2137*** 0.2145***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
0.3593*** 0.3532*** 0.3542*** 0.3226*** 0.3236***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
0.0498*** 0.0357***
(0.003) (0.003)
0.0441*** 0.0290***
(0.003) (0.003)
0.0254*** 0.0207***
(0.003) (0.003)
0.0896*** 0.0897***
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant and Year 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 33,558 33,558 33,558 33,558 33,558
R-Squared 43.7% 43.7% 43.6% 44.7% 44.7%
Log real in-house 
Hardware
Log real in-house 
Software
Log real outsourced 
SWIS
Log real intermediate 
Inputs
Log real IT capital
Log labour
Log real capital
 
Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
Notes: Estimated using OLS with cluster robust standard errors to account for panel data. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in 2005 rupees crore. Rs.1 crore was equivalent to 
US$221,900 in 2005. *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level.  
 
 
The coefficients on labour and capital from columns 2 and 3 are fairly robust to the 
inclusion of SWIS outsourcing. Their output elasticities in columns 4 and 5 are within 
90% confidence intervals for the same elasticity in the models without outsourcing. 
This suggests that the majority of the impact of SWIS outsourcing comes through 
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increases in TFP, not through changes to firms’ use of labour or capital. The 
coefficients on in-house IT capital, on the other hand, do not remain stable between 
columns 2 and 4 or between columns 3 and 5. Regardless of whether hardware and 
software are combined into one variable or not, the inclusion of SWIS outsourcing 
reduces the size of their estimated output elasticity by between 20% and 35%. This 
shows that estimating the impact of in-house IT without controlling for SWIS 
outsourcing leads to misleading results, as some of the impact of SWIS outsourcing is 
misallocated to in-house IT capital. To put this into context, the estimate for in-house 
IT in column 4, which controls for SWIS outsourcing, is 3.6% more real gross output 
per 100% increase in in-house IT capital. This estimate is substantially lower than the 
estimate for the same elasticity column 2, in which SWIS outsourcing is excluded 
from the regression. It is also lower than both the only other comparable estimate for 
India at 11.5% (Basant et al., 2006) and the mean estimate from a meta-analysis of 
developed country studies at 5% (Stiroh 2002).  
 
Figure 7.7 takes the results in column 4 of Figure 7.6 and subjects them to the first set 
of robustness tests97. In the figure, column 1 reproduces the base specification for 
comparison, and column 2 performs the first robustness test. The need for this test 
arises from the panel attrition in the PROWESS data and hence the modelling 
sample98. To test for any bias arising from loss of firms over time from the database, 
the model is re-estimated using only observations in earlier years of the sample, 
before any significant attrition took place. The estimated coefficients on all variables 
are very similar to the baseline estimates in column 1. This suggests that attrition bias 
is not driving any of the results. Column 3 adds other control variables expected to 
                                                 
97
 The model from column 4 was chosen as a base specification for robustness tests because there is 
some correlation between in-house hardware and in-house software. Combining these two variables 
into one measure of in-house IT capital also produces a higher R-squared. 
98
 This was illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
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influence productivity into the base regression. The main effect of this on the 
estimated production function is an approximate 50% decrease in the elasticity of 
output to labour. This suggests that the productivity controls included mainly work to 
augment labour productivity. 
Figure 7.7: Robustness Tests on Sub-samples and Productivity Controls 
Dependent Variable is Log of Real Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base 05 and 06 only Productivity 
controls Manf Services
0.1382*** 0.1345*** 0.1295*** 0.1718*** 0.1569***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.022) (0.012)
0.2137*** 0.2161*** 0.1165*** 0.0890*** 0.2582***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018)
0.3226*** 0.3106*** 0.3088*** 0.5802*** 0.1978***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008)
0.0357*** 0.0380*** 0.0481*** 0.0068** 0.0489***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
0.0896*** 0.0872*** 0.0886*** 0.0478*** 0.1359***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Constant and Year 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Productivity controls - - Yes - -
N 33,558 21,400 33,558 17,300 16,300
R-Squared 43.7% 43.7% 43.6% 44.7% 44.7%
Log labour
Log real capital
Log real outsourced 
SWIS
Log real intermediate 
Inputs
Log real IT capital
 
Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
Notes: Estimated using OLS with cluster robust standard errors to account for panel data. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in 2005 rupees crore. Rs.1 crore was equivalent to 
US$221,900 in 2005. Column 2 includes only data from 2005 and 2006. ** Significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level. Productivity controls are 
age, age squared, and the firm’s expenditure on royalties.  
 
Columns 4 and 5 show the results of estimating the model separately for 
manufacturers and services firms. Many of the coefficients in these specifications are 
different from the baseline estimates in ways that are expected, given the different 
activities of manufacturers as compared to services firms. For example, services 
firms’ output is more elastic to labour inputs and less elastic to increases in materials 
than that of manufacturers. This is expected because manufacturing is more materials 
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intensive and less labour intensive than many services industries. In both column 4 
and column 5, the impact of SWIS outsourcing is positive and significant at the 0.1% 
level. In services firms, the coefficient suggests that a 100% increase in SWIS 
outsourcing leads to 13.6% more output, whilst in manufacturers the same 
proportional increase in spending leads to only 4.8% more output. A much starker 
version of the same pattern is discernible in the coefficients for in-house IT, where a 
100% increase in IT capital gives a 5% increase in services output, but less than a 1% 
increase in manufacturing output. Taken together, these estimates suggest that the 
services industries in the sample get greater benefit from their IT use than the 
manufacturing industries, a finding that is reflected in the wider literature on IT 
(Stiroh, 2002: 6). Columns 4 and 5 also suggest an interesting avenue for further 
research: these models clearly show some interesting differences to one another and to 
the aggregate picture, and their further development could well be revealing. 
 
Figure 7.8 reports a set of re-estimations of equation (6) that control for endogeneity. 
As with any econometric model, endogeneity problems here can either arise from 
reverse causality or from one or more variables which are not included in the model 
but which cause both dependent and explanatory variables to change together. The 
literature identifies possibilities for both of these. Reverse causality concerns arise 
because high-productivity firms may be better able to afford purchases of IT, whether 
in-house or outsourced (Olley and Paikes, 1996: 1264). Similarly, high-productivity 
firms may also be more likely to outsource non-core competencies such as IT, as part 
of their strategy to maintain their productivity lead (Nolan, 2001). Concerns around 
possible excluded variables which drive both choice of inputs and the level of output 
are even more widespread. Two of the most often cited issues in the literature on IT 
are organisational set-up and the need for highly skilled/well managed workforces; 
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these are well documented to be both complementary to IT investments and 
productivity-enhancing in their own right (Basant et al., 2006; Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002). In the literature on outsourcing, cross-border activities 
present a similar issue; firms which export or import products are both more likely to 
outsource across borders and be more productive because of exposure to international 
best practices (Amiti and Wei, 2005: 4). If all these issues were not enough, even 
without endogeneity arising from the inclusion of IT and/or outsourcing, production 
functions are subject to their own well-known, excluded-variable problems. These 
arise because inputs are not truly independent variables, but are chosen by firms, 
possibly according to what they observe of their own circumstances; or, in other 
words, according to values of other variables not included in the econometric model 
(Griliches and Mairesse, 1998). 
 
Methods for dealing with these issues depend on whether the source of endogeneity 
predominantly varies between firms or within each firm. If the source is an excluded 
variable that changes rarely or very slowly over time, but is different across firms, 
controlling for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity, using either fixed effects or first 
differences, will correct most of the bias in elasticity estimates. On the other hand, if 
the source of endogeneity is reverse causality or a third variable that changes within 
firms over time, an instrumental variables version of fixed effects is necessary. 
Because the possible sources of endogeneity around equation (6) could vary both 
within and between firms, the approach here is to undertake all 3 of these possible 
solutions and to compare the results. Column 1 in Figure 7.8 reproduces the baseline 
OLS estimates from before. In column 2, fixed-effects estimates are given; and in 
column 3, first differences. Column 4 shows an instrumental variables fixed-effects 
(IV-FE) estimator suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
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Figure 7.8: Controlling for Endogeneity 
Dependent Variable is Log of Real Output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base Fixed Effects 1st Differences
IV-FE 
(GMM)
0.1382*** 0.0660*** 0.0519** 0.0971***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024)
0.2137*** 0.0558*** 0.0640** 0.0216
(0.010) (0.016) (0.023) (0.019)
0.3226*** 0.1781*** 0.1600*** 0.1535***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019)
0.0357*** 0.0239*** 0.0250*** 0.0285***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
0.0896*** 0.0576*** 0.0534*** 0.0468***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
0.4457***
(0.004)
Constant and Year 
Dummies Yes Yes No constant
No Year 
Dummies
N 33,558 33,558 20,622 20,622
R-Squared 44.7% 44.5% 4.5% -
Log labour
Log real capital
Log real outsourced 
SWIS
Log of real output            
(t-1)
Log real intermediate 
Inputs
Log real IT capital
 
Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is log of real gross output. ** 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.1% 
level. Column 2 is estimated using fixed effects; column 3 is estimated using OLS on first differenced 
data; column 4 is estimated using general method of moments and uses both lags of the variables and 
lags of first differences of the variables as instruments (as suggested by Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
Year dummy variables were tested and found insignificant the model reported in column 4. 
 
Columns 2 and 3 in Figure 7.8 eliminate any bias arising from unobserved variables 
that predominantly vary across (between) firms. The estimates can only exploit 
variation within firms over time to identify the output elasticities of the various inputs. 
In both of these two models, both the IT capital variable and the SWIS outsourcing 
variable remain positive and highly significant. However, the output elasticity for 
SWIS outsourcing falls from 9% per 100% increase in expenditure to 5.8% for the 
fixed-effects model, and to 5.3% for the first-differences model. This shows that there 
are unobserved firm-level characteristics which are related to the use of outsourced 
SWIS and which also have a positive effect on output. Column 4 further develops the 
 243 
fixed-effects model of column 2 by using instrumental variables to eliminate sources 
of endogeneity that vary within firms over time. In other words, this specification 
corrects for endogeneity in both the within-firm dimension and the between-firms 
dimension. Importantly, SWIS outsourcing still remains positive and significant with 
a coefficient that implies 4.7% more output from an additional 100% expenditure.  
 
In the literature on outsourcing, it is common to interpret the OLS coefficient as an 
estimate of the long-run impact of outsourcing, and the estimate that controls for 
endogeneity as the short run (Egger and Egger, 2001; Fixler and Siegel, 1999; Olsen, 
2006). This is justified under two conditions. The first is that the source of 
endogeneity is unobserved variables correlated with outsourcing, such as skill profile 
of workers or organisational set up of the firm. The second is that over the long run, 
firms change these unobserved factors to complement their decisions on outsourcing. 
For IT variables, a similar argument can be made if the omitted variables are IT-
related inputs, such as Internet availability, which arrive as part of the same 
phenomenon as the firm’s purchased IT. In this case, the OLS estimate can be 
interpreted as the “broader impact of the IT revolution”, with the endogeneity-
corrected estimate interpreted as the impact of a firm’s investment into its own IT 
(Stiroh 2002: 6). Of course, the other, more pessimistic possibility is that the OLS 
estimate is simply an over-estimate of the effect of IT and that the IV-FE estimate is 
the only unbiased one (p. 23–24). It seems likely that both of these possibilities—the 
OLS estimate is true for the long run impact, the IV-FE estimate is the only unbiased 
one—are too extreme for this research. Firms are unlikely to prioritise the impact on 
productivity from SWIS outsourcing over the impact of more general in-house 
productivity when deciding, for example, on the skills profile of their work force. On 
the other hand, it is likely that both some productivity enhancing internal changes and 
 244 
some additional benefits from the wider IT revolution will be accrued by the firm as a 
result of the decision to invest in outsourced SWIS. This suggests that the true impact 
appropriated by firms from SWIS outsourcing is somewhere between the OLS and 
IV-FE estimates.  
 
On this basis, the upper and lower bounds of the effect of investment into SWIS on 
output can be calculated using the OLS and IV-FE elasticities given above. The 
elasticities range from 0.047 (for the Fixed Effects–Instrumental Variables GMM 
model) to 0.090 (for the OLS estimate). Figure 7.9 uses these figures to provide some 
ranges for the effect of SWIS. It also includes the same measures for the impact of in-
house IT capital on output as a comparison. The first row in Figure 7.9 gives the range 
of gross marginal products suggested by the elasticity estimates. Even for the most 
conservative estimates, these are substantially larger than Rs. 1 crore, suggesting that 
SWIS outsourcing offers supernormal returns. Also, when the gross marginal product 
of SWIS outsourcing is compared to that of in-house IT capital, it is clear that, on 
average, an additional Rs. 1 crore would be better spent on outsourced SWIS.  
 
Figure 7.9: In Sample Effects of IT and SWIS investment 
Lower 
Limit       
(IV-FE)
Upper 
Limit 
(OLS)
Gross marginal product of SWIS outsourcing  (Crore) Rs. 11 Rs. 20
Growth in output per firm from investment into SWIS (%) 20% 40%
Growth in output per firm from investment into SWIS (Crore) Rs. 35 Rs. 68
Share of total growth in output per firm attributable to SWIS (%) 10% 19%
Gross marginal product for in-house IT capital (Crore) Rs. 8 Rs. 10
Growth in output per firm from investment into in-house IT (%) 11% 14%
Growth in output per firm from investment into in-house IT (Crore) Rs. 20 Rs. 24
Share of total growth in output per firm attributable to in-house IT (%) 5% 7%
  
Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
Notes: Gross marginal products are calculated at the mean amongst those firms which have some 
spending on the IT type in question. All growth figures refer to growth between 2005 and 2008 in real 
terms. Rs.1 crore was equivalent to US$221,900 in 2005. 
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The other rows in the table are concerned with how much output growth in the sample 
firms can be attributed to investment into IT. Between 2005 and 2008, SWIS 
outsourcing per firm increased from Rs. 0.45 crore to Rs. 2.3 crore on average, giving 
a percentage growth rate of 420%. Applying the IV–FE elasticity to this growth rate 
gives a 20% increase in output per firm attributable to SWIS outsourcing. This 
amounts to an output increase per firm from Rs 180 crore to Rs. 215 crore, or 10% of 
a total 203% growth in output per firm over the period 2005-2008. Even with this, the 
most conservative estimate, it is a strong effect and an important driver of output 
growth. This becomes particularly clear when the effect of SWIS is compared to the 
impact of in-house IT. During the same period, the value of in-house IT per firm in 
the sample grew from Rs. 0.3 crore to Rs. 1.5 crore on average, a percentage increase 
of 381%. Even with the most optimistic (OLS) estimate, Figure 7.9 shows that this 
increase in in-house IT is responsible for only a 14% growth in output per firm, or 7% 
of all output growth in the period. 
 
7.1.5 Results on productivity 
 
The findings described in Section 7.1.4 show that the inclusion of SWIS into 
econometric models of equation (6) amongst the PROWESS sample did not 
substantially alter the elasticities of output to labour and capital. This suggests that the 
impact of SWIS on output came through an increase in total factor productivity rather 
than through changes in labour or capital productivity. This section provides more 
evidence to that effect. It examines in detail the response of one aspect of total factor 
productivity to SWIS expenditure: how technical efficiency changes when firms buy 
IT.   
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Figure 7.10 is the most important table of results arising from this investigation. It 
shows the results of estimating equation (8) to investigate how SWIS impacts 
technical efficiency. These results depend on a prior estimation of equation (7) which 
is detailed in Appendix A2.4. The model of equation (7) identified the production 
function for the most technically efficient firms in the sample, and estimates how 
distant in terms of output each firm is from what it would produce if it were as 
efficient as those superior performers. This output based measure of inefficiency was 
converted to a measure of efficiency, which was then used as the dependent variable 
in the estimation of equation (8) (described in Figure 7.11). Column 1 in figure 7.11 
shows a regression of technical efficiency on SWIS outsourcing, and column 2 
modifies this regression by including a set of other variables which might also be 
expected to affect efficiency. Both equations are estimated using a tobit specification 
to account for the fact that the dependent variable is bounded between zero and one. 
Both sets of estimates show that technical efficiency is significantly higher for firms 
which purchase SWIS99. 
 
                                                 
99
 Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000: 262–265) provide a clear technical explanation of the two-step 
process which has been followed to reach the results here. 
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Figure 7.10: Estimates of the Impact of SWIS on Technical Efficiency 
Dependent variable is technical efficiency
(1) (2)
0.0021*** 0.0016***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
0.0012***
(0.0001)
0.0035***
(0.0002)
0.0022***
(0.0002)
0.2002***
(0.0185)
0.2476***
(0.0279)
0.0522***
(0.0058)
0.0684***
(0.0065)
0.0053*** 0.0046***
(0.013) (0.013)
0.0141*** 0.0110***
(0.0017) (0.0017)
0.0368*** 0.0279***
(0.0026) (0.0025)
Constant Yes Yes
N 33,558 33,558
Log real outsourced SWIS
Age
Log research and development
Log expenditure on royalties and licences
Banks
Dummy for 2007
Dummy for 2008
Financial Institutions
Finance - Securities
Wholesalers
Dummy for 2006
 
Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
Notes: Tobit models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is ln(E) as 
detailed in the methods section above, and estimated using the model in Appendix A2.4. *** 
Significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level. 
 
This is an important result. It demonstrates that SWIS improves the technology with 
which firms convert inputs to outputs and moves them closer to the technical frontier. 
This verifies the earlier suggestion that a significant proportion of the output impact 
of SWIS comes from its ability to improve TFP in the firms that use it. 
 
The next section returns to the qualitative data collected during the in-depth 
interviews. It provides the reasons for why SWIS outsourcing has such a strong 
impact on productivity, and why it outperforms in-house IT in its impact on output. 
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7.2 SWIS comes with learning from the west and new IT 
 
The interviews in the 2009 fieldwork revealed two key contributions that SWIS 
projects uniquely bring to IT intensive firms: the application of knowledge from 
Western firms on how best to use IT in particular industries, and the use of innovative 
technologies. This section outlines these two contributions, explaining what benefits 
they bring to Indian firms. Before that though, the discussion provides a brief outline 
of sources of learning in IT firms. This is included here because it explains why the 
two benefits are uniquely associated with IT purchased from SWIS firms, and why 
they do not arise to the same extent when firms purchase their own in-house IT.  
 
Successful IT firms are engaged in a conscious effort to learn in both domestic and 
export markets. IT professionals, during the in-depth interviews, reported that their 
firms acquired two distinct sets of knowledge and experience: one from India, and the 
other from Western countries. They then used the gained knowledge and experience 
from one market to create case studies that help them to sell more projects in the 
other. Figure 7.11 illustrates this process. In the right-hand panel, which is concerned 
with IT companies’ undertaking projects in export markets, IT firms learn how 
leading firms in a particular industry use IT to benefit their specific businesses. To put 
this in the language of the experts, they accumulate “domain expertise”. This domain 
expertise is then bought back to India where domestic clients expect, and insist on, the 
IT firm being able to advise on how best to use IT.  
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Figure 7.11: A Virtuous Cycle of Learning for IT Firms in Export and Domestic Markets  
 
 
 
Source: Author’s summary of in-depth interviews. 
 
 
IT specialists in the in-depth interviews were quite clear that domestic market 
contracts, represented by the left-hand panel in Figure 7.12, also offer important 
lessons. In India, client firms are typically installing their first IT system; therefore the 
operation of any new system is not constrained by pre-existing or out-of-date “legacy” 
systems with which the new system must work. According to the interviewees, many 
Indian clients are also much more tolerant of a process of trial and error than export 
clients. These two factors, together with the proximity to the IT firms’ staff and base, 
make India an ideal place to trial new technologies.  
 
All of this learning and movement of knowledge means that Indian clients get both 
the benefits of Western domain expertise and the benefits of the latest IT innovation. 
These benefits are incredibly valuable to an Indian company buying IT. Domain 
expertise is important because, in many cases, the established firms that comprise the 
sector’s clients in developed countries have been using IT for longer than Indian 
firms. These established firms have far more experience using IT successfully and 
using complicated applications that have arisen over years of experimentation. A 
senior a vice president at NASSCOM put it this way: 
Innovate for size & complexity of India 
context – unconstrained by legacy 
systems. 
Use case study from India to secure deal 
with world-class IT using company 
Understand world’s best practice at using 
technology in a particular industry 
Act as advisor/consultant. Bring world 
best practice to India.  
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“We brought in a lot of experiences from our work with British Telecom, from 
our work with General Electric, our work with all the banks in the world, and 
now we are saying [to Indian firms], ‘Look guys, its time for you to pull up 
your socks.’” [Rajdeep Sarawat, 22 January 2009, Delhi]  
 
In the context of the literature on development, this opportunity to “pull up your 
socks” or, to put it another way, to gain parity with the technology used in Western 
firms, is both rare and precious (Chang, 2008). As with knowledge on other advanced 
uses of technology, domain expertise is context-specific, with decisions on how to use 
IT often being heavily dependent on the particular processes that a client follows. This 
means that it is difficult to codify the knowledge, and learning it requires experience 
in the client’s industry; or, at the very least, extensive face-to-face training from 
someone with that experience. In general, developed-country firms cannot be 
expected to willingly offer these insights directly to potential competitors in India. 
The fact that they have been willing to share with IT companies, who in turn apply the 
lessons in India, is an important and rare conduit of this kind of tacit knowledge. 
 
The value of Western domain expertise to Indian firms is further amplified by the fact 
that IT systems often have implications for processes throughout a firm’s operation, 
so that implementation of a new system can often mean pervasive restructuring 
(Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002: 342; Perez, 1985: 9). In this context, 
applying developed-country domain expertise not only involves IT itself, but possibly 
improvements in a great many of the firm’s processes. According to interviewees, this 
kind of restructuring can be difficult, but Indian IT firms are aware of both what to do 
in particular client industries and how to manage the process:  
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“Organisation change management…those kind of issues will be impediments 
in successful implementation of IT programmes in this country. Over the past 
20 years, these are issues we have seen in the Western world, and we know 
how to manage it; we have gone through this cycle.” [Rajesh Varrier, 24 
February 2009, Bangalore] 
 
Application of appropriate Western domain knowledge into IT and surrounding 
processes is not the only reason why SWIS projects are so successful in improving 
productivity and output. The other reason is the technological innovations being 
applied in India. It is worth paraphrasing here the evidence from Chapter 6 on the 
competitive advantages that Indian firms have enjoyed as a result of innovation for 
economies of scale initiated by SWIS companies working in the domestic market. On 
Indian mobile telephone companies, Kiran Karnik (Mumbai, 13 February 2009) said 
that SWIS innovations have already been responsible for Indian firms being able to 
charge lower prices than many of their competitors worldwide. He said that even with 
these low prices, Indian firms have been “incredibly profitable” because of the vast 
numbers of customers they provide call services to and economies of scale in their 
SWIS systems. The same low price, large scale business model has been adopted in 
Indian banking and Arindam Banerjii (Mumbai, 4 February 2009) said that it poses a 
significant threat to large multinational banks. He said that the threat arises because 
Indian banks already have millions of customers and their systems allow them to add 
a million more very easily. He also said that Indian banks can charge their customers 
a much lower price for banking services than Western banks because they have a 
lower cost of servicing customers as a result of more advanced technology.  
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But the benefits available from installing the latest versions of SWIS do not end there. 
Indian firms, by coming late to IT, have been able to take advantage of a whole range 
of other improvements in the technology too. Both IT consultants and clients of the IT 
sector agree that this has led to superior technologies being used in India versus the 
West: 
 
“India did not go through the same cycle of adoption that the UK and US did. 
India went from being a very low usage, fixed-line telephony environment 
straight into wireless, the same thing happened in television and it’s true of 
cars as well. We went from some very dirty cars to some very decent cars very 
quickly…. [I]n IT the same thing is happening; we didn’t go through 
mainframe as much as the West did. Everyone is on Java, everyone is aware of 
it. The technology is very modern.” [Vasu Rao, CEO of IT Company, 1 March 
2009, Bangalore] 
 
“India has skipped everything. If you are a late adopter, you can skip 
everything…. Late adopters can use the best technology.” [Sanjay Jain, Head 
of Process Improvement at an ITES-BPO firm, 23 January 2009, Gurgaon] 
 
The potential to overtake Western firms in terms of the quality of IT in use arises 
because investment choices in IT are path dependent. As adoption occurs, it 
influences the costs and benefits of subsequent purchases. The more accustomed a 
firm is to using a particular system, the higher is the cost of changing it: Employees 
have to be retrained and given time to become familiar with the new system, and, any 
processes or systems which depend on the one that is being changed also have to be 
re-designed. On the other hand, the benefits of not changing the IT system, but 
expanding the existing system are higher when the firm is already familiar with it 
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(Arthur, 1994). If path dependence like this is accompanied by fast technical change, 
as is the case with IT, it is problematic for early adopters and advantageous for late 
adopters. Early adopters become familiar with an early, inferior, version of the 
technology and so find it costly to replace that inferior version with a later and better 
type. Later adopters on the other hand go straight for the best version available. The 
president for the domestic market business for one of India’s biggest IT firms gave the 
example of the Bombay Stock Exchange to illustrate how this situation benefits late 
adopters of IT in India: 
 
“This is the third biggest stock market in the world…. The Bombay stock 
market does a higher throughput of transactions with one-third of [the] 
infrastructure [of] the New York Stock Exchange…. When the people from 
NASDAQ came in, we shared our best practices.” [S. Venkatramani, 17 
February 2009, Mumbai] 
 
To some extent, the benefits of having a blank slate upon which to build new IT 
systems are also available to Indian firms who buy IT without outsourcing it. 
However, it was clear from the interviewee comments that experimentation with new 
technologies is a costly and risky affair, and the sort that Indian companies rarely feel 
comfortable undertaking without advice. Mr Venkatramani said that his firm often 
undertakes projects in the domestic market using new technologies, at a great cost in 
terms of effort and expense. This is justified because knowledge of the new 
technology, and the demonstrated ability to use it successfully, is valuable in securing 
lucrative export market contracts which use the same, cutting edge, technologies: 
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“ [Digitising the Bombay Stock Exchange] was very complex, and we really 
worked hard on it, [and] we must have got at least 20 to 30 projects using that 
as a case study. It was a big learning experience, but we can proudly say [that] 
we did it, with customers saying ‘What a wonderful job you’ve done.’” [S. 
Venkatramani, 17 February 2009, Mumbai]  
 
According to these experts then, firms in India that purchase outsourced SWIS from 
the sector get two clear benefits over those that only purchase in-house IT: learning 
industry-specific uses of the technology from their competitors in the West, and using 
the newest technologies. Together, these two considerations explain why purchasing 
outsourced SWIS gives such a strong impact on output in the econometric estimates 
in Section 7.1. They also verify the finding there that rupee for rupee, SWIS 
outsourcing has a bigger impact on output in Indian IT intensive firms than in-house 
IT. The next section moves on from describing the processes by which SWIS impacts 
output to quantify the total impact of SWIS in different Indian sectors and in the 
economy as a whole.  
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7.3 SWIS use is responsible for significant services-led economic 
growth 
 
This section reports the results of using the elasticity estimates from Section 7.1 to 
identify the impact of SWIS outsourcing in the different sectors that purchase SWIS 
and on India’s economic growth. The work in this part of the project used a simple 
methodology. Growth rates of real expenditures on SWIS were calculated for each 
year that the econometric study covered. These growth rates were then multiplied by 
the two estimated elasticities (OLS and IV-FE) from the study to give a range for the 
total number of percentage points of economic growth100 or growth in per-firm output 
by sector attributable to investment into SWIS.  
 
Figure 7.12 begins by applying this methodology to growth rates of per-firm 
expenditure on SWIS between 2005 and 2008 for each of the major sectors in the 
PROWESS sample. For each sector plotted along the x-axis, the vertical line shows 
the range of average per firm output growth implied by the estimates. The top of each 
line stops at the growth rate implied by the OLS elasticity estimate, and the bottom of 
each line stops at the rate implied by the IV-FE estimate. It is firms in services sectors 
that have expanded their purchases of SWIS the most during this period, and so it is in 
these sectors that the strongest per-firm growth from SWIS purchasing has been 
experienced. The sectors in the sample with the highest average per-firm growth rates 
attributable to SWIS purchasing are communications, hotels, media and films, 
transport, wholesale and other services.  
 
                                                 
100
 To get a true contribution to GDP growth rates, the estimates also have to be converted to growth in 
value-added. This is accomplished using the value-added percentage from the PROWESS data. 
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Figure 7.12: Estimated Per Firm Growth by Sector in PROWESS Sample 
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Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
 
For an estimate of the impact of SWIS use on GDP, it is possible to use the OLS and 
IV-FE elasticities in tandem with data on macro-level expenditure on SWIS provided 
by NASSCOM (and graphed in Figure 5.15). The NASSCOM data on SWIS 
spending is not a measure of all expenditure on outsourced IT in India, because it only 
covers the revenues of NASSCOM’s own members. Chapter 4 provided a detailed 
discussion of this dataset which concluded that it is a strong measure of forward 
linkages from large, registered IT firms but excludes all activity by informal101 and 
small IT firms. What this means is that estimating the aggregate impact of forward 
linkages using NASSCOM spending data specifically limits attention to the impact of 
forward linkages from large and registered IT firms. It is a restriction that is 
unfortunate in one way, but not in another. On the one hand it means the resulting 
estimate completely ignores the informal sector which may well be both big and 
                                                 
101
 Informal refers to firms that are unregistered with the Government of India for the purposes of 
paying taxation. Formal refers to firms which are registered with the Government. 
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important. On the other hand though, it helps in alleviating any concern that the 
elasticity in the rest of the economy might be different to that measured in the 
PROWESS sample: Restricting attention to estimating the macro-level impact of 
NASSCOM members’ forward linkages means it is possible to use NASSCOM’s 
knowledge to identify characteristics of their members’ clients. It turns out that this 
matches the profile of firms in the PROWESS dataset, so that there is some 
justification for applying the elasticities estimated in Section 7.1 to the national level 
NASSCOM spending figures.  
 
The PROWESS dataset covers a large sample drawn from a subset of Indian firms 
which are listed on stock markets and publish financial reports. As mentioned above, 
these are predominantly large- and middle-size firms and together they produce a 
large proportion of the output of the formal, tax-paying, sector. It is reasonable to 
apply the elasticity estimated from the PROWESS dataset to the NASSCOM figures 
if NASSCOM’s members’ clients are also mainly large- or medium-size firms and are 
formally registered with the taxation authorities in India.  
 
Figure 7.13: Firm-size Structure of NASSCOM members’ clients 
 
Source: NASSCOM (2009a: 87) 
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During the in-depth interviews Rajdeep Sarawat, a vice-president of NASSCOM, 
sketched a diagram of a pyramid which was later published in NASSCOM’s 2009 
strategic review, and which is reproduced in Figure 7.13. Based on knowing the 
make-up of NASSCOM members’ clients, he made it clear that, so far, the majority of 
these clients are large, and the minority are of medium-size. 
 
“At the end of 1990s to the middle of the 2000s, this class of firms [pointing at 
the top of pyramid], this enterprise class… the Tata Steels, the Reliances of 
the world, and all, these guys went into overdrive of getting into productivity 
improvements. Firms…started looking at IT as a big lever to transform…. As 
we go down this pyramid, the IT adoption starts dropping. [Interview 
question: Does it drop quite quickly?] Very radically. Forget about quickly; 
it’s a steep drop, and today the medium- and the small-firms, the “SME’s”. I 
call it MSME, micro-small and medium-size enterprises [which] do not have 
IT. There is this entire set of millions of small firms…employing 10 people, 
20 people, who are just doing something like producing widgets with one or 
two machines….  So the challenge for our industry in India is how do I get IT 
here?” [Pointing to the lower half of the pyramid.] (22 January 2009, Delhi) 
 
Dennis Rajakumar, another expert with experience of research amongst small, 
informal sector firms, agreed with this sentiment. He said that it is a well-known fact 
that smaller and, in particular, unregistered firms do not usually work with 
NASSCOM members because deals with formal sector IT firms are one way of being 
discovered by authorities, something that unregistered firms seek to avoid:  
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“The problem in our country is…people are scared of registering their firms, 
because the moment you are registered, you [come] under this kind of taxman; 
you [come] under the scam of this type, that type, and so on. Each firm ex-post 
has to face the provisions related to a number of parliamentary acts [and] 
nobody wants to take that risk…. These small guys will also not work with 
NASSCOM members. This is an obvious place for the taxman to start 
looking…. They [small unregistered firms] will work with unregistered IT 
firms. There are a number of guys catering to this market, and this market is 
not small… it is a huge market, a huge market [stressing the word huge], but 
there are huge number of [unregistered IT company] players, and their 
revenues are not at all large.” 
 
Another reason is that NASSCOM members offer SWIS at a price point too high for 
many small firms. Dennis Rajakumar continued: 
 
“If they [small informal firms] want to have some IT solution, why should 
they go to some big companies…their pricing is very high… For them, the 
best thing is when a small guy says, ‘I will develop some product, I’ve got 
something special for you, and I am going to charge 50-60 thousand rupees.’ 
Larger companies would not care to get into this kind of segment… [Interview 
question: For the small unregistered IT company, it is a better business 
prospect?] Sure. Some of their friends…introduce them… [and then they] do 
the pilot testing, and they know that this is the requirement, but [the] product 
is not meeting their [the client’s] requirements…so they keep improving, 
improving, and they don’t have big overheads, and they don’t have a number 
of clients to attend to simultaneously, they only have this one client….so they 
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struggle, struggle, struggle and come out with the perfect fit model that takes 
care of the requirements of that client. If they are successful, then what 
happens is word keeps spreading.” [25 February 2009, Bangalore] 
 
Taken at face value, Rajdeep Sarawat and Dennis Rajakumar’s comments suggest that 
the type of firms in the PROWESS database are a reasonable match for the type of 
firms which become NASSCOM members’ clients in India. It is therefore appropriate 
to apply the elasticity from the analysis above to the NASSCOM data. Figure 7.14 
performs this exercise.  
 
Figure 7.14: Estimating the Macro-level of Impact of Forward Linkages 
Real aggregate spend 
on SWIS*
Growth in SWIS 
Spending
Lower Limit       
(IV-FE)
Upper Limit 
(OLS)
2005 Rs. 25,600 35% 1.6% 3.1%
2006 Rs. 34,390 34% 1.6% 3.1%
2007 Rs. 44,438 29% 1.4% 2.6%
2008 Rs. 48,885 10% 0.5% 0.9%
2005-2008 
(Average) 27% 1.3% 2.4%
Implied GDP Percentage Points
 
Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). Athreye (2005: 34); Hanna (1994: 100); Heeks 
(1999b:2); Kenney and Dossani (2002: 237); Kumar & Joseph (2005: 94); NASSCOM (2008a:1), 
NASSCOM (2009a: 6,203), NASSCOM (2011:7,8); Sridharan (2004b: 34,37). 
Notes: *Spending on SWIS is measured using revenues for NASSCOM members in the domestic 
market and are published in US dollars. These have been converted to Rs. Crore using exchange rates 
published by RBI (2011) and deflated as described in Appendix A2. 
 
The second column in Figure 7.14 reproduces the figures for macro-level forward 
linkages from the formal SWIS sector from Figure 5.15. The third column shows 
percentage growth rates in these figures and the two columns on the right then apply 
the elasticities from Section 7.1 to these growth rates to obtain estimates of the 
implied contribution to GDP102. What these final two columns show is that between 
2005 and 2008 forward linkages from the SWIS sector contributed an average of 
                                                 
102
 The GDP growth rates are the implied growth rates for gross output scaled down to reflect value 
added.  
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between 1.3 and 2.4 percentage points, or between 10% and 20%, of total GDP 
growth.  
 
To put this contribution into context, Figures 7.15 and 7.16 graph macro-level real 
GDP growth rates and TFP growth. It is clear from both charts that starting in the 
mid-2000s, around the same time as the acceleration in forward linkages noted in 
Chapter 5, both measures have shown consistently improved performance. What the 
findings of this section suggest is that at least some of this improvement in 
macroeconomic outcomes can be attributed to the rise in domestic forward linkages 
from the SWIS sector.  
 
Figure 7.15: GDP Growth Rates 1990-91 to 2010-11 in Constant 1999–00 Prices 
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Source: MOSPI (2010). 
Notes: Financial years run April to April. Market prices. 
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Figure 7.16: Total Factor Productivity Growth, 1950–2007 
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Source: Bhalla (2009: 37) 
 
 
Figure 7.17: Breakdown of Economic Growth by Sector, 2002–03 to 2007–08 
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The set of data in Figure 7.17 verifies this. It shows the sector-wise breakdown of 
economic growth during the period from 2002-03 to 2007-08. A large proportion of 
economic growth has come from the sectors identified in figure 5.21 (for 2003-04) 
and figure 5.22 (for 2006-07) using both NASSCOM and GOI data as being large 
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purchasers of SWIS in India (in particular, manufacturing, financial services, 
communications and retail). In conclusion, it seems evident that the purchasing and 
usage of SWIS has made an important contribution to accelerated economic growth at 
the macro-level since 2005-06. 
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7.4 Conclusion: Important findings and a rich vein of new research 
 
This chapter has found a strong impact of forward linkages from the SWIS sector into 
India’s domestic economy. Even using the most conservative estimates from the 
econometric modelling exercise in Section 7.1, the results find that amongst large- 
and medium-size firms listed on India’s stock markets outsourcing was responsible 
for a 20% increase in output per firm between 2005 and 2008. In aggregate, the 
analysis in Section 7.3 also finds that forward linkages from the formal SWIS sector 
have been responsible for between 1.3 and 2.4 percentage points of GDP growth. 
These estimated returns are large, relative to several different benchmarks. The most 
obvious of these is that the return is large relative to the cost of purchasing SWIS. The 
gross marginal product arising from the estimated elasticity of SWIS to output is 
Rs.11 crore for an additional Rs. 1 crore spent. This is a significantly higher return 
than the same firms achieve from purchasing in-house IT. At the margin, an 
additional Rs. 1 crore of in-house hardware and/or software assets returns a very 
respectable, but significantly lower, Rs. 8 crore. Relative to benchmarks in the 
literature, the same themes emerge. The elasticity for in-house IT is below the mean 
in a meta-study of developed country studies by Stiroh (2002). This suggests that 
Indian firms achieve less return with in-house IT than do their developed country 
competitors. The elasticity on SWIS outsourcing, on the other hand, is much higher 
than Stiroh’s mean, suggesting that amongst the firms in the study, SWIS outsourcing 
may be instrumental in bringing parity between Indian and Western firms’ technology 
use. This hypothesis is supported by the qualitative data outlined in Section 7.2. The 
in-depth interviewing found that purchasing SWIS from the sector enables Indian 
firms to significantly gain from the years of knowledge of Western firms about how to 
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use IT in particular industries. Equally important, it also enables Indian firms to utilise 
the newest technologies. 
 
The work contained in this chapter contributes to the two strands of literature 
introduced in Chapter 2. To the literature on output and productivity effects of 
outsourcing, it contributes the first developing-country study and the first study of IT 
outsourcing separated from other services. Perhaps because of this latter difference, 
the explanation for the productivity improvements measured is different here to that 
given in the rest of the literature on outsourcing. Where it refers to outsourcing of 
components, materials or non-IT related services, qualitative explanations of 
productivity improvements in the literature usually focus on re-structuring and the 
removal of low productivity work from the firm. In the current research, learning 
from partners seems to be much more important. In this respect, IT outsourcing has 
revealed itself to be different from normal outsourcing, suggesting that, in future 
studies of outsourcing, it needs to be divided from, not combined with, outsourcing of 
components or other services.  
 
To the literature on the impact of IT, this chapter contributes one of the few pieces of 
research focussed on developing countries, and contributes the first research with a 
large sample size and with complementary qualitative research. Perhaps more 
importantly, it investigated the role of SWIS outsourcing and identified problems that 
arise if it is not included in studies of in-house IT. In Section 7.1, a significant bias 
was found in the elasticity of in-house IT when SWIS outsourcing was excluded. It 
may be that this issue is also relevant in other countries and contexts, particularly in 
other developing countries, and that there is a need to re-evaluate or re-design 
research methodologies in these cases.  
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This chapter has touched on several other avenues for further research worth 
mentioning here. In Section 7.3, IT firms’ learning in export markets and how that 
learning is dispersed in India is discussed. This topic is worthy of further investigation 
because the learning activities of IT companies are a rare and important avenue for 
tacit learning to cross borders. There are also several interesting avenues for further 
research using the PROWESS database. A fuller investigation of productivity in 
Indian firms is one of these, as is a more granular investigation of returns to IT and 
SWIS outsourcing at the sector level. These other avenues for future research are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 8. The chapter also includes a summary of the role of 
the SWIS sector in India’s economy as a synthesis of the themes and research 
discussed so far, and some thoughts on the future for IT in India. 
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8. Discussion and Conclusions  
8.1 In conclusion, IT is a leading sector in India 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that, despite all the pessimism, the Indian IT industry is 
a leading sector in India. The research project identified and quantified the size and 
strength of different linkage mechanisms. Chapter 5 found that backwards linkages 
from IT firms’ purchases were worth 2% of 2005-06 GDP and that IT workers’ 
purchasing patterns contributed a further 0.6-0.75%. Chapter 7 discussed forward 
linkages from SWIS, and estimated that because of their strong impact on output, 
these linkages contributed 1.3 to 2.4 percentage points (or 10% to 20%) of GDP 
growth in the years between 2005 and 2007.  
Figure 8.1: Conservative Estimate of the Total Contribution of the IT Sector to GDP in 2005–06 
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Source: “Direct” is from Figure 3.2. Total backwards and demand linkages are from Figures 5.4 and 
5.7. Forward linkages have been calculated using the results in Figure 7.14. 
Notes: Hardware manufacture is excluded. Estimate of the impact of forward linkages is only from 
SWIS and excludes indirect linkages. When a range of different values was suggested by previous 
chapters, the midpoint of this range is plotted here. 
 
There are several reasons why these estimates may understate the impact of the IT 
industry in India’s economy. The first reason is that for backwards and demand 
linkages, the estimates are five years old (the most recent estimates in Chapter 5 are 
 268 
from 2005-06), and for the last five years (2005-06 to 2010-11), the sector has 
continued to increase rapidly in size. The second is that for reasons laid out in Chapter 
4, these estimates ignore the informal IT sector (that is, firms not registered with the 
GOI). Finally, the estimate of the impact of forward linkages, taken from the 
econometric work in Chapter 7, does not include any impact arising from indirect 
linkages. This is important because indirect forward linkages may have a substantial 
impact. When IT is used to deliver, for example, health advice or education, it is a 
conduit of investment into human capital (UNGAID, 2006). Similarly, familiarity 
with communications tools can lead to improved political debate and participation, 
and can be a driver of good governance and better decision making at national level 
(United Nations, 2010). In non-democratic countries this kind of debate can even lead 
to the emergence of democracy itself (Sen, 1999). Notwithstanding these 
considerations, Figure 8.1 collates the different contributions of the IT sector to GDP 
for 2005-06. It shows that in that year, the total impact of the sector on GDP (at 
10.1%) was over double the size of the sector’s own output (at 4.6%). It also shows 
that even in that early year, and even using conservative estimates, a total of 10.1% of 
GDP was attributable to the IT sector.  
 
Of all the parts that comprise this substantial contribution, forward linkages from 
SWIS are the most likely to lead to sustainable growth. Chapter 7 showed that 
installing SWIS in firms leads to improvements in productivity. This produces a more 
sustainable pattern of growth because, as argued in Chapter 1, productivity 
improvements can put industries on to the ‘high road’: Firms that compete through 
improving productivity, rather than through low costs and slim margins, earn profits 
that can be reinvested into their business. If they do this, they can embark on a 
virtuous circle of further upgrading, which in turn secures and improves their 
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competitive position on an on-going basis. As long as there is sufficient demand for 
the firm’s products, expansion can continue. Demand is likely to be strong for India’s 
SWIS-buying industries, at least in the medium-term. Both IT itself and many of 
India’s SWIS-buying sectors are income elastic, and continue to have a large and 
growing share in world trade (Portugal-Perez, Reyes, and Wilson, 2010: 1).  
 
If growth arising from the SWIS sector’s forward linkages is both substantial and 
sustainable, then the question of how and why these forward linkages arose is 
paramount. The thesis answered this question by documenting and explaining how the 
technology became appropriate for India. Chapter 6 gave a detailed analysis of how 
SWIS is used in Indian firms and, in particular, the returns to scale of software 
systems. It found a match between attributes of the technology and recently emerged 
attributes of India’s economy and society. This match meant SWIS was appropriate 
for India because it enabled companies to provide low-cost, quality products to price-
conscious consumers on a large scale. This not only allowed Indian companies to find 
more demand for their products, it also, in many cases, led to price cuts that were 
beneficial for Indian consumers. In uncovering and explaining this process, Chapter 6 
provided an empirical demonstration of a widespread appropriateness of IT in a 
developing country, therefore making a significant contribution to the literature on IT 
and development reviewed in Chapter 2.  
 
These main conclusions of the research project, combined with other themes threaded 
through the preceding chapters, have several important implications for economic 
principles and policy. These are covered in Section 8.2, while Section 8.3 lays out an 
agenda for future research, and Section 8.4 brings the thesis to a close. 
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8.2 Implications for Economic Principles and Policy 
 
Software, services and the pattern of India’s economic growth 
 
This thesis is supportive of the idea that services sectors such as finance, 
communications, hotels, transport, wholesale and retail trade, and IT can be the 
engine of India’s economic growth both now and in the future. Chapter 5 included 
data that demonstrated that it is the services sectors which are the main buyers of 
outsourced SWIS. Chapter 7 went on to demonstrate that because of this large 
investment, it is these sectors which experience the biggest per firm improvements in 
output and productivity. In a supplementary analysis, Chapter 7 also included separate 
models of the production functions in services and in manufacturing. These identified 
significantly higher output elasticities for both SWIS outsourcing and in-house IT in 
services firms versus manufacturers. Finally, the case study on one services industry, 
SWIS, in this thesis has found evidence of many linkages which have positive effects 
on other industries. This adds to the evidence of Hansda (2001) and Dasgupta and 
Singh (2005) who both also found that services sectors have strong growth enhancing 
externalities.  
 
This evidence points to an optimistic prognosis for ongoing expansion in India’s 
services industries. It is these sectors who, as a result of purchasing SWIS, can 
compete on the basis of a technological lead. In turn it is they who have the 
opportunity to enter into a ‘high road’ pattern of growth and a virtuous circle of 
investment and upgrading (Guiliani, Pietrobeli and Rabelotti, 2005: 550; Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2000: 4). If they capitalise on this opportunity, India’s services firms 
will not only be more profitable, they will also have a more sustainable business than 
firms in other sectors which compete on the basis of low wages and slim margins. 
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Demand for services is also likely to be strong over the coming years. Services 
continue to be the fastest growing sector of the world economy (McCartney, 
2010:108) and empirical studies have confirmed that demand in many service sectors 
is income elastic (Falvey and Gemmell, 2005). If the neo-Schumpeterian authors 
introduced in Section 2.1.1 are correct, future demand for services can be relied upon 
for many years to come. They predict that a global restructuring of economic activity 
in favour of exactly the type of activity that takes place in IT-intensive services 
sectors is underway, and is set to last for forty to sixty years. 
 
The new findings also shed light on two mysteries that were introduced in Chapter 2. 
The first was data by Poddar and Yi (2007:8) which showed Indian services sectors 
experiencing stronger total factor productivity (TFP) growth than manufacturing 
despite both Smith (1776) and Marx (1887) having predicted that for fundamental 
reasons manufacturing should be the more productive of the two. What the new 
evidence in this thesis adds to this debate is an explanation of why TFP growth is so 
strong in these Indian service industries - it is because of investment into IT. The 
thesis also contributes an understanding of why Smith and Marx were unable to 
predict India’s recent pattern of growth. IT simply hadn’t been invented when they 
were writing. The second mystery surrounded India’s experience of structural change. 
Evidence was presented in Chapter 2 which showed that as the share of agriculture in 
India’s GDP has diminished, it is services sectors which have grown to fill the gap 
and not manufacturing. It was noted that this stood out in stark contrast to the 
experience of the now developed countries (Rostow, 1960), and the question was 
posed as to whether this could possibly be as successful as the usual, manufacturing 
based, route. On this possibility, the current research gives reasons for optimism. In 
turn it is suggestive of a general policy implication for developing countries: 
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Development based on services rather than manufacturing may well offer an 
alternative, and in some cases preferable, route to prosperity. 
 
The next section moves on from the implications for India and begins to discuss some 
implications of the current research for economic theory. 
 
Not all production is equal: some sectors are better than others 
 
The most obvious implication for economic theory is the thesis’ finding that particular 
leading sectors are important. The research project has found that the expansion of the 
IT sector in India has successfully transmitted growth to other sectors through linkage 
effects. It has provided a case study which demonstrates, just as Hirschman (1958) 
predicted, that leading sectors can bring about growth. The thesis has also shown that 
in India, the IT sector and its forward linkages are bringing to the Indian economy a 
totally new and highly technical type of production. Prior to the sector’s inception, 
and in accordance with the profile of India’s endowments103, India had very little 
expertise in IT and, therefore, carried out very little production in an IT intensive way. 
Thirty years later, India has strong companies which compete successfully in world 
markets in both IT production and production using IT. It is a compelling 
confirmation of the power of leading sectors and linkages. If the leading sector 
strategy can bring growth using a new and demanding technology in a country with 
no experience of using that technology, and with the wrong endowments, it will 
surely be useful in less demanding scenarios.  
 
In providing support to the idea that growth in leading, highly linked sectors is 
superior to growth in other sectors, the thesis has implications for an idea which 
                                                 
103
 Mayer and Wood (1999) find that India’s endowments are suitable for labour-intensive 
manufacturing.  
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pervades the modern practice of macroeconomics. This is the belief that it is possible 
to simply add up all economic activity in a country, and to treat the aggregate quantity 
(GDP) as one thing to be explained and perhaps targeted through use of policy. What 
leading sectors tell us is that applications of this idea will give misleading results. For 
example, econometric models that link macro-level growth to macro-level causal 
variables over time treat output increases in every period as equally valuable. When 
leading sectors are important, this is an invalid assumption. Expansion in a leading 
sector, which might occur in only a subset of the time periods under consideration, 
may bring more expansion in the future, whilst expansion in another sector at another 
time does not. A similar criticism can be levelled at the use of theoretical models that 
use linear aggregations of micro-foundations to understand the macro economy. In 
assuming that a group of firms, individuals, or sectors will all do the same thing in 
reaction to a particular stimulus, these models effectively rule out the possibility that 
one firm, individual, or sector may react to the actions of another. When linkage 
effects are important in driving macro-outcomes, this can only be described as a 
disastrous thinking (Hausman 2009; Kirman 1997).  
 
Another implication of the leading sector strategy concerns the relationship between 
growth and inequality. Leading sectors drive spurts in economic growth that are 
concentrated in particular linked sectors and, hence, amongst particular types of 
workers and in particular geographies. In the current case study the leading sector and 
the other sectors that buy from it either produce or use IT. Therefore, there is a need 
for skilled workers, which means that poor, uneducated people are effectively 
excluded104. If this pattern turns out to be relevant more generally, it can constitute 
                                                 
104
 Section 2.2.2 explains why IT-intensive firms need more highly skilled workers; this is also 
documented in Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002). 
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one explanation for an empirical regularity which has become increasingly visible in 
recent years: starting in the 1980s, growth has come with rising inequality (Cornia and 
Addison, 2003; Palma, 2011) and the world is now more unequal than it once was 
(Figure 8.2).  
 
Figure 8.2: Gini coefficient (y-axis) versus inequality ranking (x-axis) in 1985 and 2005 
 
Source: Palma (2011: 90). 
Note: Ma is Malaysia; US is USA; Br is Brazil. 
 
If leading sector growth is important to the stories behind these figures, then the 
current case study could add an important strand to the global debate. Not only would 
India’s experience provide a new explanation for rising inequality, but the country’s 
relatively long history with an IT related leading sector might offer lessons to other 
countries on how inequality associated with leading sectors evolves. Over the 
medium- to long-term, the IT sector in India has begun to locate in disadvantaged 
areas. It has also seen the emergence of substantial domestic backwards linkages 
which, as the discussion in Chapter 5 showed, predominantly benefit low-skilled 
workers. In other words, because of backwards linkages, unequal growth in India has 
begun to “trickle down,” as Kuznets (1955) predicted.  
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What all of these considerations have in common is that they suggest a much larger 
role for the meso-level both in the theory and the practice of economics. This sub-
section has argued that if leading sectors are important, meso-level analysis is likely 
to provide a good understanding of macro-level quantities like growth and inequality. 
Meso-analysis is also likely to be helpful for policymakers, particularly in identifying 
potential leading sectors and providing the right kind of policy to support them. The 
next sub-section discusses what policymakers should do to encourage leading sector 
growth, and highlights the implications of the current meso-level case study on this 
issue. 
 
Government versus markets is a false dichotomy: both must play a part 
 
This thesis provides a case study not only of the importance of SWIS as a leading 
sector, but also of how expansion in that leading sector came about. In this latter 
respect it is a case study that sheds light on a controversy which still exists between 
the two authors who advocate leading sectors introduced in Chapter 1. Hirschman 
(1958) and Hausmann along (with various coauthors) disagree on (1) how leading 
sectors should be chosen and (2) who should provide the investment that leads to 
expansion in them. On both counts, Hirschman points to the government. He says that 
the state should choose leading sectors by reference to statistical analysis (of the kind 
included in Chapter 5) and then provide investment directly to them (1958:203). He 
also says that the government should ensure that growth in the leading sector can 
continue by investing into sector-specific complementary public goods (such as ports, 
highways and electricity) (p. 83-97). Rodrick and Hausmann’s (2006) position is very 
different. They argue that governments have neither the information nor the incentives 
to choose the correct leading sectors, or to identify and implement the right types of 
investments into them (p. 29). Aside from providing general, multipurpose, public 
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goods, governments should do nothing more than initiate a period of consultation with 
private sector actors. This consultation should have the objective of identifying 
opportunities for investment and finding private sector volunteers willing to make 
those investments (p. 31). The process is expected to elicit superior information by 
identifying investment opportunities in which private sector entrepreneurs see 
potential profit (p. 31). It is also expected to excuse the government from making the 
kinds of investments that Rodrik and Hausmann think are outside of any 
government’s purview to implement and manage.  
 
Section 3.3 addressed this government versus market controversy by providing a 
critical review of the literature on the emergence and growth of the IT sector in India. 
The discussion found that despite most of the literature agreeing with either 
Hirschman or Hausman (and coauthors) in this debate neither of the two positions can 
explain the sector’s trajectory on its own. The position of this research is that there 
was a particular chain of events which led to the IT sector establishing itself in India. 
To begin, starting in the 1950s, the Government of India provided substantial 
investment in education in engineering and related subjects. This created a later 
comparative advantage in SWIS at a time when, because of the nature and life stage 
of the technology, global demand was outstripping the ability of the developed 
countries to supply it. These two circumstances—historical government investment 
into engineering education and global demand for SWIS—created a market 
opportunity in exporting IT services and it was this opportunity, exploited by the 
private sector, which led to the SWIS sector’s emergence and early success. As for the 
government’s later involvement, this was generally unhelpful or neutral in the early 
days of the industry because the aim of policy was to support a hardware 
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manufacturing sector and SWIS was largely ignored. Once the SWIS industry was 
clearly more viable than hardware, the direction of policy switched to being helpful to 
SWIS rather than hardware and this was generally successful in helping to build the 
sector.  
 
The current case study cannot, therefore, support either side of the divide between 
Hirschman (1958) and Hausman and Rodrik (2006) on policy implications. In 
accordance with Hausman and Rodrik’s predictions, the GOI did not actually select 
the correct leading sector (SWIS) to target with policy, but it was close in picking 
hardware. On the other hand, and in line with Hirschman’s proscribed role, the 
government did later take several important actions which supported the sector. A 
similarly contingent story applies to the role of the market and private sector actors. 
Without private entrepreneurs, India’s comparative advantage in SWIS would not 
have been sufficiently exploited to provide such impressive growth in exports. Then 
again, there would have been no opportunity for the private sector to exploit if a 
comparative advantage for SWIS had not been created as a result of the historical GOI 
investment in education. In summary, then, this case study is one in which 
development has been supported by a successful interplay of government intervention 
and market forces, with both working in the same direction. It has also occurred in the 
context of some special circumstances relating to the nature and life-stage of the 
technology which ensured strong and growing demand. The existing debate on the 
emergence of the SWIS sector, arguing strongly for either government or market is, 
therefore, misleading. There is a need for a more balanced and nuanced approach to 
the question of how this leading sector came to be so successful both in export 
markets and at home. 
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The tendency of the literature to focus on government versus market is not limited to 
discussions on leading sectors, and it doesn’t arise from any particular features of 
them. The controversy between Hirschman and Hausman and Rodrik (2006) on policy 
can be explained by an understanding of wider trends in thinking about economics. In 
the 1950s, when Hirschman wrote his book, the prevailing wisdom was that 
postcolonial governments in developing countries were both capable of and interested 
in enacting successful development-oriented policy. More recently, and because of the 
perceived failure in that earlier period, mainstream economics moved to the other, 
pro-market, extreme. Hausman and Rodrik (2006) is simply one example of this 
extreme thinking: that governments are for several endemic reasons incapable of 
identifying and successfully carrying out sector-specific industrial policy. A full 
consideration of this thinking, and the reasons given to support it, falls outside of the 
scope of the current work. However, in showing that the government intentionally and 
successfully played a role in the SWIS sector’s success, the current case study 
suggests that the swing to a pro-market ideology in mainstream economics went too 
far.  
 
 “It’s the demand side, stupid” 
 
Contributions in the literature on the emergence and growth of the IT sector are not 
the only ones which have been queried during the research project. The new research 
in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 made it clear that the accepted literature on the sector’s 
linkages, reviewed in Chapter 3, also has serious shortcomings. This sub-section takes 
another look at both of these two literatures in the light of all the data collected and 
analysed in this project. In the case of the literature on the emergence and growth of 
the sector it asks ‘In focussing on governments versus markets, which important 
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drivers did this literature miss? And, in the literature on linkages, why did the two 
most influential analyses of forward linkages, Dahlman & Utz (2005) and D’Costa 
(2003) get their predictions so wrong? The answer to both of these questions is 
demand. IT is relatively new, and has several unique and valuable characteristics, and 
there is a great demand for it and for the products which embody it.  
 
The literature on the IT sector’s emergence misses this point because it pays little if 
any attention to the importance of demand for IT workers in the developed world and 
why that demand was so strong. Section 2.1.1 discussed in detail the trajectory of 
investment in the United States and Europe in IT in the late 1980s and 1990s. The 
literature review there found that the speed of uptake in that period was dramatic: 
technological advances and improvements in semi-conductor technology meant that 
what was achievable with IT for a given expenditure was improving very quickly. 
Additionally, IT could be used in myriad ways, including raising productivity in many 
industries. These attributes of IT and of that period in its lifecycle meant there were a 
great number of firms and consumers in Western economies wanting to purchase it. 
Chapter 2 concluded that the resulting speed of uptake was too fast to be matched by 
output of suitably qualified staff in developed countries, thus leading to a shortage of 
IT workers. In India, by coincidence, historical government policy (which set out to 
create heavy industry in the country) had created a pool of English speaking 
university educated engineers. The beginning of the IT industry in India was sparked 
when it became clear that there was profit in sending these engineers to Western 
countries for work, or having them work remotely on Western IT problems. True, 
India had a comparative advantage in providing IT workers to developed countries, 
but this would not have been enough if IT had not been so new, fast-changing, and 
pervasive. Without the large, worldwide demand for IT, there would have been no 
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urgency for it in developed countries, and India’s engineers would not have been 
deployed.   
 
A similar criticism can be levelled at the literature on forward linkages. Chapter 3 
introduced two influential contributions which provided explanations for the lack of 
forward linkages from the IT sector into India (Dahlman and Utz, 2005; D’Costa, 
2003). These publications led to a gloomy prognosis that it was unlikely that forward 
linkages would emerge in the near future. These two contributions were re-evaluated 
in Chapter 6 in the light of the findings of the project. The research found that despite 
these two analyses resting on very different methods and ideologies, they both 
concentrated almost exclusively on the supply side. For this reason, neither was able 
to explain the actual trajectory of forward linkages. The market-oriented model of 
Dahlman and Utz (2005), and the Marxist model of D’Costa (2003), both analysed the 
most likely location for the supply of SWIS and IT-intensive products and services for 
world markets. Both analyses had the implication that this was, and would likely 
continue to be, the developed world. In paying scant attention to the special features 
of the technology, in particular its attributes when deployed over scale, both missed 
the possibility that IT might become appropriate for India and, therefore, demand for 
IT-intensive products might arise there. In turn, both missed the possibility that Indian 
firms producing for domestic markets might begin to install SWIS in large volumes.  
 
The omission of the decisive role of demand in the existing literature on Indian IT is 
important for three reasons. The first is that there are clear theoretical reasons why 
demand is more important than supply for the location and growth of IT-intensive 
sectors, and as argued in chapter 6, this case study when properly understood offers 
empirical validation of these theories. The second is that there are lessons for other 
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developing countries. If analyses of which sectors developing countries can and 
cannot succeed in do not consider demand, they risk ruling out as improbable or 
unlikely, trajectories which could offer a beneficial pattern of growth, and even 
structural change. Finally, as explored in more detail in the next section, it is through 
an examination of the demand side that the features of the technology, which made it 
a good leading sector, are revealed.  
 
Pervasive, new, and productivity-boosting products make leading sectors 
 
This sub-section details the characteristics of IT, as a product and as a technology for 
production, which contributed to it being a successful leading sector in India. Some of 
these have already been highlighted in this chapter. The sub-section directly above 
found that two characteristics of IT were important for the early demand in the West 
and, therefore, for bringing the Indian sector into being: innovation and myriad uses. 
Together, these factors led to a vigorous uptake of IT in the West, which directly led 
to a demand for India’s educated workers. Another two important characteristics were 
highlighted in Section 8.1. The first arose from the discussion of why forward 
linkages have expanded so quickly in India. There it was found that without 
economies of scale resulting from software code being free for its owners to copy, 
very fast growth in domestic forward linkages would not have occurred. The second 
was the productivity-enhancing capabilities of SWIS. These are the main reason why 
forward linkages from the sector are successful at expanding output in SWIS-buying 
sectors. They have also been essential in putting India’s SWIS-buying industries onto 
the ‘high road’, or in other words, bringing about a desirable, and sustainable, pattern 
of growth. 
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These are not the only features of the technology which have been important, 
however. Chapter 7 found that the impact of forward linkages on productivity and 
output in Indian firms was stronger than the impact of in-house IT either in India or in 
Western countries. Section 7.3 explained this finding, and the two reasons given rest 
heavily on two particular attributes of the technology: that IT is constantly improving 
and that it is appropriate for outsourcing. In India, the SWIS sector often installs IT 
into firms that previously have not experienced IT. Unlike in developed countries, 
there are no compromises or changes needed to make the new system compatible with 
legacy or dated systems already in place, because there are no systems in place. For 
this reason, IT systems installed in India are often superior to those in used in the 
West. This over-taking in terms of the technical quality of systems comes about 
because of a process which has long been observed with new technologies 
experiencing continuing innovation and improvement in IT (Abramovitz, 1986). That 
is, because the technology continues to be improved, newer systems implemented 
later are better than the older ones which are in use amongst early adopters. The 
second reason for superior returns from SWIS arises from IT being an ideal service 
for successful Western companies to outsource. Section 7.3 found that Indian firms 
that buy IT from the sector have the opportunity to learn about how best to implement 
IT from their IT outsourcing partners. Because these firms also undertake SWIS 
outsourcing projects in western economies, these lessons are very valuable. IT firms 
are experts on how IT should and should not be used in particular industries. They 
have accumulated “domain knowledge” through export projects in Western countries, 
and they regularly apply this knowledge in Indian companies.  
 
If features of the product are important in explaining why IT makes a good leading 
sector, then this is an important implication for other developing countries. IT, as a 
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product or as a production technology, will have these same features in other 
developing countries. This means that an IT sector may well be able to play a similar 
role there to the role that which the thesis has documented in India. If so, this case 
study adds an important strand to the literature on IT and development. That 
literature, perhaps not surprisingly, given its paucity of meso- or macro-level 
empirical evidence (as documented in Chapter 2), is far from any consensus on what 
IT can or will do in developing countries. Section 2.2.2 documented that some authors 
believe that IT may not be appropriate for developing countries (Miller, 2001; Mody 
and Dahlman, 1992). Even amongst those that reject this position there is a wide 
divergence of opinion on how IT can help. On the one hand, the mainstream literature 
holds that IT helps development because it complements free markets and trade 
liberalisation (International Monetary Fund 2001: 136; Miller, 2001; Mody and 
Dahlman 1992: 1706). On the other hand, specialist literature, such as Information 
Technology for Development, rejects this position on the grounds that it is a-
contextual and includes little about the processes that actually take place in 
developing countries (Avgerou, 2003: 383). This latter literature, instead, focuses on 
contextual case-study evidence which, whilst rich, has a narrow geographical and 
empirical scope and rarely makes conclusions about the economy-wide impact of IT 
(Avgerou, 2008). Against this uncertainty, the current research is important because it 
documents a clear process by which IT can affect growth in developing countries. IT 
technology is appropriate because it is amenable to use in automating and upgrading 
production in developing countries with large middle classes. A leading IT-producing 
sector is a reliable mechanism by which to start and maintain the processes which 
bring this outcome about.  
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Another implication of the special features of IT identified in this section is that other 
products, with some or all of these same special features, may also make a good 
leading sector. This suggests the creation of a checklist of attributes against which to 
judge any potential leading sector. If the research is a good guide, one attribute of 
such a product or technology is that it be relatively new, so that demand is strong and 
growing. If innovation means falling prices at the same time as increasing quality, so 
much the better. The product or technology should be pervasive, or at least multi-
purpose, so that it has many potential buyers, and so that forward linkages can be 
numerous. Finally, if the product or technology is productivity-enhancing and 
undergoing rapid technical change, it may be able to put its linked sectors onto the 
high road. In this case, the sector’s linkages can lead to sustainable growth and 
catching-up with technologies in use in developed countries. This is not a short list, 
and it is not easy to find products or technologies that completely fit these attributes. 
Perhaps leading sectors can be found in products or technologies with only some of 
these attributes. If, however, all are needed, it suggests the need for developing 
countries to focus on products or technologies, like IT, which can be described as 
“revolutionary” (David, 1990; International Monetary Fund, 2001; Nolan, 2001: 134; 
Perez, 1985). Citing Britain for steam, America for oil, and South East Asia for IT 
hardware, Perez (2001) argues these historical “revolutionary” technologies did, in 
fact, carry at least one developing country to a much wealthier status. Although Perez 
does not use the terminology of leading sectors, she sums up that developing countries 
that make an early entrance into production of a “revolutionary” technology gain a 
rare chance to leap forward, development-wise.  
 
Taking this idea to its natural conclusion leads to a policy recommendation for 
developing countries to now begin to plant the seeds of a comparative advantage in 
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whatever the next “revolutionary” technology will be. A recent article by Kuper 
(2011) suggests a novel strategy. Citing the proliferation of models of Tintin’s rocket 
in the offices of astronauts whose work got us to the moon and the accuracy with 
which Orwell’s 1984 imagined Korea under communism, he suggests looking to 
science fiction as a guide to the future. In 2011, this might lead to building 
capabilities in nano-technology, or at least investing in the education of physicists or 
biologists who might play a similar role to India’s engineers in the next nano-enabled 
“revolution”.  
 
Figure 8.3: Herge, Destination moon. A predictor of the first moon landing?  
 
 
Source: Herge (1950) 
 
While not as adventurous as Kuper’s suggestion to look toward science fiction, the 
next section sets out avenues for useful research arising from the research project.   
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8.3 An agenda for further research 
 
Addressing the limitations of this study 
 
Understanding the role of all the linkages between one particular sector and all 
possible other sectors throughout an extremely large developing country like India is a 
considerable endeavour and one which will only be fully completed through on-going 
research. This section identifies several areas in which the current work’s conclusions 
would be strengthened by further attention. The most significant of these is a 
consideration of the informal IT sector and its impact on small- and medium-size 
client firms throughout India. As quoted in Chapter 7, Dennis Rajakumar (25 
February 2009, Bangalore) suggested that the informal (i.e., unregistered with the 
GOI) IT sector does important work for these particular firms, including researching 
the firms’ needs and developing software designed specifically for them. If this 
assertion is verified by further research, it could show that informal IT firms are 
having an important additional effect on macro-level outcomes. On the other hand, the 
informal sector may display different attributes, and may be more or less effective, 
than the official IT sector researched in this thesis. These are issues worthy of 
investigation, if estimates of the percent of informal employment in India’s economy 
are a guide to the share of the informal IT sector. Naik (2009:9) estimates that in 
2004-05, 86% of employment in the country took place in unregistered firms. 
 
Another set of avenues to explore for extensions of the current work arise from a 
paucity of official data on some of the issues covered in the thesis. The most 
important of these is the weakness of official data on the size, growth, and activities 
of the IT sector itself. The thesis has relied heavily on NASSCOM’s data on the size 
of the sector and on its activities. Chapter 4 provided verification of its data and a 
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discussion of the methods used; however, it is clear that NASSCOM’s remit is to be 
persuasive in particular directions. How much this affects what is contained in 
NASSCOM’s research and publications remains unclear because there is no 
comprehensive official source for comparison. A related issue concerns the analysis in 
Chapter 5 of India’s input–output tables. The discussion in that chapter revealed what 
appeared to be serious concerns regarding the official estimates of where output from 
the SWIS and ITES-BPO sectors was used. This uncertainty is compounded by the 
frustratingly slow speed at which additional years are published by the GOI. At the 
time of this writing, the most recent input–output tables available are five years old. 
This not only makes it difficult to verify the earlier figures or to match trends with 
other data sources, it also renders the estimates of direct and indirect linkages arising 
from the tables as already out of date.  
 
There are also areas which merit further attention but which were not fully 
investigated during the project because of its limited size and, so, necessarily its 
limited scope. The first of these is on backwards linkages. It would be beneficial to 
undertake newer research on these linkages. The discussion on this issue in Chapter 5 
relied heavily on NASSCOM and CRISIL (2007). Their research, in turn, relied on a 
single survey of SWIS+ITES-BPO spending patterns and India’s 1997-98 input–
output tables. The second is that there is little consideration within the thesis of 
Hirschman’s third type of linkage: entrained wants. Chapter 6 argued that the middle 
class in India are desirous of IT-intensive products, which may be a result of using 
and seeing SWIS from the sector. However, it was not possible to research this 
linkage in any meaningful way during the timeframe of this thesis. The third 
limitation is that ITES-BPO is also an under-researched area. It was argued in Chapter 
4 that this is often misclassified as an IT-producing sector, when, in fact, it is better 
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thought of as an IT-buying sector. However, many of the processes documented in 
Chapter 6 as being important in the expansion of Indian IT-intensive industries do not 
apply to ITES-BPO, because it is significantly more export-oriented. This means that 
the rise of large middle-class markets in India is less important to their IT use than the 
needs of Western clients.  
 
Research that would extend the boundaries of the current project is not the only next 
step suggested by this thesis. Throughout the preceding chapters, there were questions 
which arose but were not fully investigated. The remainder of this section sets out a 
plan to rectify these omissions. It re-visits where this project intersected with other 
pertinent themes, and it outlines an agenda for further research. This begins with a 
discussion of the implications of increasing returns to scale arising from the use of IT.  
 
Big is bountiful? IT, increasing returns, and growth  
 
For all the investment into and interest in IT over the past 30 years, the nature of the 
technology and, in particular, how IT works in production is under-studied in the 
literature on economics. The “productivity paradox” literature, reviewed in Chapter 2, 
includes a large number of publications interested in the impact of IT in production, 
but very few delve into what is different in the production methods and capabilities of 
firms that install it. Instead, these contributions generally treat “the firm” as a black 
box. In goes IT and other inputs, and out comes telephone services or online banking. 
This thesis has demonstrated that this is an area worthy of more investigation. Even in 
the limited timeframe available for this project, striking findings have arisen from 
studying what happens to the process of production when Indian firms use IT. Chapter 
6 showed that economies of scale arise from the use of software in production as 
firms grow. It also highlighted two other beneficial scale effects within the firm: 
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conscious learning by doing in systems, and improved co-ordination to postpone 
decreasing returns to scale as firms grow. These beneficial scale effects may be the 
first of many important generalities that can be drawn from study of the economic 
properties of IT as a production technology. Increasing returns to scale may also be 
important in more ways than those documented here so far.  
 
One possibility in this latter direction is the prospect that the features of software, and 
how it is used in firms, can lead to a form of endogenous growth. De (2007) has 
begun work which revolves around this insight. He set up an endogenous-growth 
model with the important feature that software acts a special type of capital, alongside 
traditional and human capital. In it, the “free copy” property of software code (see 
Chapter 6) generates endogenous growth because software companies can sell the 
software they produce to other industries whilst keeping a copy for themselves at no 
additional cost. This increases output but still allows software firms to re-use a 
proportion of the software. It means that in the next period, the software industry can 
produce and sell more software than in the first, without having to increase its input 
needs. De applies his theoretical model to India, and argues that his mechanism may 
be able to explain both macro-level economic growth and differential growth rates 
amongst states. There are some serious problems with this conclusion, however, not 
the least of which is that domestic consumption of software from the sector was too 
small during period he analyses to be the main driver of the whole economy’s pattern 
of growth. However, the central insight of De’s model is important. If IT-producing 
firms, and those that use IT, can use free, copied, software to give themselves more or 
better knowledge (or inputs) during the following period, this is a valid source of 
endogenous growth. This idea may be able to explain the trajectory of productivity 
and output growth at the micro- or meso-level in India and elsewhere.  
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Another, perhaps even more, interesting possibility arises from a different theoretical 
model of how increasing returns to scale in the production technology matters. The 
“Big Push” theories of development, introduced by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and 
formalised by Murphy, Schleiffer, and Vishny (1989a, 1989b), postulate that if the 
technology of modern industry displays increasing returns to scale, insufficient 
domestic demand may prevent developing countries from experiencing 
industrialisation. The problem is that until large domestic markets for firms’ final 
products are in place, increasing returns technologies are not viable for use as 
production technologies. This means that modern industry which relies on these 
technologies cannot emerge, and so it cannot hire the workers which could otherwise 
make up the so far lacking domestic markets. The end result is that industrialisation 
does not occur. Murphy, Schleiffer, and Vishny (1989a) say that one way out of this 
trap is for one or several industries to be successful enough to escape the trap, perhaps 
by finding markets for their products abroad. Workers in these industries then 
constitute a source of domestic demand, which then enables other industries to invest 
in technologies requiring a large scale to be viable. These other sectors then also 
escape the trap. They can add more workers to the pool of domestic demand, so that 
more and more industries invest, and a launch into industrialised growth can occur.  
 
It is possible that a similar narrative around software and automation, not machinery 
and factories, applies to India in the modern era. The pattern of economic growth 
since the 1980s in India has, as described in Chapter 1, predominantly benefited the 
middle class. This segment of society has now become a large domestic market for 
IT-intensive products. As described in Chapter 6, this, in turn, has enabled many IT-
intensive sectors to invest in the technology for the first time, particularly because IT 
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firms have assisted their clients by sharing the risks. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, it 
has also meant that many IT-intensive sectors have experienced an expansion. Where 
the need for more research arises is in understanding whether these sectors actually 
hire more workers as a result of their IT-enabled expansions. If so, the Big Push 
model may apply, and India might witness a growth take-off, accompanied by a 
restructuring of the economy in favour of IT-intensive sectors. This would validate 
the ideas of authors, primarily in the business press, who put forward the idea that the 
Indian middle class will be central to a consumption-led economic growth take-off 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2008: 1; Deutsche Bank, 2010). On the other hand, though, in 
the 1990s, there were concerns in the literature about a low-employment elasticity of 
IT- and services-led growth in India (Joshi, 2004). If anaemic employment growth 
remains the norm, then even the important addition to a Big Push narrative made 
here—an enabling technology with increasing returns to scale—will not turn it into a 
compelling bet. 
 
These issues around increasing returns in IT are not only relevant in India. The 
observation made in Chapter 6, that economies of scale, alongside large consumer 
markets, made the technology appropriate for India, might also be important in other 
large developing countries. Even if this is not the case, one or both of the two 
applications of increasing returns to scale in IT introduced in this sub-section may be 
relevant. More research is needed, particularly in China and Brazil, which each have 
large and thriving domestic markets for SWIS (Arora and Gambardella, 2005). If 
increasing returns to IT are important in explaining investment in these countries, and 
if IT in these countries is as important in driving economic expansion as it is in India, 
this strand of research could yield important dividends. Existing cross-country 
research already reveals that these three countries (India, China and Brazil) are 
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influential outliers without which the cross country relationship between IT 
investment per worker and GDP growth per worker would be much weaker (Figure 
8.4). Going forward, it is conceivable that increasing returns to scale in the production 
technology may eventually be found to be part of the reason for these three countries’ 
strong performance in the IT era (World Development Indicators, 2010).  
 
Figure 8.4: IT investment Growth per worker and GDP Growth per worker 
 
Source: Kraemer and Dedrick (2002: 264) 
 
Of course, this relevance to other large developing countries depends on their 
implementations of IT being of equal quality as those studied in this thesis. The next 
section picks up on this issue by advocating further investigation around why Indian 
SWIS is so effective in producing productivity and output improvements. It focuses 
on how and why learning about the use of IT has been transferred from the West to 
India by the actions of the Indian IT sector.  
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SWIS outsourcing and knowledge transfer 
 
Chapter 7 provided evidence that the SWIS sector is an important conduit of tacit 
knowledge about IT from developed countries to Indian firms. This knowledge was 
argued to be an important driver of success in IT projects in India. Because IT firms 
possess experience gained from the developed countries, they are able to replicate 
complicated and useful applications of the technologies which have emerged from 
years of experimentation by Western firms. This means that Indian firms do not have 
to repeat the experimentation phase or make the costly mistakes inevitably involved. 
In some cases, such as mobile telecommunications or banking, interviewees reported 
that Indian systems are better than those in place in developed countries. In these 
cases Indian firms have been able to learn from Western applications of IT, and then 
improve them by using more current versions of the technology itself. This parity, and 
even surpassing of Western technology, may have huge ramifications. When use of 
technology is an important determinant of competitive advantage, implementation of 
superior systems can lead to an opportunity to dominate in world markets. As an 
example of this type of effect, Chapter 6 noted the fast growth of Bharti–Airtel in 
supplying mobile telephones in many countries.  
 
If India’s catching-up or surpassing of Western technologies continues to occur as a 
result of the SWIS sector delivering Western learning to Indian firms, this case study 
will add significantly to the literature on development. Such success stories are rare, 
and always have been. Historically, there is a long list of publications which 
document how difficult it is to bring about technological catching-up in developing 
countries and question how and why successes can be brought about (Chang 2008; 
Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon, 2005; Kaplinsky, 2000; List, 1856). More recently, 
a new question on learning and technological catching-up specifically as a result of 
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outsourcing relationships has spawned a new literature which reflects the same 
difficulties. This new literature, which takes the supply chain, or Global Value Chain 
(GVC), for a particular finished product as the unit of analysis, contains two different 
types of case study. On the one hand, there are rare cases in which developing-country 
firms supply products or services to Western firms, and then are able to learn from 
these buyers (e.g., Gereffi, 1999). On the other hand though, there are far more case 
studies which document developing-country firms joining global supply chains, only 
to find themselves unable to improve their processes (e.g., Dolan and Humphrey, 
2000). The current case study, suitably extended, may be an important one because it 
has the potential to add interesting arguments to the debate which has arisen around 
what makes a particular case a success or failure, in terms of learning (e.g., Gereffi, 
Humphrey, and Sturgeon, 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz. 2000). If so, it may also 
contribute to the larger debate about when and how developing countries can catch up 
technologically with Western countries. 
 
There is a need for caution here, though. Several of the interviewees in the 2009 
fieldwork testified that, so far, Indian firms are only just beginning to work with the 
IT sector. Much could change as India’s IT buying firms reach maturity, so it will be 
important to monitor whether later purchases are on the technological frontier. It will 
also be important to see whether other developing countries can surpass Western 
applications of IT, and perhaps even outperform their competitors in India. The 
subject explored in the next sub-section is of clear relevance to India’s potential 
position in this conceivable future race, and argues for more research on the second 
cause of investment into SWIS: sector-specific reform. 
 
Industrial policy by stealth? Reform in India’s IT-intensive sectors 
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Chapter 6 introduced a role for sector-specific reform in prompting investment, and 
documented evidence which showed that liberal policies by the GOI were an 
underlying cause of slow growth in forward linkages both before and after 2005–06. It 
also delved into why government reform led to this investment. What emerged was a 
clear corroboration of the effects of reform expected by India’s policymakers 
(Virmani, 2006). In the experience of the experts interviewed, the sequence and style 
of sector-by-sector reform led to investment and technology improvements as each 
sector was targeted. In a first wave of “pro-business” reforms, a targeted sector was 
helped to invest and upgrade with protective barriers. This particular approach to 
reform gave a window of opportunity for Indian firms to prepare prior to the 
introduction of competition from foreign companies. It was the forewarning that such 
competition was coming, combined with the opportunities presented by pro-business 
policies that prompted and, perhaps, compelled firms to invest. Without upgrades to 
the quality and value that they could offer consumers, the coming foreign competition 
might have eroded, or even eclipsed, incumbents’ market share. 
 
It was argued in Chapter 6 that this was a strange narrative to arise from a program of 
ostensibly liberal reforms. Usually, reforms have the intention of rolling back the 
influence of the state and ending interventionist industrial policy. Here though, the 
protectionist barriers allowed room for India’s firms to upgrade and invest, and the 
GOI used the threat of international competition to compel firms to undertake these 
steps. In other words, the government managed to create successful infant industry-
type policies, whilst ostensibly carrying out only a gradual scheme of liberal reform. 
This is an interpretation of India’s liberalisation that is a far cry from that of Jenkins 
(1999). He argued that India’s reform process was a introduced suddenly, was 
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initiated by the bureaucracy and occurred as a result of many behind the scenes 
activities and decision-making processes, and he famously labelled the process 
‘liberalisation by stealth’. If a closer inspection of reforms in sectors using IT, instead 
verifies the chain of events which have been identified here as the cause of investment 
in IT-intensive industries, a better description would be ‘intervention by stealth’.  
 
If this process can indeed be verified it could be very useful knowledge for other 
developing countries. The gradual and carefully sequenced reform in India took place 
in a period during which policy makers had committed not to intervene in particular 
sectors (Pederson, 2000: 276). This is a commitment that has also been made in many 
other developing countries around the world. Intervention by stealth, according to the 
research here, may be feasible for other countries; in particular, “pro-business” 
deregulations, privatisations, and reductions in the share of government firms, in 
particular sectors, are aligned with the wider liberalisation agenda. The threat and 
eventual enactment of “pro-market”, or trade liberalisation policies, are exactly those 
that international or domestic constituencies for neo-liberalism require. 
 
There is a possibility that the PROWESS database introduced in Chapter 7 could be 
used to provide a wider exploration of these issues than was possible from the limited 
experiences of the experts who took part in this project. For example, it is possible to 
perform a similar analysis to that found in Aghion et al. (2005), which focussed on the 
impact of reform in manufacturing industries in the 1980s. A new analysis using the 
PROWESS data could look for significant increases in investment, both into SWIS 
and into other forms of capital, as reform is enacted. A finding that the response to 
“pro-business” reform was stronger than the response to “pro-market” reform might 
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verify the chain of events explained. Other, alternative hypotheses about the effect of 
reform, should also be investigated.  
 
Using collected data in new ways 
 
An investigation of reform in IT-intensive sectors is not the only possible use of the 
PROWESS database, which could well yield interesting results, given more time and 
attention. The most obvious additional investigation is suggested in Chapter 7. The 
size and scope of the PROWESS database means that it is possible to look at the 
impact of IT, including outsourced SWIS, in a much more disaggregated way than 
that included here. In particular, it seems that services sectors and manufacturing 
sectors get different returns from their purchases of IT, and there may also be 
differences between sectors within these wider divisions. The stochastic frontier 
modelling in chapter 7 also opens up additional avenues for investigation. In 
particular it would be interesting to identify other factors, apart from SWIS use, that 
improve the technical efficiency of Indian firms. Another possibility arises from the 
fact that PROWESS includes measures of outsourcing of components and/or business 
services. This enables an analysis of the impact of non-IT outsourcing in the same 
vein as those reviewed in Section 2.2.3. What this analysis would add to that literature 
is the second ever investigation of outsourcing from developing country firms rather 
than from the United States or Europe105.  
 
Apart from the collation of the PROWESS dataset, the research project included the 
production of a large number of charts illustrating the data that describes the current 
case study. In many cases, these charts were put together through detailed collation of 
                                                 
105
 According to a fairly extensive literature review, and with the understanding that Banga and Goldar 
(2004) is the only other publication that would fall into this category. 
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data in disparate publications. In at least one case this effort in creating a more 
complete picture illuminated something which had been missed by the literature. This 
is the long time series of the size of the domestic market for SWIS (see Figure 5.15). 
This chart illustrated for the first time that the sector has been growing very quickly 
since 2005-06. An added bonus to the production of these charts is that the data 
collated in this thesis may be used elsewhere, without other researchers needing to sift 
through the individual sources. 
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8.4 Epilogue: On happy endings  
“About midnight in they came, dancing and skipping, hopped round the room, 
and then went to sit down to their work as usual; but when they saw the 
clothes lying for them, they laughed and chuckled, and seemed mightily 
delighted. 
“Then they dressed themselves in the twinkling of an eye, and danced and 
capered and sprang about, as merry as could be; till at last they danced out at 
the door, and away over the green.” 
Brothers Grimm, The Elves and the Shoemaker, (1912) 
 
Fairytales like the Elves and the Shoemaker always have a ”happy ever after”, and 
here at the end of the thesis is the time to assess whether the story of the IT sector in 
India might also have one. The thesis has found that progress so far has been strong. 
The volume and nature of purchasing by the IT industry and its employees is such that 
it creates jobs and improves opportunities, even amongst the most disadvantaged. 
More importantly, like the Grimm’s elves, some of India’s firms have begun to use 
the sector to clothe themselves with top quality IT. So far the firms that have been 
done so also have reason to be “mightily delighted”. The IT that they have purchased 
is bringing strong productivity and output improvements. In 2011, though, it is still 
too early to write ‘happy ever after’ and close the book. Many Indian firms have not 
yet bought IT from the sector, and those that have still have many processes yet to be 
automated. There continue to be possible events that could thwart the continuation of 
the current IT trend in India. However, there also continue to be possible 
developments that could accelerate its processes and expand the benefits.  
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If India is to experience a continuation or acceleration of the current narrative towards 
a happy conclusion, a host of factors identified as important will need to persist. The 
intrinsic characteristics of the technology, its pervasiveness, its capacity to bring 
increasing returns to scale, and its tradable nature will remain, regardless. As time 
goes on though, the scope for continued innovation in the technology and, 
consequently, for its continued ability to raise productivity may turn out to be limited. 
This might lead to a diminution in the strong demand both abroad and at home that 
have bought the sector to where it is today. The continuation of the current success 
story relies on the on-going successful interplay between government policies and 
private sector actions. Unfortunately, this includes controversial policies on the part of 
the government. The actions which supported the IT sector, both before its inception 
and in its early years, are more difficult to justify now that the sector is both large and 
profitable. Nevertheless, the promotion of tertiary, rather than primary, education, and 
the continuation of sector tax breaks and infrastructure provision will continue to be 
important for its future growth. On the prospects for maintaining and expanding 
forward linkages, private sector firms in potential IT-using industries will need to 
continue to play their part. This will in turn depend on both the GOI and firms that 
hire workers continuing to act in ways that favour the middle classes and lead to 
expansions in their numbers. IT firms also need to remain willing to invest in their 
clients businesses by paying the up-front costs of systems in pay-per-use deals. Before 
long, it will also become important for IT firms to find a way to get economies of 
scale across small and medium companies, or, at a minimum, outside of large ones.  
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If enough of these things come to pass in the coming years, India’s IT sector will 
continue to contribute to the country’s economic expansion, and the story which has 
been begun here may well have a happy ending.  
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Appendix 1: Source Data for Selected Charts 
 
This appendix accompanies Chapters 2 to 8 and contains the source data used in the 
figures, in particular where the numbers are not immediately transparent in the main 
text. The tables included in this appendix are intended as an accompaniment to the 
figures in the main body of the thesis. Please see the respective sources and notes in 
each chapter. 
 
Table A1, for Figure 2.6: GDP Growth Per Annum Attributed to IT in the United States 
 
Source Sample
Percentage Points of GDP 
Growth Attributed to IT 
Use
Oliner and Sichel, 1994 1970-1979 0.0
Oliner and Sichel, 1994 1980-1992 0.2
Jorgensen and Stiroh, 1995 1985-1992 0.2
Sichel, 1997 1987-1993 0.3
Crafts, 2001 1991-1995 0.6
Daveri, 2001 1991-1999 0.9
Oliner and Sichel, 2000 1996-1999 1.1
Crafts, 2001 1996-2000 1.4
 
 
 
Table A2, for Figure 2.7: The Effect of IT on US Labour Productivity Growth, Percentage Points 
 
Source Sample
Percentage Points of Labour 
Productivity Growth Attributed 
to IT Use
Oliner and Sichel, 1994 1980-1992 0.0
Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000 1995-1998 0.7
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2007 1995-2000 1.0
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2002 1995-2000 0.8
Oliner and Sichel, 2000 1996-1999 1.0
Oliner and Sichel, 2002 1996-2001 1.0
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2007 2001-2005 0.6
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Table A3, for Figure 2.8: Share of Total GDP Growth Attributed to IT Use in Developed Countries 
 
Source Country Sample
% of Total GDP 
Growth Attributed to 
IT Use
Colecchia, 2001 Canada 1995-99 10.4%
Daveri, 2001 France 1991-99 21.5%
Colecchia, 2001 France 1995-99 13.8%
Daveri, 2001 Germany 1991-99 31.3%
Colecchia, 2001 Germany 1995-99 17.6%
Daveri, 2001 Italy 1991-99 22.5%
Colecchia, 2001 Italy 1995-99 20.6%
Daveri, 2001 UK 1991-99 29.1%
Colecchia, 2001; Roeger, 2001 UK 1995-99 21.2%
Daveri, 2001 US 1991-99 24.3%
Roeger, 2001 US 1995-99 16.5%
 
 
Table A4, for Figure 2.11: Real GDP for India, 1951–52 to 2010–11 (in 1999–00 prices) 
Year Real GDP Growth Year
Real GDP 
Growth Year
Real GDP 
Growth
1951-52 2.9% 1971-72 1.6% 1991-92 1.1%
1952-53 2.6% 1972-73 -0.5% 1992-93 5.5%
1953-54 6.1% 1973-74 3.3% 1993-94 4.8%
1954-55 4.8% 1974-75 1.2% 1994-95 6.7%
1955-56 3.2% 1975-76 9.1% 1995-96 7.6%
1956-57 5.6% 1976-77 1.7% 1996-97 7.6%
1957-58 -0.4% 1977-78 7.3% 1997-98 4.1%
1958-59 7.4% 1978-79 5.7% 1998-99 6.2%
1959-60 2.6% 1979-80 -5.2% 1999-00 7.4%
1960-61 5.5% 1980-81 6.7% 2000-01 4.0%
1961-62 3.7% 1981-82 6.0% 2001-02 5.2%
1962-63 2.9% 1982-83 3.5% 2002-03 3.8%
1963-64 6.0% 1983-84 7.3% 2003-04 8.4%
1964-65 7.5% 1984-85 3.8% 2004-05 8.3%
1965-66 -2.7% 1985-86 5.2% 2005-06 9.3%
1966-67 0.0% 1986-87 4.8% 2006-07 9.7%
1967-68 7.8% 1987-88 4.0% 2007-08 9.1%
1968-69 3.4% 1988-89 9.6% 2008-09 6.1%
1969-70 6.5% 1989-90 6.0% 2009-10 7.9%
1970-71 5.2% 1990-91 5.5% 2010-11 8.3%
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Table A5, for Figure 2.13: Sector-wise Composition of Real GDP in India (1999–00 prices)  
Year
% of GDP 
for Primary 
Sector
% of GDP for 
Secondary 
Sector
% of GDP for 
Tertiary Sector
1980-81 39.9% 22.0% 38.0%
1981-82 39.8% 22.5% 38.0%
1982-83 38.8% 21.8% 39.5%
1983-84 39.3% 22.0% 38.6%
1984-85 38.5% 22.2% 39.4%
1985-86 37.2% 22.2% 40.6%
1986-87 35.8% 22.4% 41.9%
1987-88 34.1% 22.9% 43.0%
1988-89 35.8% 22.4% 41.8%
1989-90 34.4% 22.9% 42.8%
1990-91 34.1% 23.2% 42.8%
1991-92 33.0% 23.0% 44.1%
1992-93 33.3% 22.5% 44.2%
1993-94 32.5% 22.7% 44.9%
1994-95 32.1% 23.3% 44.6%
1995-96 29.8% 24.3% 45.8%
1996-97 30.2% 24.1% 45.6%
1997-98 28.5% 23.9% 47.7%
1998-99 28.3% 23.3% 48.2%
1999-00 27.3% 23.0% 49.7%
2000-01 26.2% 23.5% 50.3%
2001-02 26.2% 22.8% 51.0%
2002-03 23.7% 23.5% 52.8%
2003-04 23.9% 23.4% 52.7%
2004-05 22.4% 24.0% 53.4%
2005-06 21.6% 24.3% 54.0%
2006-07 20.6% 24.6% 54.8%
2007-08 19.8% 24.4% 55.7%
2008-09 18.9% 23.9% 57.3%
2009-10 16.9% 25.8% 57.3%
2010-11 16.6% 25.7% 57.7%
 
Table A6, for Figure 2.17: Income Distribution of Indian Households 1989–90 and 1998–99 
1989-90 1998-99
Up to US$850 58.8% 47.9%
US$850 - US$1,700 26.9% 41.7%
US$1,700 - US$2,500 10.1% 16.8%
US$2,500 - US$3,400 2.7% 7.5%
Above US$3,400 1.4% 6.9%
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Table A7, for Figure 2.18: Income Distribution of Indian Households 2002 and 2010 
 
2002 2010
< US$2,000 72.0% 61.4%
US$2,000 - US$4,200 22.0% 40.1%
US$4,200 - US$10,500 5.0% 11.8%
> US$10,500 1.0% 4.7%
 
 
Table A8, for Figure 3.1: Revenue of Indian IT Sector (HW, SWIS, ITES-BPO) 
Year Total Revenue of IT Sector (US$m) Year
Total Revenue of IT 
Sector (US$m)
1985-86   $234 1998-99   $5,041
1986-87   $302 1999-00   $7,679
1987-88   $394 2000-01   $11,675
1988-89   $547 2001-02   $14,744
1989-90   $720 2002-03   $18,864
1990-91   $784 2003-04   $21,500
1991-92   $924 2004-05   $28,000
1992-93   $1,064 2005-06   $37,408
1993-94   $1,269 2006-07   $47,883
1994-95   $1,602 2007-08   $64,119
1995-96   $2,296 2008-09   $71,669
1996-97   $3,091 2009-10   $77,643
1997-98   $4,342 2010-11(E) $92,322
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Table A9, for Figure 3.2: India’s GDP with IT Sector Output (Current US$, millions) 
 
Year Remainder of the Economy (US$ Millions)
IT Sector       
(US$ Millions) Share of GDP
1985-86 $227,306 $234 0.1%
1986-87 $249,447 $302 0.1%
1987-88 $275,836 $394 0.1%
1988-89 $304,548 $547 0.2%
1989-90 $299,878 $720 0.2%
1990-91 $324,730 $784 0.2%
1991-92 $287,643 $924 0.3%
1992-93 $289,281 $1,064 0.4%
1993-94 $274,081 $1,269 0.5%
1994-95 $322,156 $1,602 0.5%
1995-96 $365,323 $2,296 0.6%
1996-97 $386,041 $3,091 0.8%
1997-98 $416,137 $4,342 1.0%
1998-99 $419,322 $5,041 1.2%
1999-00 $445,701 $7,679 1.7%
2000-01 $456,128 $11,675 2.5%
2001-02 $468,231 $14,744 3.1%
2002-03 $486,197 $18,864 3.7%
2003-04 $569,851 $21,500 3.6%
2004-05 $666,980 $28,000 4.0%
2005-06 $775,913 $37,408 4.6%
2006-07 $862,981 $47,883 5.3%
2007-08 $1,079,766 $64,119 5.6%
2008-09 $1,212,050 $71,669 5.6%
2009-10 $1,295,531 $77,643 5.7%
2010-11(E) $1,394,825 $92,322 6.2%
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Table A10, for Figure 3.3: IT Sector’s Contribution to GDP Growth (%) 
 
Year GDP Growth ($US, m)
IT Growth 
($US, m)
IT's Share of 
GDP Growth
1995-96 $43,861 $694 1.6%
1996-97 $21,513 $795 3.7%
1997-98 $31,347 $1,251 4.0%
1998-99 $3,885 $699 18.0%
1999-00 $29,017 $2,638 9.1%
2000-01 $14,424 $3,996 27.7%
2001-02 $15,172 $3,069 20.2%
2002-03 $22,086 $4,120 18.7%
2003-04 $86,290 $2,636 3.1%
2004-05 $103,629 $6,500 6.3%
2005-06 $118,340 $9,408 7.9%
2006-07 $97,543 $10,475 10.7%
2007-08 $233,022 $16,236 7.0%
2008-09 $139,834 $7,550 5.4%
2009-10 $89,454 $5,974 6.7%
2010-11(E) $113,973 $14,679 12.9%
 
 
Table A11, for Figure 3.4: Employment in the IT Sector 1993-94 to 2008-09   
 
Year IT Professionals Employed
1992-93 71,300
1993-94 93,040
1994-95 114,780
1995-96 136,520
1996-97 158,260
1997-98 180,000
1998-99 230,000
1999-00 284,000
2000-01 430,114
2001-02 622,250
2002-03 670,000
2003-04 880,000
2004-05 1,068,000
2005-06 1,283,000
2006-07 1,621,000
2007-08 2,010,000
2008-09 2,236,614
2009-10 2,300,000
2010-11(E) 2,540,000
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Table A12, for Figure 3.5: India’s Exports with IT Sector Exports 
 
Year Total IT Sector Exports
All Other 
Exports IT's Share
1985-86   $52 $8,853 0.6%
1986-87   $73 $9,672 0.7%
1987-88   $91 $11,998 0.8%
1988-89   $167 $13,803 1.2%
1989-90   $243 $16,370 1.5%
1990-91   $233 $17,912 1.3%
1991-92   $297 $17,569 1.7%
1992-93   $361 $18,176 1.9%
1993-94   $489 $21,749 2.2%
1994-95   $662 $25,669 2.5%
1995-96   $769 $31,026 2.4%
1996-97   $1,371 $32,099 4.1%
1997-98   $1,960 $33,046 5.6%
1998-99   $2,604 $30,615 7.8%
1999-00   $4,613 $32,209 12.5%
2000-01   $7,337 $37,224 16.5%
2001-02   $9,435 $34,392 21.5%
2002-03   $12,239 $40,480 23.2%
2003-04   $13,400 $50,443 21.0%
2004-05   $18,100 $65,436 21.7%
2005-06   $24,189 $78,902 23.5%
2006-07   $31,677 $94,737 25.1%
2007-08   $40,930 $121,974 25.1%
2008-09   $47,339 $137,956 25.5%
2009-10 $50,118 $128,545 28.1%
2010-11 $59,380 $186,220 24.2%
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Table A13, for Figure 3.8: The Indian IT Sector by Its Component Industries  
Year SWIS Hardware ITES-BPO
1985-86   $81 $153
1986-87   $108 $194
1987-88   $130 $264
1988-89   $160 $387
1989-90   $191 $529
1990-91   $243 $541
1991-92   $327 $598
1992-93   $410 $654
1993-94   $558 $711
1994-95   $835 $767
1995-96   $1,224 $1,072
1996-97   $1,755 $1,336
1997-98   $2,936 $1,406
1998-99   $4,011 $1,030
1999-00   $5,539 $1,536 $604
2000-01   $8,298 $2,377 $1,000
2001-02   $9,958 $3,218 $1,568
2002-03   $12,455 $4,059 $2,350
2003-04   $13,200 $4,900 $3,400
2004-05   $17,200 $5,600 $5,200
2005-06   $23,110 $7,084 $7,214
2006-07   $29,921 $8,455 $9,507
2007-08   $39,616 $11,997 $12,506
2008-09   $44,778 $12,107 $14,784
2009-10 $49,066 $13,923 $14,654
2010-11(E) $59,401 $16,012 $16,910
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Table A14, for Figure 3.9: Software and IT Services Revenue, Domestic vs. Exports, 1985-86 to 
2003-04 
 
Year SWIS Revenue ($m)
Domestic Share 
(%)
1985-86   $81 70.4%
1986-87   $108 63.9%
1987-88   $130 60.0%
1988-89   $160 58.1%
1989-90   $191 47.6%
1990-91   $243 47.3%
1991-92   $348 44.1%
1992-93   $453 40.9%
1993-94   $558 40.9%
1994-95   $835 41.9%
1995-96   $1,224 40.0%
1996-97   $1,755 38.2%
1997-98   $2,936 40.1%
1998-99   $4,011 35.2%
1999-00   $5,539 28.5%
2000-01   $8,298 25.1%
2001-02   $9,958 23.2%
2002-03   $12,455 22.2%
 
 
Table A15, for Figure 3.10: Cost of IT Labour in India, the US and the UK in 1995 
US UK India
Project Leader $54,000 $39,000 $23,000
Systems Designer $55,000 $34,000 $11,000
Development Programmer $41,000 $29,000 $8,000
Quality Assurance Specialist $50,000 $33,000 $14,000
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Table A16, for Figure 4.6: Comparison of NASSCOM and IDC Figures on the IT Sector for 2006 
 
NASSCOM 2005-06 IDC 2006 NASSCOM 2006-07
Domestic $13,219 $15,462 $16,206
Exports $24,189 $29,397 $31,677
Total $37,408 $44,859 $47,883
 
 
Table A16, for Figure 5.1: Private Equity & Venture Capital Funding in India 
 
Value of Deals 
($USm)
Number of 
Deals
1996 $20 5
1997 $80 18
1998 $250 60
1999 $500 107
2000 $1,160 280
 
Table A17, for Figure 5.5: Enrolments in Higher Education in Engineering 
 
Year
Enrolment in Higher 
Education in  
Engineering Year
Enrolment in Higher 
Education in  
Engineering 
1970-71 87,257 1988-89 201,289
1971-72 82,804 1989-90 209,371
1972-73 82,674 1990-91 216,837
1973-74 86,665 1991-92 258,028
1974-75 90,685 1992-93 271,213
1975-76 96,067 1993-94 285,045
1976-77 100,040 1994-95 299,583
1977-78 103,706 1995-96 315,720
1978-79 111,659 1996-97 331,017
1979-80 118,607 1997-98 346,833
1980-81 128,937 1998-99 363,481
1981-82 130,189 1999-00 389,001
1982-83 142,440 2000-01 529,469
1983-84 153,131 2001-02 605,597
1984-85 159,046 2002-03 692,087
1985-86 176,540 2003-04 716,652
1986-87 183,966 2004-05 754,635
1987-88 192,148 2005-06 795,120
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Table A18, for Figure 5.10: Domestic Output from IT Firms’ and Workers’ expenditures in 
2005-06 (Rs. Bn) 
 
Indirect Direct Total
Via IT Firms' Operating Expenditures Rs. 267.9 Rs. 309.9 Rs. 577.8
Via IT Firms' Capital Expenditures Rs. 61.9 Rs. 63.9 Rs. 125.8
Via IT Workers' Consumption Rs. 108.0 Rs. 96.0 Rs. 204.0
Total Rs. 437.8 Rs. 469.8 Rs. 907.6
 
 
Table A19, for Figure 5.13: Software Exports from Orissa 
Software Exports from 
Orissa (Rs. Crore)
1996-97 Rs. 0.0
1997-98 Rs. 5.0
1998-99 Rs. 53.0
1999-00 Rs. 89.0
2000-01 Rs. 200.0
2001-02 Rs. 213.0
2002-03 Rs. 260.0
2003-04 Rs. 315.0
2004-05 Rs. 400.0
2005-06 Rs. 465.0
2006-07 Rs. 800.0
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Table A20, for Figure 5.15: SWIS Revenue for Indian IT Sector from Domestic Market, Current 
Rs. Crore 
 
Domestic IT Services 
Revenue (Rs. Crore) Growth (Rs. crore)
1985-86 Rs. 70.5
1986-87 Rs. 87.0 Rs. 16.5
1987-88 Rs. 101.1 Rs. 14.1
1988-89 Rs. 129.4 Rs. 28.4
1989-90 Rs. 147.6 Rs. 18.2
1990-91 Rs. 201.2 Rs. 53.6
1991-92 Rs. 346.4 Rs. 145.1
1992-93 Rs. 493.4 Rs. 147.0
1993-94 Rs. 716.9 Rs. 223.6
1994-95 Rs. 1,098.1 Rs. 381.2
1995-96 Rs. 1,588.6 Rs. 490.5
1996-97 Rs. 2,373.7 Rs. 785.1
1997-98 Rs. 4,274.8 Rs. 1,901.1
1998-99 Rs. 5,822.7 Rs. 1,547.9
1999-00 Rs. 6,789.8 Rs. 967.1
2000-01 Rs. 9,352.0 Rs. 2,562.2
2001-02 Rs. 10,904.6 Rs. 1,552.6
2002-03 Rs. 13,457.1 Rs. 2,552.5
2003-04 Rs. 15,837.8 Rs. 2,380.7
2004-05 Rs. 19,032.9 Rs. 3,195.1
2005-06 Rs. 25,600.1 Rs. 6,567.1
2006-07 Rs. 32,326.6 Rs. 6,726.6
2007-08 Rs. 41,771.6 Rs. 9,445.0
2008-09 Rs. 45,951.5 Rs. 4,179.9
2009-10 Rs. 56,891.7 Rs. 10,940.2
2010-11 E Rs. 65,543.9 Rs. 8,652.2
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Table A21, for Figure 5.19: SWIS Revenue for Indian IT Sector and Share Accounted by 
Domestic Contracts, 1985-86 to 2010-11  
 
Exports Domestic
Domestic Market 
Share %
1985-86 Rs. 24.0 Rs. 57.0 70.4%
1986-87 Rs. 39.0 Rs. 69.0 63.9%
1987-88 Rs. 52.0 Rs. 78.0 60.0%
1988-89 Rs. 67.0 Rs. 93.0 58.1%
1989-90 Rs. 100.0 Rs. 91.0 47.6%
1990-91 Rs. 128.0 Rs. 115.0 47.3%
1991-92 Rs. 173.9 Rs. 152.7 44.1%
1992-93 Rs. 219.8 Rs. 190.3 40.9%
1993-94 Rs. 330.0 Rs. 228.0 40.9%
1994-95 Rs. 485.0 Rs. 350.0 41.9%
1995-96 Rs. 734.0 Rs. 490.0 40.0%
1996-97 Rs. 1,085.0 Rs. 670.0 38.2%
1997-98 Rs. 1,759.0 Rs. 1,177.0 40.1%
1998-99 Rs. 2,600.0 Rs. 1,411.0 35.2%
1999-00 Rs. 3,962.0 Rs. 1,577.0 28.5%
2000-01 Rs. 6,217.0 Rs. 2,081.0 25.1%
2001-02 Rs. 7,647.0 Rs. 2,311.0 23.2%
2002-03 Rs. 9,545.0 Rs. 2,769.0 22.2%
2003-04 Rs. 9,800.0 Rs. 3,400.0 25.8%
2004-05 Rs. 13,000.0 Rs. 4,200.0 24.4%
2005-06 Rs. 17,305.0 Rs. 5,805.0 25.1%
2006-07 Rs. 22,790.0 Rs. 7,131.0 23.8%
2007-08 Rs. 29,500.0 Rs. 10,116.0 25.5%
2008-09 Rs. 34,196.0 Rs. 10,582.0 23.6%
2009-10 Rs. 37,300.0 Rs. 11,765.0 24.0%
2010-11 E Rs. 44,800.0 Rs. 14,601.0 24.6%
 
 
Table A22, for Figure 5.20: Growth in SWIS Revenue by Destination Market 
 
Export Growth Domestic Growth
2001-02 23.0% 11.1%
2002-03 24.8% 19.8%
2003-04 2.7% 22.8%
2004-05 32.7% 23.5%
2005-06 33.1% 38.2%
2006-07 31.7% 22.8%
2007-08 29.4% 41.9%
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Table A23, for Figure 5.21: Destination for Domestic SWIS and ITES-BPO in 2003-04, Current 
Rs Lakh  
 
2003/4 2003/4
Input Output Flow 
Tables
NASSCOM 
Member's Survey
Financial Services Rs. 30,299.0 Rs. 545,527.5
Communications Rs. 412,891.0 Rs. 296,569.6
Retail Rs. 21,717.0 Rs. 15,505.7
Manufacturing Rs. 405,559.0 Rs. 466,357.2
Others Rs. 217,083.0 Rs. 363,563.4
 
 
Table A24, for Figure 5.22: Destination for Domestic SWIS and ITES-BPO in 2006-07, Current 
Rs Lakh  
 
2006/07 2006/07
Input Output Flow 
Tables
NASSCOM 
Member's Survey
Financial Services Rs. 41,040.0 Rs. 1,487,518.5
Communications Rs. 838,125.0 Rs. 689,337.8
Retail Rs. 55,021.0 Rs. 290,247.5
Manufacturing Rs. 946,159.0 Rs. 544,214.1
Others Rs. 292,288.0 Rs. 616,776.0
 
 
Table A25, for Figure 6.6: Indian IT sector revenues from high value export projects, US$ 
millions 
 
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2005-06
Project Based $2,500 $3,200 $7,708
IT Consulting $50 $50 $348
Systems Integration $75 $150 $374
Network Testing and Integration $125 $50 $167
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 (E)
Project Based $9,860 $11,980 $13,327 $13,973
IT Consulting $600 $650 $737 $764
Systems Integration $580 $680 $778 $808
Network Testing and Integration $230 $280 $320 $332
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Table A26, for Figure 7.12: Estimated Growth from SWIS Purchasing by Sector in PROWESS 
Sample 
 
IV-BB Midpoint OLS
Finance (All) 6.9% 9.8% 12.7%
Manufacturing 7.8% 11.2% 14.6%
Communications 16.0% 22.8% 29.7%
Consultants 2.7% 3.8% 5.0%
Couriers 4.3% 6.1% 8.0%
Health 3.6% 5.1% 6.7%
Hotels 11.0% 15.7% 20.4%
ITES-BPO 3.3% 4.6% 6.0%
Media and Films 7.7% 10.9% 14.2%
Other Services 11.2% 15.9% 20.7%
Retail 3.8% 5.4% 7.1%
Tourism 1.9% 2.7% 3.5%
Transport 12.7% 18.2% 23.6%
Wholesale 8.4% 11.9% 15.5%
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Table A21, for Figure 5.19: SWIS Revenue for Indian IT Sector from Domestic Market, Current 
Rs. Crore 
 
Exports Domestic
Domestic Market 
Share %
1985-86 Rs. 24.0 Rs. 57.0 70.4%
1986-87 Rs. 39.0 Rs. 69.0 63.9%
1987-88 Rs. 52.0 Rs. 78.0 60.0%
1988-89 Rs. 67.0 Rs. 93.0 58.1%
1989-90 Rs. 100.0 Rs. 91.0 47.6%
1990-91 Rs. 128.0 Rs. 115.0 47.3%
1991-92 Rs. 173.9 Rs. 152.7 44.1%
1992-93 Rs. 219.8 Rs. 190.3 40.9%
1993-94 Rs. 330.0 Rs. 228.0 40.9%
1994-95 Rs. 485.0 Rs. 350.0 41.9%
1995-96 Rs. 734.0 Rs. 490.0 40.0%
1996-97 Rs. 1,085.0 Rs. 670.0 38.2%
1997-98 Rs. 1,759.0 Rs. 1,177.0 40.1%
1998-99 Rs. 2,600.0 Rs. 1,411.0 35.2%
1999-00 Rs. 3,962.0 Rs. 1,577.0 28.5%
2000-01 Rs. 6,217.0 Rs. 2,081.0 25.1%
2001-02 Rs. 7,647.0 Rs. 2,311.0 23.2%
2002-03 Rs. 9,545.0 Rs. 2,769.0 22.2%
2003-04 Rs. 9,800.0 Rs. 3,400.0 25.8%
2004-05 Rs. 13,000.0 Rs. 4,200.0 24.4%
2005-06 Rs. 17,305.0 Rs. 5,805.0 25.1%
2006-07 Rs. 22,790.0 Rs. 7,131.0 23.8%
2007-08 Rs. 29,500.0 Rs. 10,116.0 25.5%
2008-09 Rs. 34,196.0 Rs. 10,582.0 23.6%
2009-10 Rs. 37,300.0 Rs. 11,765.0 24.0%
2010-11 E Rs. 44,800.0 Rs. 14,601.0 24.6%
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Appendix 2: Details from Econometric Modelling 
 
This appendix accompanies Section 7.2 and contains additional details on the 
econometric estimates of the impact of SWIS outsourcing contained therein. 
A2.1 Data Dictionary 
 
Real Total Output 
The basis of this measure is the PROWESS metric “Total Income” which has the 
following description in their online, context specific, documentation: “Total income 
is the sum of all kinds of incomes generated by an enterprise during an accounting 
period. It represents the sum of the sale of goods and services.” This metric is deflated 
using the following indices: for manufacturing, Reserve Bank of India’s wholesale 
price index for manufactured products; and for services and finance, the GDP deflator 
for those sectors implied in National Accounts Statistics (which are published both in 
real and nominal terms). 
 
Real Net Capital Stock 
 
The basis of this measure is the PROWESS metric “Net Fixed Assets” which has the 
following description in their documentation: “These are total fixed assets that are 
used for producing goods and services and are shown net of accumulated 
depreciation.  These include movable and immovable assets as well as capital work in 
progress, i.e., assets which are in the process of being installed. Net fixed assets 
include capital work-in-progress and re-valued assets, if any.” This metric is deflated 
using the Reserve Bank of India’s wholesale price index for machinery and machine 
tools.  
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Real Net Stock of Computers 
The basis of this measure is the PROWESS metric “Total Net Computers” which has 
the following description in their documentation: “This data field captures the value 
of computers and its peripherals owned by the company or leased by it and is shown 
net of accumulated depreciation.” This metric is deflated using the Reserve Bank of 
India’s wholesale price index for IT hardware.  
 
Real Net Stock of Software Assets 
 
The basis of this measure is the PROWESS metric “Total Net Software Assets” which 
has the following description in their documentation: “Software is a computer 
program, which provides the instructions which enable the computer hardware to 
work. Anything that is not tangible and cannot be touched like the operations, 
programs, and files on a computer is software. This data field captures the value 
software of a company on the last day of the accounting period and is shown net of 
accumulated depreciation.” This metric is deflated by 6% per year, as suggested 
Prud’homme, Sanga, and Yu, (2005)’s price index for software in Canada.  
 
Labour 
The basis of this measure is the PROWESS metric “Employees” which has the 
following description of workers included in their documentation: “Employees 
[include] all kinds of workers and management employees.” According to this metric, 
there are many firms in the PROWESS database with zero employees. It is assumed 
that these are firms with one working director or owner. For the purposes of the 
econometric modelling, 0 in this variable has been replaced with 1. 
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Real Intermediate Inputs 
This is a composite variable which has been constructed as the sum of all intermediate 
inputs to the production process. These include: 
• Real Expenditure on materials; 
• Real Expenditure on energy; 
• Real Expenditure on manufactured components produced outside the firm; 
• and Real Expenditure on outsourced services. 
Each of these components is based on an appropriate field in the PROWESS database 
and each has been deflated using an appropriate price index. For expenditures on 
materials, it is the Reserve Bank of India’s wholesale price index for primary articles. 
For expenditures on energy, the field is the Reserve Bank of India’s wholesale price 
index for fuel and power. For manufactured components, it is the Reserve Bank of 
India’s wholesale price index for manufactured products. For outsourced services, the 
field is the GDP deflator for services sectors implied in MOSPI (2011) (which are 
published both in real and nominal terms). 
 
Real SWIS Outsourcing  
 
The basis of this measure is the PROWESS metric “Expenditure on Software and 
Other Professional Services”. The software part of this metric is defined as “Expenses 
paid by the company to get a piece of software developed from an external 
professional agency. It also includes software maintenance fees, upgradation fees, etc. 
However, it excludes any data-entry work or data-processing work that may have 
been outsourced by the company. These are included separately in ‘IT-enabled 
services charges.’ The “Other Professional Services” part “captures all those expenses 
reported by a company on external professional services engaged by the company for 
services other than for audit, consultancy, software development, IT-enabled services, 
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cost audit and legal services”. This metric is deflated by 6% per year, as suggested 
Prud’homme, Sanga, and Yu’s (2005) price index for software in Canada. 
 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) controls  
 
Included in these controls is, for any given firm, the firm’s age; expenditures on 
research and development; and expenditures on royalties; other controls are sub-sector 
dummies for banks; financial institutions; providers of securities; and wholesalers. 
These measures were all extracted directly from the PROWESS database.  
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A2.2 SWIS and miscellaneous outsourcing by industry  
 
Figure A2.1 shows the size of SWIS and miscellaneous outsourcing by industry in 
2008 as measured by PROWESS’s “Expenditure on Software and Other Professional 
Services”. It shows the top ten industries by mean expenditures per firm on 
outsourcing. For these industries, the figure includes the number of firms in the 
sample that spend more than Rs 1 crore on outsourcing and the total expenditure by 
these firms in Rupees and US dollars. 
 
Figure A2.1: SWIS and Misc. Outsourcing by Sector for 2008, Firms Spending> Rs 1 crore. 
Mean per 
firm (Rs 
Crore)
Number of 
firms 
included
Total in 
sample (Rs 
Crore)
Total in 
sample 
($USm)
Communications 99.2 21 2,084 $529
Banks 16.8 50 841 $213
Chemical 
Manufacturers 16.1 99 1,590 $403
Misc Services 14.0 68 952 $241
Non-bank Financial 
Services 10.3 11 113 $29
Metals Manufacturers 9.8 53 521 $132
Transport Services 7.2 19 136 $35
Securities (Finance) 6.9 19 131 $33
Computer 
Manufacturers 6.4 4 26 $6
Brokers (Finance) 5.9 14 83 $21
 
Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
 
Of the top ten SWIS-buying sub-sectors, four are financial services; three are 
manufacturing; and one each are Communications, Transport Services, and Misc 
Services. This set of industries is very close to the set which is globally known to use 
IT intensively in production. In the United States during the 1990s, finance, 
telecommunications, and equipment manufacturing were widely reported as the most 
intensive users of IT (Baily and Lawrence, 2001: 309; Mann, 2003: 4; Stiroh, 2001: 
19; Triplett, 1999: 318). Similarly, Hanna (1994: 40) shows that banking; finance and 
insurance; IT production; manufacturing; transport and other services were five of the 
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nine industries that comprised between 68% and 94% of IT expenditures in seven 
Asian countries in 1992. It is also consistent with NASSCOM and GOI data on shares 
of the Indian SWIS sector’s revenues in 2006-07 in figure 5.22, chapter 5. 
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A2.3 Summary statistics for key variables  
 
Figure A2.2: Summary Statistics for Key Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Real Gross Output 33,564 Rs. 272.4 Rs. 3,106.2 0.0 Rs. 233,752.9
Employees 33,564 305 3,727 0 320,506
Real Net Capital 33,564 Rs. 100.1 Rs. 1,138.8 0.0 Rs. 74,924.5
Real Net Computer Capital 33,564 Rs. 0.4 Rs. 6.5 0.0 Rs. 520.1
Real Net Software Assets 33,564 Rs. 0.2 Rs. 3.2 0.0 Rs. 192.7
Real Intermediate Inputs 33,564 Rs. 91.7 Rs. 1,201.5 0.0 Rs. 77,427.6
Real SWIS outsourcing 33,564 Rs. 0.9 Rs. 12.2 0.0 Rs. 997.9
 
Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
Notes: Firm-level unweighted statistics over the whole pooled sample (2005–2008). All currency 
figures are in constant 2005 rupees crore. Quantities of capital are shown net of accumulated 
depreciation.  
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A2.4 Stochastic frontier model  
 
Figure A2.3 shows the stochastic frontier model which provided the dependent 
variable in the regression which is the subject of Section 7.1.4. It was estimated using 
a pooled, rather than panel data formulation and under the assumption that -ln(E) (the 
measure of inefficiency) follows an exponential distribution106. The model uses a 
heteroscedasticity robust form for both the inefficiency term and the normal residual. 
The standard error of the inefficiency term is 1.17. 
  
Figure A2.3: Stochastic Frontier Model for Output in the PROWESS Sample 
Dependent Variable is Log of Real Output
Stochastic Frontier estimates
Coefficient Standard Error z
0.053*** 0.002 23.800
0.235*** 0.005 46.760
0.120*** 0.002 78.900
0.018*** 0.001 19.220
Constant Yes
N 33,558
R-Squared 44.7%
Log real capital
Log labour
Log real intermediate Inputs
Log real IT capital
 
 
Source: Author calculations based on CMIE (2009). 
Notes: Stochastic frontier model of equation (7) in section 7.1.1. *** Significantly different from zero 
at the 0.1% level.  
 
 
                                                 
106
 Other distributional assumptions were tested, and found to give similar estimates to those found 
here. 
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